Concept
Foreseeability as the Test
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Foreseeability as the Test
Once a later force has been classified as intervening, the remaining question is whether it also supersedes. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sends that question to a set of rules: whether the active operation of an intervening force prevents the actor's antecedent negligence from being a legal cause of harm is determined by §§ 442 through 453.1 Those rules share one organizing idea, which this section isolates before the sections that follow break it into parts.
Courts need such an idea because the number and kinds of causes that can intervene after a defendant's negligence are virtually without limit. They therefore ask whether the intervening cause is so closely connected with the defendant's negligent conduct that responsibility should not be terminated.2 The shorthand for that inquiry is whether the intervening cause is “foreseeable,” an undefined term covering a “multitude of sins.”3 A word that covers so much is useful only once we ask what it measures.
Foreseeability measures the same thing that made the defendant's conduct negligent in the first place. Conduct is negligent because it involves a foreseeable and unreasonable risk that it will cause harm,4 so the superseding-cause question asks whether the harm that followed belongs to that risk. A moral argument supports the same boundary. There is little moral connection between a person's chosen actions and unforeseeable consequences of them, so only foreseeable consequences may ordinarily be considered in evaluating those choices, and responsibility is bounded by the foreseeable scope of risk.5
The hard cases arise when conduct is negligent but the resulting harm is different in kind or degree from what was or should have been foreseen.6 The doctrine handles them by judging foreseeability loosely. Fairness requires only that the defendant should have foreseen, in loose terms, harm to the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member and the general type of harm that in fact occurred. Differences in the manner of occurrence are generally irrelevant, and so is the fact that the harm was greater than expected.7 Conventional doctrine accordingly leaves a defendant liable even if it could not foresee the extent of the harm or the particular manner in which it occurred, but not if it could not foresee the type of risk that injured the plaintiff.8 One court put the point in traffic terms: after a negligent mix-up, the events between the culpable act and the plaintiff's injury may be bizarre indeed, and no one in the defendant's position could predict in advance how the act would work out to another's injury, yet that is no bar to recovery.9
The inquiry also runs backward from the harm, not forward from the act. The dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. described the method: a court looks back to the catastrophe, whether the fire kindled by the spark or the explosion, and traces the consequences, not indefinitely but to a certain point, fixing that point by asking what might ordinarily be expected to follow.10 Starting from the harm explains why a defendant who could not have mapped the exact sequence is not thereby excused.
What finally sorts the cases is whether the intervening force or the resulting harm falls within the risk that made the conduct negligent. When explosive gas is negligently permitted to accumulate in an oil barge and lightning unforeseeably ignites it, the defendant is liable even though the intervening cause was unforeseeable, because the result was within the foreseeable risk for which the defendant is responsible.11
Stated as a rule, an intervening act does not serve as a superseding cause where the risk of the act occurring is the very same risk that renders the actor negligent.12 Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. applies the rule. The jury could have found that Felix negligently failed to safeguard an excavation site, and a prime hazard of that dereliction is that a driver will negligently enter the work site and injure a worker. That the driver was negligent, or even reckless, does not insulate Felix. Nor is it decisive that the driver lost control through a negligent failure to take medication rather than through a driving mistake.13
The same court contrasted its earlier holding that a lessor who negligently supplies a car with a defective trunk lid is not liable to a lessee who, stopped to repair the lid, is injured by a third party's negligent driving.14 Cases like that one, the court said, generally involve independent intervening acts that operate upon but do not flow from the original negligence. The driver's act in Derdiarian flowed from the risk the contractor created. The third party's driving in the trunk-lid case only operated upon the situation the lessor had created.
Labels do not substitute for this analysis. To say that the defendant's conduct created “merely a condition,” and not a cause, is mere verbiage in the words of one court. It states a conclusion reached on other grounds, that the causal relation between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury is not strong enough to warrant legal responsibility.15
Foreseeability, for all its elasticity, is ordinarily a question for the jury. Proximate cause has traditionally been called “legal cause” to distinguish it from factual cause, but it is an issue of “fact” for the jury on the facts of a particular case. The Restatement (Third) of Torts renames it “scope of liability” to reduce the terminological confusion.16 Close cases on proximate cause are normally left to the jury, and in one case the court found no error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the issue.17 A court decides the question as a matter of law only where the established facts permit a single conclusion, as in the trunk-lid holding, and in Derdiarian it could not say as a matter of law that the driver's negligence interrupted the link.18
One rule in this group shows the test in sharper form for third-party crimes. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of resulting harm, even though the actor's negligence created an opportunity for it, unless the actor at the time realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity.19 Even there, the exception to supersession turns on foreseeability. The sections that follow take up the § 442 considerations and then the recurring situations of escape and emergency reactions, rescue, medical treatment, and third-party conduct within the risk.