Concept
Normal Consequences of Negligence
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Normal Consequences of Negligence
A negligent act that creates danger or injury sets other people in motion. Those in peril try to get away, bystanders try to help, and physicians treat the injured. Section 443 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts covers all three responses in one rule: the intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor’s negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which that conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about.1 Section 442(c) treated the normal-result question as one consideration among several. Section 443 answers it decisively when the later force is a normal consequence of the situation the defendant created.
The rule rests on what a dangerous situation does to the people in it. A careful actor sizing up a risky act asks how people who meet its consequences are likely to behave, so their ordinary reactions belong to the risk that made the act careless. If those reactions superseded, a wrongdoer would escape liability for the very responses the wrongdoing provoked.
The operative word is normal, and it also sets the limit. A reaction that is foolhardy, wanton, or bizarre is no normal consequence of a dangerous situation, so it can still supersede even though ordinary reactions cannot. Each of the three responses below carries that limit in its own form. Escape and emergency reactions come first, because they are the most immediate response a negligent act provokes.
Escape and Emergency Reactions
People caught in a peril try to get out of it, and a plaintiff or third person who dodges, brakes, swerves, jumps back, or runs has produced exactly the kind of force § 443 describes.3 A defendant who negligently creates an emergency must therefore anticipate negligent defensive acts by those in peril, though not foolhardy or unreasonable ones.4 An attempt to escape does not supersede, and the limit is a reaction so irrational or bizarre that it falls outside what a person in that peril would normally do.
The yardstick is lenient for a reason. A person facing sudden danger has little time to think, so the reaction is measured against what a person in peril normally does, not against the best choice that calm hindsight supplies. A response can be a mistake, even one most people would avoid, and still be a normal consequence. Hindsight finds a better option in nearly every emergency, so a test that asked whether a better response existed would excuse the defendant almost every time. Only a reaction so irrational that no reasonable person in the emergency would make it breaks the link, because it then reflects something other than the danger the defendant created.
The rule reaches further than flight and evasion. Even suicide has been held not to supersede the victim’s death when it results from an insanity, caused by the defendant’s tort, that prevents the victim from realizing the nature of the act or controlling his conduct.5 The result fits the logic of the rule: irrationality that the defendant’s own wrong produced remains part of the risk the defendant created.
A common wrong answer measures the swerve against the best available response and concludes that, because a reasonable driver would have braked, the swerve supersedes. That comparison asks what a person with time to think would have done. Section 443 asks whether a person in peril would normally react that way, and a panicked swerve passes that test even though it fails the first.
The limit comes into view when a reaction stops looking like an effort to deal with the danger at all.
Both scenes involve a frightened person acting within seconds of a negligently created danger, so fear and speed cannot be what separates them. The difference lies in the connection between reaction and peril. The driver who swerved was trying, badly, to avoid a hazard that was really present, and a collision predictably produces that kind of response. The passenger’s act cannot be traced to any effort to avoid harm, so the danger no longer explains it. The line is not sharp, and the choice between a poor reaction and an irrational one is a question of degree. The next two sections apply the same normal-consequence reasoning to the people who arrive after the injury: rescuers who try to help, and physicians who treat the harm.
Rescue Attempts
Rescuers, even negligent ones, are to be expected, so a defendant who creates an emergency answers for what follows when someone steps in to deal with it.7 The person in peril, discussed above, reacts to a danger already threatening that person. A rescuer was not endangered until choosing to help, and the question is whether that choice ends the liability of the defendant who created the danger. Under § 443 it does not: the rescue attempt is a normal consequence of the situation the defendant created.8
Judge Cardozo gave the doctrine its classic statement in Wagner v. International Railway Co.: “The wrong that perils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.” The risk of rescue, “if only it be not wanton,” is “born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man.”9 He drew the consequence for the wrongdoer directly. The wrongdoer “may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer,” yet “is accountable as if he had.”10 The law, in effect, charges the wrongdoer with foreseeing the rescuer. The reason is that the emergency itself produces the rescuer, so a wrongdoer who could point to the rescue as a superseding cause would escape liability for injuries to the very people the emergency drew in.
The doctrine’s practical force shows in McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., where a rescuer who came to the aid of those in a Suzuki Samurai was injured by a third vehicle. Suzuki argued that it was totally unforeseeable that a rescuer would be hurt by a passing car on these facts and sought judgment as a matter of law. The Washington Supreme Court held that foreseeability of the intervening cause was close enough to go to a jury, which could weigh the rescuer’s position, any negligence of the approaching motorist, and many other factors.11 The court relied on an earlier case, Estate of Keck v. Blair, which likewise left proximate cause to the jury when a rescuer was killed by an approaching car.12
A later force that strikes the rescuer, such as a passing vehicle, therefore does not defeat the claim by itself. The question remains one of foreseeability, and a court takes it from the jury only when the later result is too remote. The same opinion recalls Maltman, which dismissed a claim against the party who caused the principal accident for the later crash of a rescue helicopter hundreds of miles away, because that crash was simply too remote a result.13
Cardozo wrote the limit into the rule: the risk of rescue is born of the occasion only if the rescue “be not wanton.”14 The limit follows the same logic as the default. Haste, poor judgment, and clumsy technique are what an emergency ordinarily produces, so a negligent rescue remains a normal consequence of the peril. A wanton rescue is no longer explained by the danger. The harm then comes from the rescuer’s own recklessness, and the defendant’s negligence furnished only the occasion for it.
Both passersby responded to the same danger and both were hurt, so the decisive fact is how each one acted. A rescue that goes badly still belongs to the risk the driver created, while a rescue carried out in reckless disregard of an obvious danger belongs to the rescuer alone. The line between a poor rescue and a wanton one is a matter of degree.
Medical Treatment
Medical treatment is the most familiar force of that kind, because an injury is what places the victim in a physician’s hands. When negligence hurts someone, a trip to the hospital usually follows, and the care there is human work that sometimes goes wrong. Negligent treatment of an injury the defendant caused does not supersede, so the defendant answers for the aggravation the treatment produced as well as for the original injury.16
The reasoning matches the rescue rule: the risk is part of what the defendant created. The injury delivers the victim to the doctors, so the risk of imperfect treatment is among the risks to which the defendant exposed the victim. Take a driver who negligently strikes a pedestrian, who then receives deficient care in the emergency room. The driver is likely to be held a factual and proximate cause of both the original injuries and the aggravated injuries from the negligent treatment, because one of the risks to which the driver subjected the pedestrian was the risk of negligent medical care in an emergency room.17 The same result is often put in terms of limbs. Usually an intervening cause that consists of a third party’s negligence is regarded as foreseeable, so the negligent driver is liable for the victim’s broken leg and also for the amputated leg resulting from the attending physician’s negligence.18
That reasoning does not depend on negligent care being probable. Deficient medical care is a foreseeable risk because it is not so rare or bizarre that it should save the driver from liability for aggravated injuries that would not have occurred but for the driver’s negligence.19 A driver who simply asserts that the physician’s negligence broke the chain of causation announces a conclusion and supplies no reason. The question that decides the case is whether the treatment error falls within the risk that made the driver’s conduct careless, and ordinary malpractice does.
Courts attach one condition to the plaintiff’s own conduct. In Stuart v. Hertz Corp., the court put the rule this way: when an injured person uses reasonable care in choosing a competent physician and in following the physician’s advice and instructions, and the injuries are then aggravated by the physician’s negligence, mistake, or lack of skill, the law regards the wrongdoer’s negligence in causing the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the later treatment.20 The condition tracks the reason for the rule. The doctrine protects a victim who seeks help sensibly, and a victim who chooses a physician carelessly or ignores competent advice has stepped outside that protection.
The default rests on the foreseeability of ordinary deficient care, so it gives out when the later conduct is no longer ordinary. Care so rare or bizarre that nothing in the usual range of medical practice explains it falls outside the reasoning that makes negligent treatment foreseeable. Deliberate wrongdoing is a related boundary. An older rule treats an intervening cause consisting of a third party’s intentional or criminal wrongdoing as superseding, and courts do not always follow that rule today.21 Section 442B states the modern exception: where negligent conduct creates the risk of a particular harm, another force’s intervention does not relieve the actor, except where a third person intentionally causes the harm and it falls outside the scope of the risk the actor created.22
The two scenes share a hospital, an injury, and a later actor who harmed the patient, so the character of the later conduct decides them. A mistaken dose is an imperfection in treatment and sits inside the risk of injuring someone. A deliberate poisoning has no connection to treatment at all.
Courts classify one recurring variation differently, the later provider’s failure to prevent harm that an earlier provider’s negligence began. In Siggers v. Barlow, the court concluded that a third person’s failure to prevent the harm originated by another person’s antecedent negligence was a superseding cause. Compare Looney v. Davis, an Alabama decision, which treated subsequent negligent medical care as foreseeable and therefore not superseding.23 A court could say that a failure to act on a diagnosis is one more way the first provider’s error plays out, or that it is a fresh failure by someone better placed to prevent the harm. Because the classification is contested, an answer has to argue it from the risk the first error created and cannot simply announce that the later failure did or did not supersede.
The same reasoning governs professional-liability claims outside medicine, because the question is again whether the later act lies within the risks that made the first defendant’s conduct tortious. In Stanfield v. Neubaum, the Texas Supreme Court held that a trial court’s error of law on an agency issue was a new and independent cause of an adverse usury judgment. The clients therefore could not hold their lawyers responsible in a malpractice action for the costs of the ensuing appeal.24 Ordinary professional error by a later actor usually leaves the first defendant liable, and a later error that breaks the connection, such as the trial court’s legal error in Stanfield, can cut liability off.