Concept
Foreseeability and Superseding Cause
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Intervening Forces and Liability
Foreseeability and Superseding Cause
Most proximate-cause disputes follow one pattern. The defendant acts negligently, something else happens afterward, and the plaintiff is hurt. That later event is an intervening force, any act or occurrence that follows the defendant's negligence and contributes to the harm. Many intervening forces leave the defendant fully liable, so the label settles nothing by itself. The real question is whether the force is a superseding cause: an act of a third person or other force that, by its intervention, prevents the actor from being liable for harm that the actor's antecedent negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about.1
That definition names a result and offers no method for reaching it. A court that calls a force superseding has announced its conclusion without yet explaining it, and the court must still separate the forces that cut off liability from those that do not. Most courts draw that line by asking whether the later events were extraordinary or unforeseeable.2 In the usual formulation, a superseding cause is an intervening force or act so extraordinary that it was not reasonably foreseeable, and the converse holds: a third party's negligence does not break the causal chain if it was foreseeable.3
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. states the working test. A contractor had excavated a work site in a Mount Vernon street to install a gas main, and an employee of a subcontractor was sealing the main when a driver suffered an epileptic seizure, lost consciousness, and careened into the site. The car struck a kettle of 400-degree liquid enamel and threw the worker into the air, and he landed splattered with the scalding enamel.4 The New York Court of Appeals explained that a third person's intervening act does not automatically sever the causal connection. Liability turns on whether the act was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation the defendant's negligence created. An act that is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct may be superseding.5
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) frames the inquiry in hindsight. A court looks back from the harm and asks whether the force's operation or its consequences appear, after the event, to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing when the force operated.6
Scope of the Risk
The risk idea gives foreseeability its content. Foreseeability is an accordion concept, widening or narrowing with the detail and precision of foresight a court demands, and many torts teachers therefore express it in terms of the risk the defendant's conduct created.8 Framed that way, the inquiry asks whether the harm threatened and the injury incurred stand in a reasonably close relation. The risk approach is an approach rather than a definitive test, but it casts the question as a standard rather than a rule and makes plain that the decision-maker must exercise discretion.9
Chief Judge Magruder's opinion in Marshall v. Nugent shows how wide a risk can run. A plaintiff may suffer a miscarriage or other physical illness from the nervous shock of a hair-raising escape, and with a little imagination this bundle of risks could be enlarged indefinitely. After a negligent traffic mix-up, the events between the careless act and the injury may be bizarre indeed before the disturbed waters have become placid again, yet the defendant may be liable for the result. No one in the defendant's position could predict in advance just how the negligence would work out to another's injury, and that inability is no bar to recovery. The court found no error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant Socony on proximate cause.10
Derdiarian applies the same idea. Suppose the contractor's negligence lay in leaving its work site exposed to traffic. A car entering the site is then the very risk that made the contractor negligent, and an intervening act does not supersede where the risk of its occurrence is the very risk that renders the actor negligent.11 The contractor did not have to foresee the driver's seizure or the precise way the accident unfolded.12
A contrasting case shows where the line falls. A lessor negligently supplied a car with a defective trunk lid, and the lessee, stopped at the curb to deal with the trunk, was injured when another car, parked several car lengths behind, jumped ahead and struck him. The lessor was not liable. Its negligence undoubtedly put the lessee at that spot, but the intervening act was divorced from the foreseeable risk of a bad trunk lid, and the injuries were different in kind from those a defective lid would normally produce. The negligence merely furnished the occasion for an unrelated act to cause injuries not ordinarily anticipated.13 The work-site driver realized the danger that made the defendant careless, and the runaway car in the trunk-lid case did not.
An unforeseeable intervening event does not always cut off liability. When the harm is of the very kind that made the defendant negligent, the result is within the foreseeable risk, and the defendant remains responsible whatever the route. A defendant who negligently maintains a rotten telephone pole creates an unreasonable risk that it will fall of its own accord and injure a pedestrian. If a negligent driver strikes the pole and knocks it onto the plaintiff instead, the defendant is still liable. So is a defendant who lets explosive gas accumulate in an oil barge when lightning unforeseeably ignites it.14
Relief requires that both halves be unforeseeable. Superseding causes are those that are unforeseeable and produce unforeseeable results, so the abnormal, the unpredictable, and the highly improbable, whether forces of nature or acts of people, relieve the defendant only when the results they produce are also unforeseeable. A defendant who negligently requires the plaintiff to make a detour is not liable when a falling tree, an unexpected flood, or a robber kills the plaintiff along the way, unless the defendant had reason to know the detour exposed the plaintiff to an increased risk of such an attack.15
The charter-plane hypothetical makes the same point. A company negligently fails to fuel one of its planes, the pilot must make an emergency landing on a small Pacific island, and a volcano erupts and kills a passenger.16 Many courts would call the eruption a superseding cause, though that label is a conclusion and the reasoning lies elsewhere: the eruption was extraordinary, and a death by volcano is not a result a fuel shortage makes foreseeable.17 Doss v. Big Stone Gap is a parallel. A car on a road detour was struck by a crash-landing airplane, and the defendant that had negligently failed to maintain the original road was not liable.18
Response Versus Coincidence
Courts also sort intervening forces by how they connect to the defendant's conduct, and the sorting predicts how the foreseeability test will come out. A criminal-law illustration shows the pattern in its purest form. A shoots at B with intent to kill and misses completely, but the shot makes B turn north rather than continue south, and B, traveling north, is struck by lightning and killed. The death would not have happened but for A's shot, yet it came about in a manner A never contemplated.20 The shot placed B at a particular spot at a particular time, and nothing about it made lightning more likely. That is a coincidence.
A response is a different kind of event: a reaction to the conditions the defendant created. Examples are the victim's flight, a bystander's rescue, a doctor's treatment, and an infection that sets in because the injury weakened the victim.21
The two categories get different treatment because of what the defendant did to produce them. A defendant who creates a danger or an injury sets other agencies in motion, including the victim, rescuers, and doctors, and their reactions are predictable. A defendant who merely puts the plaintiff at a place and time has made the later event no more likely. The perimeter of legal cause is therefore drawn more tightly around coincidences. A coincidence breaks the chain unless it was foreseeable, while a response breaks it only if it was abnormal, extraordinary rather than a normal reaction to the danger.22
The trunk-lid case above is a coincidence case. The defect put the lessee at the curb, and nothing about it made a runaway car more likely.23 Sorting the later event first tells you which question to ask, whether it was merely abnormal or also unforeseeable, before the detailed analysis begins.
The Section 442 Considerations
The Restatement gathers the factors behind these distinctions in one place, and the specific rules in the rest of this chapter are best read as distillations of that list.
The first three questions measure how closely the force is tied to the risk the defendant created. Harm of a different kind, an extraordinary event, and an independent force each point toward a force unrelated to that risk. The last three ask who stands behind the force and how blameworthy that person was. The sections that follow turn particular combinations of these considerations into specific rules.
Because what is foreseeable and what is normal can support varying inferences, as negligence itself can, these questions generally go to the fact finder.26 Close cases on proximate cause are normally left to the jury.27 A court decides legal cause as a matter of law only when the established facts permit a single conclusion, as with independent intervening acts that operate upon the original negligence but do not flow from it.28 Jurisdictions also differ on how much separate attention superseding cause receives. Some have stopped giving a separate jury instruction on it, finding that the proximate cause instruction already covers its substance, and the foreseeability analysis stays the same either way.29
The sections that follow apply this test to one family of intervening forces at a time: normal responses to danger, negligent acts of third persons, intentional and criminal acts, forces of nature, and a third person's failure to act. They then take up harm that flows from the original injury itself, meaning medical treatment, complications, and suicide, and close with the division of work between judge and jury.