Concept
Negligent Third-Party Acts
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Negligent Third-Party Acts
When a third person's careless act intervenes between an actor's negligence and the plaintiff's injury, the carelessness alone does not make that act a superseding cause. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 states the rule: the fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself, or is done in a negligent manner, does not make it a superseding cause of harm that the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if any one of three conditions is met.1 The conditions are alternatives:
- the actor, at the time of his negligent conduct, should have realized that a third person might so act;2
- a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the third person acted would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted;3 or
- the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct, and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.4
Meeting any one of them is enough. Condition (a) tests the actor's own foresight when acting, condition (b) tests how ordinary the third person's act looks to an informed observer, and condition (c) tests whether the act grew normally out of the situation the actor created without being extraordinarily careless.
All three rest on the idea the notes compress into one sentence: a person is deemed to have foreseen the normal consequences of his conduct, but is not responsible for extraordinarily negligent intervening acts of third persons.5 Courts state the general test in the same spirit. An intervening act does not automatically sever the causal connection, and liability turns on whether the act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation the defendant's negligence created; an act that is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct may be superseding.6 Section 447 speaks only to the case in which one of its conditions is met. The wider § 442 considerations remain the frame for an act that meets none of them, and they include that the intervening force is due to a third person's act or failure to act, that the act is wrongful toward the other, and the degree of culpability of that wrongful act.7
Actor Should Have Realized
The first alternative, § 447(a), keeps the negligent actor liable if, at the time of his negligent conduct, he should have realized that a third person might act in that way.8 Two phrases carry the weight. Should have realized sets an objective standard: the question is what a reasonable person in the actor's position would have anticipated, not what this actor happened to predict. At the time of his negligent conduct fixes the vantage point at the moment the actor chose how to behave, which leaves hindsight out. Of the three alternatives, this is the one that tests the actor's own foresight; the other two judge the third person's act from outside.
The prong follows from what negligence is. An actor is negligent for disregarding a risk that a reasonable person would have seen, and when a third person's careless act is one of the ways that risk can turn into harm, the carelessness belongs to the hazard and does not interrupt it. Foreseeability, though, is an accordion concept: its reach depends on the detail and precision with which foresight is required. The risk idea is the usual way to set its width. Ask what hazard made the conduct negligent, and whether the third person's act is one of the ways that hazard could play out.9
A case against Felix, a contractor that failed to safeguard an excavation site, shows the method. The jury could have found that Felix negligently failed to safeguard the site, and a prime hazard of that dereliction is that a driver will negligently enter the work site and injure a worker. That the driver was negligent, or even reckless, did not insulate Felix, and it did not matter that the driver lost control through a negligent failure to take medication rather than a driving mistake. The precise manner of the event need not be anticipated; the factfinder could conclude that the foreseeable, normal and natural result of the risk Felix created was injury to a worker by a car entering the improperly protected work area.10 The contractor had to foresee the kind of conduct, a careless driver entering the site, and not its particular cause.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. 3 Oaks Wrecking and Lumber Co. applies the same prong to a different hazard. A wrecking company failed to secure a condemned house during salvage, and trespassers using the house for shelter accidentally started a fire that spread to the building next door. Testimony established that the neighborhood was frequented by vagrants and that the custom of the industry was to lock and board up buildings during salvage to keep trespassers out. The jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.11 Those two facts are the kind of proof prong (a) invites: local conditions show what a reasonable salvage contractor would have seen when deciding whether to lock up, and industry custom records what the trade already treats as a risk. The trespassers' fire was an accident, yet the company still answered for it, because someone's entering the empty building was the risk that made leaving it open negligent.
The notes that collect these decisions also include Latzel v. Bartek, in which farmers negligently planted corn. Read it with the same question in mind: what hazard made the conduct negligent, and was a third person's careless act one of the ways that hazard could play out?
An exam stem usually packs the facts that matter to this prong into a sentence or two, and the task is to decide what they show about the actor's foresight when acting.
Failing prong (a) does not end the analysis, because § 447 states the three conditions as alternatives. An actor who could not have realized that a third person would act that way may still be liable if the act was not highly extraordinary or was a normal consequence of the situation the actor created. The next two subsections take those conditions in turn.
Not Highly Extraordinary
The second alternative, § 447(b), keeps the actor liable if a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the third person acted would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted.13 The double negative is easy to misread under time pressure. The prong is met unless the third person's act would strike an informed observer as highly extraordinary, so ordinary carelessness does not break the chain. It also shifts whose knowledge counts. Prong (a) asked what the actor should have realized when acting; prong (b) asks how the act looks to a reasonable person who knows the facts as they stood when the third person acted, and what the defendant foresaw plays no part. A defendant who fails prong (a) because it could not have anticipated the conduct may therefore still be liable under prong (b).
Each half of the wording does its own work. The situation existing when the act was done lets the factfinder judge the third person's conduct in its setting, and the setting includes whatever the defendant's negligence contributed to it. Conduct that looks bizarre in the abstract may look like what people do when an alarm sounds in the night or a frightening call arrives. Highly extraordinary sets the bar, and it is a demanding one: conduct that is merely unusual, or merely careless, does not clear it. This vantage point also spares the plaintiff from showing that the defendant could have predicted the whole sequence, since the precise manner of the event need not be anticipated and an intervening driver's negligence, or even recklessness, does not by itself insulate the defendant.14
In Griffith v. Valley of Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, Inc. the defendant set off a car alarm at 4:00 a.m. while attempting to repossess a car, and in the resulting confusion a neighbor was shot. The court treated whether the negligent handling of a gun was foreseeable under those circumstances as a question of fact for the jury.15 Prong (b) shows why a jury could find for the plaintiff. Whether the defendant ever imagined that anyone would reach for a gun is a prong (a) question. An observer who knows that an alarm is sounding at 4:00 a.m. and that confusion has followed may find it not highly extraordinary that someone handled a gun carelessly.
Kolar v. Bergo reaches the same procedural place by a different route. On April Fool's Day the defendant encouraged his daughter to call a friend of his and pretend that she was home alone and frightened. The friend, concerned about the child, jumped into his pickup truck, ran a stop sign in his haste, and collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle. The plaintiff, seriously injured, sued both the driver and the instigator of the joke, and the court treated the question of who should be liable as one for the jury.16 What distinguishes this case from Griffith is how the intervening act was provoked. In Griffith the alarm created confusion for everyone nearby; in Kolar the call was meant to alarm one person about a child's safety. A jury could find that an observer who knew what the friend had been told would not regard hurried, careless driving as highly extraordinary. In both cases the intervening act can be understood as a reaction to the situation the defendant's conduct created.
That is why prong (b) so often ends in a jury question. Because questions concerning what is foreseeable and what is normal may be the subject of varying inferences, as is the question of negligence itself, these issues generally are for the fact finder to resolve.17 The interstate-collision case taken up under § 447(c) marks the other end of the range, where the court held that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. In an exam answer, say that the question goes to the jury when reasonable people could differ, and reach a conclusion as a matter of law only when the stem's facts leave a single answer.
An act that is highly extraordinary does not satisfy prong (b), but that result does not by itself make the act superseding. Prongs (a) and (c) remain available as alternatives, and the broader considerations of § 442 frame the question if none of the three is met.
Normal Consequence of the Situation
The third alternative, § 447(c), keeps the actor liable if the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.19 Both parts must be met. The first ties the third person's act to what the defendant did, because the act must be a normal consequence of a situation the defendant's conduct created. The second limits how careless the third person may have been: ordinary negligence is tolerated, extraordinary negligence is not. Prong (a) looked at what the actor should have realized, and prong (b) looked at the act through an informed observer's eyes. Prong (c) starts instead from the situation the defendant left behind, asks whether the act is a normal consequence of it, and then measures how careless the act was.
The rule stated at the start of this unit explains the second part: a person is deemed to have foreseen the normal consequences of his conduct but is not responsible for extraordinarily negligent intervening acts of third persons.20 A defendant who leaves a hazard in the world, such as an injured person in a traffic lane or a wreck across a roadway, has produced a setting in which others must react, and ordinary lapses in that setting are its normal consequence. Conduct that departs far from ordinary carelessness is the part the defendant is not held to have foreseen.
The phrase normal consequence has an older cousin in the language of Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co. (N.Y. 1866), a case about negligently thrown sparks rather than another person's carelessness. Judge Hunt put liability for the building on which the sparks fell on the ground that its destruction was the ordinary and natural result of its being fired, a result to be anticipated the moment the fire reached the building.21
The standard second-collision sequences show the first part at work. In Bunda v. Hardwick a driver hits a pedestrian, who is left helpless in the street and is run over by another car; in Holmberg v. Villaume a driver causes a collision that leaves wrecked cars blocking the highway, and another driver runs into the wreckage.22 Each sequence begins with the first crash, which is what puts the hazard where the later driver meets it. A helpless person in a traffic lane is the kind of situation that invites a passing car to strike, and wreckage across a highway is the kind of obstruction a following driver may fail to avoid. When the later driver is merely inattentive, the lapse is an ordinary one that stays within what the situation normally produces, which is why prong (c) fits facts like these.
Baumann v. Zhukov sits on the other side of the line even though it also involves a second collision. The last two cars in a mile-long line of cars with their flashers on had just been passed by a firetruck traveling on the shoulder with its siren and flashers on when another truck driver ran into them at full speed, killing the occupants of both cars. The question was whether the first truck driver was liable for the injuries the second driver caused. The Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, held that the second driver's negligence was an efficient intervening cause that severed the causal connection between the first driver's negligence and the plaintiffs' injuries, and that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.23 The court's label is Nebraska's, not the Restatement's, but read through § 447(c) the facts illustrate the extraordinary-negligence limit. Even if the first driver's negligence had left traffic standing on that road, a driver who meets a long line of cars with flashers on and an emergency vehicle sounding its siren, and still strikes the line at full speed, has gone well beyond the inattention of the second-collision cases above.
Baumann is the unusual case in which a court takes the question from the jury. The usual rule is that what is foreseeable and what is normal may be the subject of varying inferences, so those issues generally go to the fact finder.24 An exam stem in which one crash sets up another therefore asks two questions in order. The first is whether the later crash flowed from the situation the first crash created, which second collisions usually do. The second is how far the later driver's carelessness exceeded the ordinary, and the common error is to treat the first answer as settling the problem.
Failing the extraordinary-negligence limit does not by itself make the third person's act superseding, because the other conditions remain available. The Felix case shows the point. The contractor answered for a driver who was negligent, or even reckless, in entering the work site, because the risk of such an entry was the risk that made leaving the site unguarded negligent.26 That is prong (a)'s kind of reasoning. A student who finds the third person's carelessness too extreme for prong (c) has therefore not finished until prongs (a) and (b) have been run.