Concept
Intentional and Criminal Acts
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Intentional and Criminal Acts
Two Restatement sections govern a stranger’s deliberate wrong, and they point in opposite directions. Section 448 treats a third person’s intentional tort or crime as a superseding cause, even when the actor’s negligence supplied the opportunity, unless the actor should have realized that the situation might arise and that someone might exploit it.1 Section 449 keeps the actor liable whenever the chance of that kind of act is itself one of the hazards that made the actor negligent.2 A modern summary joins the two: a third person’s intentional or seriously criminal conduct may excuse the defendant, “provided the risk of that conduct is not what made the D’s act tortious in the first place,” because considerations of justice may then require that the third person, and not the defendant, be held responsible.3
The difference from the preceding section is the difference between a mistake and a choice. A third person’s carelessness usually leaves the first actor liable; a third person’s deliberate decision to do harm usually does not. The two subsections below take the presumption first and the hazard principle second, and in both the examinable question is the same: did the crime merely exploit an opening that carelessness created, or was it the very thing the defendant should have guarded against?
Crime as Superseding Cause
Section 448 begins with a presumption that favors the negligent actor and lets the actor’s own foresight rebut it. The presumption is that a stranger’s intentional tort or crime supersedes, even though the actor’s negligence created a situation that afforded the opportunity. The rebuttal applies when the actor, at the time of the negligent conduct, “realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”4 Two separate pieces of foresight therefore matter: that the situation itself (unguarded cargo, an unlocked door, a gas leak) might arise, and that someone might exploit it for a deliberate wrong. A defendant who should have foreseen only the first was warned of an accident, not of a crime.
Cole v. German Savings & Loan Society supplies a clean example of an intentional act too perverse to anticipate. An owner let a child trespasser into its building, and the boy maliciously ushered a visitor into an unguarded elevator shaft; no one, the commentary observes, would anticipate such a twisted sense of humor.5 The presumption exists for cases like that one.
The traditional gas-ignition case is Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & Railroad Co., in which a railroad’s negligence released gas that a man named Duerr ignited with a match. The court’s answer turned on Duerr’s state of mind: a careless match was a foreseeable consequence of the leak, but a deliberate, criminal one was an act the railroad was not bound to anticipate. Kentucky has since moved away from that categorical view. Its supreme court has noted that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link, because a spark that ignited negligently accumulated trash may have been foreseeable whether it was set accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or even criminally.6 The same court has said, in another setting, that it narrowly confines exceptions that excuse a wrongdoer, “so as to protect no one from responsibility for the consequences of their wrongdoing except where protecting the public makes it essential to do so.”7
The exception keeps the presumption from swallowing negligence law, and Brower v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. shows it at work. A railroad’s negligent collision left the wagon’s driver unable to protect his employer’s property, and the property disappeared. The court held that the wrongdoer could not escape making reparation for the loss, because it had deprived the plaintiff of the protection the driver’s presence in his right senses would have afforded, and it adopted the Massachusetts court’s statement that “[t]he act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have been foreseen.”8
The Restatement’s illustration of the rule adds the fact that does the work. A railroad negligently runs down a truck carrying barrels of cider, at night, at a place where there have been frequent thefts from the company’s freight cars. The collision scatters the barrels along the road and stuns the driver, and unknown thieves take the cider. The railroad’s negligence is a legal cause of the loss by theft.9
Set the gas leak beside the cider and the working fact becomes visible. A gas spiller is charged with foreseeing a careless match but, absent particular facts, not a deliberate one. The railroad in the illustration had a record of frequent thefts at that place, and its collision left the cargo with no one to guard it, so both halves of the foresight requirement were met: the unguarded goods followed from its negligence, and the theft was something it had reason to expect. An exam stem that wants the exception to apply will usually supply a fact of that kind, such as earlier thefts at the location, a known pattern of crime, or any record that shows what the defendant should have realized when it acted.
The exception also explains why the presumption protects defendants less than its wording suggests. Foreseeability is ordinarily for the factfinder: if the intervening criminal act was foreseeable, it may be within the scope of the risk, and whether it was is a scope-of-liability question that may be left to the jury.10 A bare awareness that crime exists somewhere does little work, since nearly every careless act leaves some opening for a wrongdoer. The plaintiffs who succeed point to facts particular to the defendant’s situation, and those who offered little beyond that general awareness have lost on this element; see, e.g., Briscoe v. Amazing Products, Inc.; Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co.; Double Quick, Inc. v. Moore.
Courts sometimes take the question from the jury altogether. In Baumann v. Zhukov, a second truck driver ran at full speed into the last two cars in a mile-long line of cars with their flashers on, killing their occupants, and the Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, held his negligence an efficient intervening cause that severed the causal connection to the first truck driver’s negligence; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.11 Baumann involved negligence, not crime, but courts have used the same power against deliberate attacks. Decisions on explosive-grade fertilizer used in the 1993 World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings (Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp. and Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc.) and on an airliner that allegedly flew off course over a sensitive Russian military zone and was shot down (Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983) each held an unprovoked terrorist or military attack an unforeseeable superseding cause as a matter of law. The court in the September 11 litigation tried to distinguish each case on foreseeability grounds, concluding with little reasoning that, unlike the September 11 attacks, such unprovoked attacks could not be foreseen by the fertilizer and aircraft manufacturers.12 The thinness of that distinction shows how contestable foresight is at the margins.
A crime may also be only the occasion on which a defect does its harm. If a criminal hijacks a car with the owner in the passenger seat and crashes it, and a defective airbag fails to deploy and exacerbates the passenger’s injuries, the passenger can recover for the exacerbated injuries from the manufacturer: the carjacking was the occasion and a cause in fact of those injuries, but not their legal cause.13
The stolen-car cases put § 448 in its most common modern form. An owner who negligently facilitates the theft of his car is generally held not liable to the victim of the thief’s negligent driving unless he should have foreseen a greater than normal risk of such harm, as when he leaves the car in a neighborhood populated by derelicts and drunks.14 Courts have not agreed on how much foresight suffices. Hergenrether v. East illustrates the approach that looks for a place where theft was especially likely, while Herrera v. Quality Pontiac illustrates the approach that sends proximate cause to the jury. The nature of the vehicle matters too: in Richardson v. Ham, a 26-ton bulldozer was left unlocked and unguarded at a construction site, and the extraordinary danger of such a machine is a circumstance that suggests liability.15
Crime as the Very Hazard
Defendants routinely argue that a later act “breaks the causal chain.” The casebooks illustrate the argument with Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., where a contractor working in an excavation in the traveled roadway had failed to erect a barrier to protect workers from traffic.17 Section 449 meets the argument whenever the later act is the very event the omitted precaution was meant to prevent: if the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard, or one of the hazards, that makes the actor negligent, the act does not prevent liability, whether it is innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal.18
The test therefore looks to the reason the defendant’s conduct was careless. A guard hired to keep thieves out, a landlord who leaves hallways unwatched after repeated robberies, and a custodian who lets a dangerous person go were each careless because someone might exploit the situation in a particular way, and when someone does, the harm the precaution was meant to prevent has occurred. If a deliberate act excused the defendant in exactly those cases, every failure of the precaution would supply its own defense, and the duty would mean nothing.
Sections 448 and 449 meet at a single factual question. Under § 448, a deliberate crime supersedes unless the defendant should have realized the opportunity and the likelihood that someone would use it.19 Under § 449, the prior question is whether the chance of that act was among the reasons the conduct was negligent at all. If it was, the crime is the harm the duty guarded against, and liability remains. If the crime merely exploited an opening that careless conduct happened to create for other reasons, § 448 governs, and the defendant escapes unless the plaintiff makes the further showing about foresight.20
The elevator-shaft prank in Cole falls on the § 448 side of that line, because no one would anticipate a malicious usher into an unguarded shaft. Other intentional acts, the same source notes, are entirely foreseeable, and the foreseeable ones that supply the defendant’s reason for care are the § 449 cases.21
Negligent-security cases apply the principle through the vocabulary of duty. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. (D.C. Cir. 1970), a tenant was assaulted and robbed in the common hallway of a 585-unit combination office-apartment building. The landlord had once employed a doorman, but the entrances were unguarded when the attack occurred, despite notice of an increasing number of assaults, larcenies, and robberies committed against tenants in and from the common hallways.22 The court called the landlord no insurer of its tenants’ safety but also no bystander. Where the landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults and robberies, has notice that they occurred in the portion of the premises exclusively within its control, has every reason to expect like crimes, and has the exclusive power to take preventive action, the court found it not unfair to impose a duty to take the steps within its power to minimize the predictable risk.23
The duty and the hazard principle describe one point from two sides. The duty exists because crimes of that kind were reasonably expected, so the crime is the foreseeable harm that shaped the duty, and a landlord who breached it cannot cite the crime as a superseding event without erasing the duty itself. The same passage marks the outer edge: no liability is normally imposed on the party with the power to act if the violence is sudden and unexpected, unless the source of the violence is an employee of the party in control.24
Beyond negligent security, courts regularly keep a negligent defendant liable despite an intervening crime in four recurring situations, although it is probably impossible to state a comprehensive rule.25 Each is a way of showing that the crime was the hazard:
- The defendant owes a duty, by contract or otherwise, to protect the plaintiff against crime and fails to do so, as when a theater’s failure to patrol its premises adequately could be found a proximate cause of a fatal stabbing.
- The defendant’s affirmative act destroys a protection the plaintiff placed around person or property, as when a tenant of floor space in a jewelry store went to the store on a holiday and left the key in the front door.
- The defendant brings into contact with the plaintiff a person it knew or should have known to be peculiarly likely to commit crime, as when the security agency in Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency hired a guard with a violent record who used a passkey to enter a tenant’s apartment and assault her.
- The defendant takes custody of a person with dangerous criminal tendencies and fails to restrain him, as when a matron was held liable for a policeman’s death after juveniles escaped from a youth center and stabbed him.
Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., much criticized, denied recovery where a company using convict labor negligently guarded a brutal and vicious convict with a record of sexual offenses, who escaped and raped the plaintiff. The criticism has force, because the convict’s record was exactly what made lax guarding careless. The casebook sharpens the point by asking what would change if the convict were only a forger with no record of violence who held up the plaintiff with a gun during the escape: the less the reason for care had to do with violence, the weaker the hazard argument becomes.26
A defendant prevails when the risk of the crime formed no part of the reason for care. Where the defendant had no reason to anticipate violence, courts refuse liability; see Williams v. State. Hines v. Garrett shows the opposite result on the right facts: a railroad that put a passenger off at an unsafe place could not treat her later assault as a break in causation, because the danger was one the carrier should have foreseen.
A defendant liable for failing to protect against the specific risk of an intentional tort may also answer for the criminal’s share of the loss. Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 14, such a defendant is jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfeasor, in addition to its own share; whether the rule is available depends on the law of each comparative negligence jurisdiction, particularly whether, if statutory, the statute permits it.27