Concept
Forces of Nature
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Forces of Nature
Storms, floods, lightning, frost, and eruptions enter a negligence case much as a third person's act does: they arrive after the defendant's carelessness and contribute to the harm. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sorts them by the role they play. When the force only increases or accelerates harm that the negligence would have produced anyway, § 450 keeps the defendant liable, however extraordinary the force.1 When the harm would not have happened at all without the force, § 451 relieves the defendant only if two conditions are both met.2
The sorting question is whether the negligence was already producing the harm when the force arrived. A force that speeds or enlarges such an injury changes its timing or its degree, and responsibility stays where it began. A force that supplies the missing ingredient poses a harder question: whether the force, and the harm it brought, fall within the risk that made the conduct negligent. Opinions sometimes call these events acts of God, a shorthand that a Pennsylvania court has criticized while leaving the underlying concept intact.3 Neither the label nor the criticism changes the analysis. The next subsection takes up the force that merely accelerates harm, and the one after it takes up the force without which no harm would have occurred.
Forces That Accelerate Harm
Section 450 has two parts, and each does separate work. The first concedes that the force may be extraordinary, so a freak storm gives the defendant no escape merely because it was rare. The second sets the condition that makes the concession safe: the force must do no more than increase or accelerate harm that the defendant's negligent conduct would otherwise have caused.4 To apply it, remove the force from the story and ask whether the negligence would still have led to harm of this kind, perhaps later or in smaller measure. If it would, the defendant stays liable.
The reason is that the harm was already on its way. A defendant whose negligence has created the condition that will injure someone has already done the wrong that makes the conduct negligent, and nature has contributed only timing or size. Excusing the defendant because the final push came from the weather would reward the neglect: a landlord who lets a roof rot would escape whenever the collapse happened to coincide with a storm, and storms are just when weakened structures give way. For the same reason, the defendant's liability never depended on foreseeing the particular force. The unrepaired condition is the source of the injury, and the force only chose the moment.
Two Pennsylvania decisions show the rule at work. In Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., a section of a negligently maintained roof fell on the plaintiff's decedent and killed the decedent, and the defendant blamed extremely high winds. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to treat the wind as an excuse: a party who fails to remedy a dangerous condition is liable for the resulting injuries even when wind is the immediate cause, and the causal connection remains unbroken.5 In Bowman v. Columbia Telephone Co., a telephone company went fourteen years without inspecting a pole, the pole was felled during a twelve-inch snowfall and injured the plaintiff, and the jury verdict for the plaintiff was upheld.6 In both cases the fact that decided the outcome was the neglected condition of the structure. The weather finished what the neglect had begun.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts goes further. It keeps the actor liable even for the result of an extraordinary force of nature if the risks of that force were risks against which the actor should have taken adequate precautions.7 Under that approach the question becomes whether the precautions the defendant omitted would have addressed the kind of risk the force presented. The accelerate-or-increase counterfactual is one route to that answer, and not the only one.
Section 450 stops where the force does more than speed or enlarge the harm. An operator who negligently leaves a plane's fuel tanks unfilled creates a risk that the plane will have to ditch in the water or make an emergency landing. If the plane lands on an island just as a volcano erupts, the eruption has not hastened any harm the fuel shortage was producing. It has produced a different harm, and a court will deny recovery for it.8 That case belongs to § 451, the subject of the next subsection.9
A fact pattern that pairs a neglected structure with a severe storm therefore calls for one question before any other: would the defective condition have injured someone anyway, if later or less severely? If it would, the storm is an accelerator and liability stays.
Forces Needed to Cause Harm
Section 451 governs the natural force that supplies the missing ingredient: an intervening operation of a force of nature without which the harm would not have resulted from the defendant's negligent conduct. It relieves the defendant only if the operation of the force is extraordinary, and the harm resulting from it is of a kind different from the harm whose likelihood made the conduct negligent.11 The conditions are joined by and. A rare force that produces the same kind of harm leaves the defendant liable, and so does an ordinary force that produces a different kind. Section 450, which covers a force that only hastens or enlarges harm the negligence was already producing, never reaches this test.12
Each condition screens out a different group of cases. The first rests on how careful people plan around nature: a carrier hauling cargo through a northern winter must expect cold, so the ordinary operation of a force cannot excuse careless conduct. The second rests on the link between duty and precaution. A safeguard is required because a particular harm was likely enough to justify its cost, and the safeguard is aimed at that harm. If a rare force produced the very harm the omitted safeguard was meant to prevent, excusing the defendant because the force was rare would reward the neglect. Only when both conditions are met does the negligence shrink to an occasion: the force is a freak, and the harm is one the required precautions would not have prevented.
The fuel-shortage example shows both conditions at once. Failing to fill a plane's fuel tanks creates an unreasonable risk that the plane will have to ditch in the water or make an emergency landing, and it does not create the risk that the plane will land on an island during a volcanic eruption. Injury from the eruption is not a foreseeable consequence of the omission, and the court will deny the passenger's recovery.13 The detour cases reason the same way about a plaintiff the negligence moved. In Doss v. Big Stone Gap, a car on a detour that took it near an airstrip was struck by a crash-landing airplane. The detour existed because the defendant had negligently failed to maintain the road the car would otherwise have used, and the defendant was held not liable.14 An airplane is no force of nature, but treatment of the detour cases extends the reasoning to nature: a defendant who negligently requires a detour is not liable for a death caused by a tree falling on the car or by an unexpected flood.15 Each of those events could have found any traveler at that spot, and the negligence supplied only the place.
Liability continues when the force works on the defendant's own creation. Explosive gas negligently allowed to accumulate in an oil barge is ignited by lightning, an event no one could have predicted, and the owner is still liable, because the explosion is the very harm that made allowing the gas to collect negligent.16 The frost cases come out the same way. In Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., the defendant's negligence damaged the coverings that protected a grower's pineapple plants from frost, and a frost killed the plants before the coverings could be replaced; the defendant was liable.17 In Fox v. Boston & Maine R. Co., a carrier shipped apples in an unheated car through Maine in the dead of winter, a cold spell set in, and the apples froze; the carrier was liable.18 In Benedict, even an unusual frost would not have helped the defendant, because the coverings existed to prevent frost damage and frost killing the plants is therefore the same kind of harm the negligence made likely. In Fox, both conditions fail: a cold spell in a Maine winter is weather a carrier of perishable goods must plan around, and freezing is the harm an unheated car invites.
What separates the frost cases and the barge from the volcano and the detours is what the force acted on. In the volcano and detour examples, the negligence put the plaintiff in a place where an unrelated force happened to strike, which is the coincidence idea from earlier in this chapter. In the frost and barge cases, the force worked on the condition the defendant had created, whether a damaged covering, an unheated car, or a barge full of gas. The negligence was the reason the force could do any harm, and the harm was the one the precaution was meant to prevent.
Because the conditions test different things, each needs its own application. The first compares the force with what its setting ordinarily brings, and the force's rarity is the whole of that inquiry. The second compares two harms, the one that happened and the one whose likelihood made the conduct negligent, and the force's rarity has no place in that comparison. A student who finds a freak storm and stops has answered only the first question, as the frost cases show. A student who finds a different kind of harm and stops has answered only the second, as the next scene shows.
Criminal law poses the same puzzle in sharper form. A shoots at B with intent to kill and misses completely, but the shot causes B to turn north rather than continue south; while traveling north, B is struck by lightning and killed, a result that would not have happened but for A's shot.19 The but-for link is exactly what § 451 presupposes when it speaks of a force without which the harm would not have resulted. What remains open is whether the result is one for which the actor answers, and the two conditions are the Restatement's way of answering that question for negligence.