Concept
Failure to Act and Shifted Duty
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Failure to Act and Shifted Duty
Every intervening force in this chapter so far has been something that happens: a careless act, a crime, a storm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452 turns to the opposite case, in which a third person could have stopped the harm the defendant's negligence threatened and did nothing.1 The Restatement answers in two steps. The general rule is that the third person's failure to act is not a superseding cause, so the defendant stays liable.2 The exception applies where, because of lapse of time or otherwise, the duty to prevent the harm has shifted from the actor to the third person, whose failure is then a superseding cause.3
The general rule favors the plaintiff because the defendant started the danger. Someone else could almost always have done something to stop it: a neighbor could have phoned for help, a manager could have fixed a hazard, a bystander could have shouted a warning. If each such failure excused the first wrongdoer, every negligently created threat would come with a ready excuse, and the plaintiff, who did nothing wrong, would bear the loss.
The exception rests on control. When another person has taken over the situation and is better placed than the defendant to prevent the harm, responsibility moves with that control. That someone else could have prevented the harm proves almost nothing, since it is true in nearly every case; the duty to prevent the harm must itself have moved. The cases that find a shift therefore turn on facts showing that someone took charge of the danger, or that time brought a change of responsibility.
Third Person's Failure to Prevent
A defendant who negligently creates a risk usually stays liable when a third person fails to step in and prevent the harm: if the defendant sets a grass fire burning toward the plaintiff's building, the failure of someone else to put out the fire does not relieve the defendant.4 Section 452(1) states the rule in general terms, subject to the exception in subsection (2). The failure of a third person to act to prevent harm threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of that harm.5
An omission differs from the other intervening forces because it adds nothing to the chain of events. A second collision or a crime brings a new force into the story, and the analysis asks whether that force falls within the risk the defendant created. A bystander's silence brings in no force at all. The danger the defendant set in motion runs along the very course that made the conduct negligent, so the harm that results is the harm the negligence threatened. A practical reason points the same way: almost every danger leaves someone positioned to head it off, so a rule that let inaction excuse the defendant would shrink liability in step with the number of people who might have intervened.
The rule applies to professionals as it does to anyone else. Suppose one lawyer negligently drafts a document that lacks key provisions, and a second lawyer, hired to review it, negligently fails to catch the omission. The second lawyer's negligence does not prevent the first from being found a proximate cause of the losses that follow. It is also a proximate cause itself, since the missing provisions were precisely the harm foreseeable if the second lawyer failed to review the document with care.6 A later failure to catch the error therefore adds a defendant without removing the first one.
An exam stem that stresses that someone else could have prevented the harm describes something true of nearly every danger, so that fact cannot decide the question. An omission supersedes only when responsibility for preventing the harm has itself passed from the defendant to the third person.7 Until the stem supplies such facts, the general rule controls and the defendant remains liable.
Shifted Responsibility
Section 452(2) supplies the exception: where, because of lapse of time or otherwise, the duty to prevent harm threatened by the actor's negligent conduct has shifted from the actor to a third person, that person's failure to prevent the harm is a superseding cause.9 Two features of the wording control. What must move is the duty to prevent the harm, so a third person's bare ability to step in, which exists in almost every case, does not qualify. And the duty must be found to have shifted; lapse of time is named as one route, and the words “or otherwise” leave room for others.10 The inquiry calls for judgment, as the risk approach to proximate cause does generally. That approach asks whether the injury bears a reasonably close relation to the risk the defendant created, and it is a standard rather than a rule, so it leaves room for discretion.11
The risk the defendant created does not disappear when the duty shifts. The danger is still alive and still threatens the same harm; what has changed is who is in a position to control it. That is why the cases look for a third person who knows of the danger and holds the means to stop it. A bystander who merely watches has taken on nothing, and the ordinary omission rule of § 452(1) governs.
Dynamite caps in a child's reach illustrate the point. A defendant lets a dangerous object, such as dynamite caps or a loaded gun, get into the hands of a child. The parent discovers the danger and takes the object away but fails to prevent the child from getting it again, and the child is injured. The parent's failure is treated as strong and independent enough to shift liability from the defendant to the parent, and the defendant is exonerated.12 The caps were as dangerous after the confiscation as before, so the defendant's risk was still alive. What changed was that the parent knew of the danger and, as the child's parent, was the one person then able to keep the caps out of the child's hands. A parent who never learned of the danger would have taken control of nothing, and § 452(1) would leave the defendant liable.
A second illustration involves a third person who discovers a danger and deliberately ignores it. A retailer learns that bottles of the defendant's product marked kerosene actually contain dangerous amounts of gasoline, yet keeps selling them without any warning, and the defendant is exonerated.13 After the discovery the retailer controls whether the bottles reach customers and can end the danger by pulling them from the shelf or posting a warning.
Public officials can take control of a hazard in the same way. In Kimminau v. City of Hastings, a truck driver negligently spilled corn mash onto a road. A state trooper closed that section of road and called for cleanup, and the local fire department moved the mash from the traveled lane to the shoulder and ditch. The driver was not asked to help. After the work was done the trooper cited the driver, sent him on his way, and reopened the road.14 The next day the plaintiff lost control of her car on the same stretch because of corn mash on the road. The court held that the driver was not liable, because control of the risk had shifted to the fire department that did the cleanup and the trooper who reopened the road to traffic.15 The mash was still on the road, so the danger had not ended. The officials had taken over the job of preventing the harm, and the driver, dismissed from the scene, had no further part in it.
Medical referral cases apply the same idea to professionals. In Spicer v. Osunkoya, a physician negligently misdiagnosed a child with chronic tonsillitis and referred her to an ear, nose, and throat specialist. The specialist performed a tonsillectomy and prescribed too high a dose of a painkiller, and the child suffered brain damage.16 The plaintiff argued that the referring physician's misdiagnosis was itself a proximate cause of the injury. The Delaware court disagreed. Applying the Restatement's commentary on section 452, it held that full responsibility for “control of the situation and prevention of the threatened harm” had passed to the specialist, so the specialist's alleged malpractice was a superseding cause as a matter of law.17 Without the misdiagnosis there would have been no referral, yet the shift of control cut off legal responsibility.
The court added that other jurisdictions have consistently reached this result unless the referring physician had reason to know the specialist was incompetent.18 The limit follows from the logic of the shift. A referral hands the patient to a professional expected to exercise independent judgment, and the referring physician may count on that professional to take charge. A physician who refers a patient to a specialist the physician has reason to know is incompetent has instead placed the patient where harm is likely, and no capable professional has taken charge. The referring physician remains liable for the specialist's negligence.
Medical cases at the edges of the doctrine divide. In Siggers v. Barlow, an emergency room physician missed a fracture. When the films were later read, an attending physician reported the fracture to a subsequent emergency room physician whose job was to tell the patient, and the patient was never notified and suffered irreparable injury. The Sixth Circuit treated the later physician's failure to prevent the harm that the first physician's negligence began as a superseding cause.19 Alabama's decision in Looney v. Davis points the other way: subsequent negligent medical care is foreseeable and therefore is not regarded as a superseding cause of the injury.20 Because the decisions divide, an answer about a second physician's failure should present the shift argument, flag the foreseeability argument against it, and not treat Siggers as settled.
Step four does the real work. Most omission stems supply a third person who could have acted, and the exception applies only where the stem also gives facts showing a duty and a handoff of control, such as a confiscation, a discovery, a cleanup crew taking charge, or a specialist taking over a patient's care. Without facts of that kind, the original actor stays liable.