Concept
Later Harm from the Original Injury
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Later Harm from the Original Injury
An injury does not hold still. A wound threatens infection, a broken bone calls for a doctor, and a weakened body falls more easily than a healthy one. Each threat draws a response from the plaintiff, from the people nearby, or from the body itself, and each response follows the defendant's negligence and adds to the final loss. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 445 covers the most deliberate of these responses: when the actor's negligent conduct threatens harm to another's person, land, or chattels, the normal efforts of the other or a third person to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from those efforts.1 The section speaks of efforts, however, and not every later event is an effort. An infection is not an effort, and neither is a second fall on a damaged leg.
The earlier sections of this chapter followed forces that arrive from outside the situation: a careless driver, a criminal, a storm, a bystander who does nothing. This section follows forces that grow out of the injury itself. The test is the one the chapter has used throughout. To call a later event a “superseding cause” states a conclusion and not a method, and courts reach the conclusion by asking whether the event was extraordinary or unforeseeable.2 For harm that follows an injury, the question takes a sharper form: did the event grow out of the injury and the condition the injury left, or did it only find the plaintiff where the injury had put the plaintiff? An event that grows out of the injury is a response, and a response breaks the chain of legal cause only if it was abnormal. An event that merely finds the plaintiff is a coincidence, and a coincidence breaks the chain unless it was foreseeable. Negligent medical treatment, complications and later accidents, and suicide show the sort at work.
Negligent Medical Treatment
A physician who treats an injury carelessly is a third person whose negligence arrives after the defendant's, so the analysis starts with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447. Under that section, an intervening act is not a superseding cause merely because it is negligent if the actor should have realized that a third person might so act, if a reasonable person knowing the situation would not regard the act as highly extraordinary, or if the act is a normal consequence of a situation the actor created and was not done in an extraordinarily negligent manner.3 Medical care is where those alternatives operate most often. The settled rule appears in Stuart v. Hertz Corp.: when an injured person exercises reasonable care in securing a competent physician or surgeon and in following the physician's advice, and the injuries are then aggravated by the physician's negligence, mistake, or lack of skill, the original wrongdoer's negligence remains the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the bad treatment, and the wrongdoer is liable for them.4 Looney v. Davis reaches the same result by calling subsequent negligent medical care foreseeable and therefore not superseding.5
Foreseeability explains the rule first. A person who is hurt must obtain care, and fallible professionals deliver it, so the risk of imperfect treatment travels with the injury. Negligently deficient medical care is a foreseeable risk not because it is common enough to be probable but because it is not so rare or bizarre that it should save the driver from liability for aggravated injuries that would not have been incurred but for the driver's negligence.6 The same source makes the point about successive professionals: a second lawyer's negligent review of a document does not prevent the first lawyer from being a proximate cause of the resulting losses, and the second lawyer's negligence is also a proximate cause, since it was precisely the harm foreseeable if care was not taken.7 Applied to medicine, the physician's error and the original wrongdoer's conduct can both be proximate causes of the added damage. Review questions that ask whether a driver answers for a victim's further injury from negligent medical treatment point to Jess Edwards, Inc. v. Goergen for the answer.8 In the vocabulary of this chapter, treatment is a response to the condition the defendant created.
The condition that the injured person use reasonable care follows from the same logic. A person hurt by another's negligence did not choose to need a doctor and cannot avoid needing one, so when the care goes wrong the loss belongs with the person whose negligence made treatment necessary and not with a patient who acted reasonably. That premise lasts only as long as the plaintiff's conduct stays reasonable. A plaintiff who picks a plainly unqualified provider or ignores the physician's instructions has helped produce the aggravation, and the rule's protection no longer applies on its own terms.
Ordinary medical negligence is part of the risk, but the rule has an outer edge, and the edge comes from the question about normality that runs through the chapter. The third alternative in § 447 carries its own limit: a normal consequence of the situation the actor created stays attached to the actor only if the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.9 Criminal causation asks a parallel question and serves here as an analogy only, because criminal liability serves different purposes. One criminal-law illustration treats grossly negligent medical treatment as generally not foreseeable or the natural and probable result of the defendant's conduct; such a deviation from the standard of medical competence is unusual as a matter of human experience, so it is an independent intervening cause.10 A homicide court drew the line the same way. It is ordinarily no defense that inadequate treatment contributed to the victim's death, the court said, but grossly improper treatment may discharge liability when it is the sole cause of death and so an unforeseeable intervening cause, and the record before it showed no such treatment.11 In that formulation, the words that carry the limit are grossly and sole. A fact pattern that says only that a physician made a mistake describes the ordinary case, in which the original wrongdoer remains liable.
The rule also stops at harm the treatment did not aggravate. The Stuart formulation speaks of injuries “aggravated or increased” by the treatment, and that is the harm the rule reaches.12 A victim hurt when the ambulance carrying him to the hospital is struck by another vehicle has suffered a new injury, and no physician's care worsened the original wound. The malpractice rule does not decide that case. The general question does: was the later event so extraordinary or unforeseeable that it supersedes the defendant's negligence?13
Intervening-cause doctrine also limits the liability of an actor who was already negligent and already a cause in fact of the harm, and it cannot supply those elements. In Chamberland v. Roswell Osteopathic Clinic, a failure-to-diagnose appendicitis case, the New Mexico court held an independent-intervening-cause instruction inappropriate because the instruction assumes negligence and causation in fact by the original actor; without an original tortious act or omission by the clinic staff, subsequent causes cannot intervene.14 The plaintiff must establish the defendant's own negligence and causation first, and the later treatment enters the analysis only afterward.
Complications and Later Accidents
Medical care is only one response an injury calls forth. The wound may become infected, a frail plaintiff may die of an injury a healthy person would survive, an impaired plaintiff may fall a second time, and a frightened one may fall ill. These events are not efforts to avert harm, so § 445 does not govern them; the response-versus-coincidence sort does. Criminal causation states that sort with unusual clarity. It rests on the same two-part framework as tort, cause in fact and proximate cause,18 and although criminal decisions serve as analogy and not controlling tort authority, they supply clean examples.
The criminal puzzle arises when a defendant brings about the intended result in a manner never contemplated.19 The variation may be slight, as when A aims at B's heart and hits B's head.20 It may be great, as when A shoots at B and misses, but the shot makes B turn north, and B, traveling north, is struck by lightning, a death that would not have happened but for A's shot.21 The shot supplied only the place where the lightning struck, which is coincidence in its purest form. An arson example makes the same point: a defendant who throws a torch inside a house, where it flickers and dies, is not guilty of arson when lightning burns the house, because his act did not cause the burning, although he is guilty of attempt.22 Criminal law arguably demands a closer link between conduct and result than tort does, since tort may hold a defendant responsible for harms different from those the conduct actually risked.23 When a criminal court finds a defendant responsible for later harm, a tort court has even less reason to hesitate.
Infection is the standard response that stays with the defendant. A wound opens the body to germs, and a body weakened by injury resists them poorly, so an infection that sets in comes from the injury's own condition and not from an outside agency. Review questions that ask whether an injured person will contract pneumonia or another infection because of a weakened condition, and die of it, belong with the fact patterns treated as within the risk of the original injury.24 The mechanism rests on what the defendant did. The negligence created both the opening and the weakness, so the infection is the harm the injury was already threatening.
A plaintiff who is unusually fragile presents the same problem from another side. The weakness exists before the defendant acts, so it is a condition the defendant meets and not a force that follows the negligence. Tort law holds the defendant responsible for the full extent of harm to a susceptible plaintiff, which courts express by saying the defendant takes the plaintiff as found, and the thin-skull situation is among the fact patterns in which proximate-cause principles have become fairly well crystallized.25 Criminal causation reaches the same result. When A attacks B and inflicts a wound that a healthy person would survive, and B dies because disease, earlier wounds, exposure, or intoxication has left B weak, A is the direct cause of the death, even if B would eventually have died of the condition, because A's attack carried B off sooner.26 In People v. Stamp, a robbery victim with a history of heart disease died, and the court held that the robber had proximately caused the death.
A defendant cannot choose the people the conduct will reach. Negligence lands on whoever is actually in the road or on the sidewalk, and some of those people are more fragile than average. A rule that discounted liability for the fragile would let the careless actor profit from the victim's vulnerability and leave the loss with a plaintiff who did nothing wrong. The weakness explains why the harm was larger than a healthy person would have suffered. It does not explain who caused the harm, because without the defendant's conduct the weakness would have stayed dormant.
A second accident is the next place the sort does its work, and the answer depends on what produced it. Review questions ask whether the injured person's second accident, six months later and while walking on crutches, stays with the first wrongdoer, and Squires v. Reynolds is the decision they cite.27 The crutches explain why the later accident belongs to the defendant. The first injury is the reason the plaintiff is on them, and impaired balance and reduced mobility make a fall likely, so the later accident grows out of the condition the defendant created.
A victim left helpless in a place of danger presents the same pattern with an outside actor. The standard question asks whether a driver who hits a pedestrian and leaves the pedestrian helpless in the street answers when another car runs the pedestrian over, and Bunda v. Hardwick is the cited authority.28 People v. Kibbe supplies a criminal counterpart. Robbers left an intoxicated victim alone at night on a rural road in winter, and a speeding truck killed him. The New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the truck driver's conduct superseded the robbers' conduct, because death was a foreseeable result of leaving the victim there. These cases show that a label does not end the analysis. A coincidence, by definition, uses the defendant's negligence only as an occasion, yet courts keep the defendant liable when the situation the defendant created normally produces the later event, as when a helpless person left in a traffic lane is run over.
Illness brought on by fright is a bodily response of the same kind. Review questions ask whether a driver who narrowly misses a pregnant woman and frightens her into a miscarriage answers for the miscarriage, and they cite Mitnick v. Whalen Bros.29 Section 444, taught earlier in this chapter, provides that an act done in normal response to fear or emotional disturbance that the actor's negligence was a substantial factor in producing is not a superseding cause of the harm that act does to the actor or a third person.30 A miscarriage is a bodily reaction and not an act, but the reasoning carries over: the defendant's carelessness created the fright, and the body's reaction to fright is a normal consequence of it. The limit is the same as for conduct, because the shock must come from the defendant's negligence and not from an unrelated alarm.
The sharpest contrast with infection is a disease the plaintiff catches from someone else in the hospital. That illness comes from an outside source that could have reached any patient in the ward, and the injury supplied only the setting. It is therefore a coincidence, which breaks the chain unless it was foreseeable, as it would be if an outbreak in that hospital were generally known.31 Infection of the wound and a contagion from another patient may arrive in the same hospital bed, so the setting cannot separate them. What separates them is whether the harm grew out of the plaintiff's injured condition or merely found the plaintiff there.
Suicide After Injury
A suicide looks like the clearest superseding act: a deliberate choice by the very person the defendant harmed. Courts have refused to treat it as superseding in every case, and they sort suicide cases by what produced the act and by what the defendant owed the victim. Three groups emerge: an injury that destroys the capacity to choose, a defendant with a duty to prevent suicide, and a defendant who merely supplied the means.
The leading answer for the first group comes from Fuller v. Preis. A physician in sound health struck his head in a car collision, suffered repeated seizures he had never had before, and months later took his own life. His executor sued on the theory that the ensuing mental disease had left him unable to resist an impulse to destroy himself.34 The New York Court of Appeals held that an act of suicide is not, as a matter of law, a superseding cause in negligence law that precludes liability. An initial tortfeasor may be liable for the wrongful acts of a third party if they are foreseeable, the court said, and neither public policy nor precedent bars recovery for the suicide of a tortiously injured person driven insane by the consequence of the tortious act.35
The rule has a shape that follows its reason. A deliberate act ordinarily cuts off the defendant's liability because a responsible agent chose it, and the choice belongs to that agent. When the defendant's tort destroys the capacity to choose, that premise is gone, and the act is the injury continuing to operate on the victim. In the chapter's vocabulary, it is a response to a condition the defendant created. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 455 states the same limit: suicide is not a superseding cause when it results from an insanity, caused by the defendant's tort, that prevents the victim from realizing the nature of the act or controlling conduct.36 A suicide fact pattern therefore turns first on whether the injury produced the mental state. That the act was deliberate describes every suicide and decides nothing.
The second route depends on the defendant's relationship to the person, and the mental-disease inquiry drops away. Tort law sometimes imposes an affirmative duty to use care to prevent suicide on particular classes of defendants, and when it does, the suicide is not an intentional act that supersedes the defendant's negligence.37 In Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., the court treated the suicide itself as the foreseeable risk, which cannot therefore be a superseding cause.38 In Singing River Health System v. Vermilyea, police officers coaxed a person off a bridge and took the person to the defendant hospital for treatment; the hospital discharged the patient a few hours later, and the patient returned at once to the bridge and jumped.39 The reasoning parallels § 449: when the likelihood that a third person will act in a particular manner is the hazard that makes the actor negligent, the act does not relieve the actor of liability, whether it is innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal.40 A hospital that discharges a suicidal patient is careless precisely because suicide may follow, so treating the suicide as an interruption would cancel the duty. Duty also marks the edge of this route. In Cotten v. Wilson the defendant was a psychiatrist, but his relationship with the decedent was romantic and not doctor-patient, and the Tennessee court found no affirmative duty to prevent suicide.41 What decided the case was the nature of the relationship, and professional training alone created no obligation.
The third group involves a defendant who only supplied the means. In Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a store sold ammunition to a minor who used it to end his own life, and the Iowa court treated the minor's act as a superseding cause. The Oklahoma court reached the same result in Runyon v. Reid, where barbiturates were sold without refill authorization.42 The cases suggest that the result might have been otherwise if the sellers had had reason to suspect the buyer's intent.43 Without that reason, the buyer's decision stands as the deliberate act of a responsible person, and the sale supplied only the opportunity. The structure parallels § 448, under which a third person's intentional tort or crime supersedes even though the actor's negligence afforded the opportunity, unless the actor realized or should have realized the likelihood that someone would use the opportunity that way.44 Some jurisdictions apply the same idea to a defendant who, knowing of a person's suicidal state of mind, negligently leaves a loaded gun where the person can easily reach it, and they allow a finding that the negligence was a proximate cause.45