Concept
Judge and Jury Roles
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Judge and Jury Roles
Two decision makers share every superseding-cause problem, and each has a distinct job. The court declares the rules that limit a negligent defendant's responsibility and decides the circumstances to which they apply. The jury, in the ordinary case, resolves the questions of foreseeability and normality that those rules turn on.
What the court declares
The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes it the exclusive function of the court to declare the existence or non-existence of rules that restrict the actor's responsibility short of making the actor liable for harm that his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about, and to determine the circumstances to which such rules apply.1 The limiting rules earlier in this chapter are rules of that kind: those on normal responses to danger, negligent and criminal acts of third persons, forces of nature, failures to act, and later harm from the original injury. Each marks a point at which liability ends even though the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in the harm, and the court decides where that point falls.
Intervening crimes show how such a rule is built and how it can change. It is probably impossible to state any comprehensive rule for when a negligent defendant remains liable after a third person's crime. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 448-449 and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 34, comment e, frame the inquiry as one of scope of the risk: an intervening act that is unforeseeable, unusual, or highly culpable may fall outside it.2 Courts also revise their own rules. The Kentucky Supreme Court has noted that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link in Kentucky. In Britton v. Wooten (1991), whether trash negligently allowed to accumulate next to a building was ignited accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or even criminally, the ignition may still have been foreseeable and so would not cut off liability.3
What the jury resolves
Once the court has stated a rule, whether a particular intervening event was foreseeable or normal is a different kind of question, and it ordinarily goes to the jury. What is foreseeable and what is normal can support varying inferences, as the question of negligence itself can, so these issues generally are for the fact finder to resolve.4 The question is an old one. In Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co. (N.Y. 1866), Judge Hunt rested the recovery of the owner of the building on which the defendant's negligent sparks fell on anticipation: the building's destruction was the ordinary and natural result of its being fired, to have been anticipated the moment the fire reached it.5
The same vocabulary of foreseeable, normal, and natural appears in Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., where Felix left a work area improperly protected, a car entered it, and a worker was injured. The finder of fact could have concluded that the foreseeable, normal and natural result of the risk Felix created was the injury of a worker by a car entering the area. An intervening act cannot be a superseding cause where the risk of its occurring is the very risk that renders the actor negligent.6 The court supplied the rule, and the jury could decide whether a car's entry fit it.
When the court decides the question itself
The same opinion recognizes that in some cases only one conclusion can be drawn from the established facts, and legal cause may then be decided as a matter of law. Those cases generally involve independent intervening acts that operate upon the original negligence without flowing from it. The opinion's example is a lessor that negligently supplied a car with a defective trunk lid and was held not liable to the lessee, who was injured by a third driver's negligent driving while stopped at the curb to repair the trunk.7 The lessor's negligence undoubtedly placed the lessee at the scene, but the third driver's act was divorced from, and was not the foreseeable risk associated with, that negligence. Set that beside Derdiarian. In each case an intervening car injured someone, and what separates the cases is whether the car's arrival was the risk that made the defendant negligent or only a coincidence of place.
Local law can move the line further toward the bench. One court noted that, under the applicable law, whether a superseding cause constituted a legal cause was a question for the court and not the jury.8 That is a jurisdiction-specific rule. The general default remains that the judge states the rule, the fact finder resolves foreseeability and normality where inferences vary, and the judge decides the application outright only when the established facts permit a single conclusion.
The third step does most of the work, and it is where answers most often go wrong. A question that asks whether a third person's act superseded is really two questions: what the rule is, and whether these facts satisfy it. The first belongs to the court. The second belongs to the jury unless the facts leave room for only one answer.