Concept
Invitees
Possessor of land and entrant status
Invitees
Invitee status has two doors. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 provides that “an invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor,”1 and an entrant who passes through either door is an invitee. A public invitee is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.2 A business visitor is invited to enter or remain for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor.3 Each definition requires an invitation and then adds a purpose, and the added purpose is what keeps an invited social guest among the licensees.
Both doors lead to the same justification. An invitation can be read as an implied representation that the possessor has used reasonable care for the visitor's safety, and the visitor may rely on that representation.4 The possessor controls the land and can inspect it. The invitee, following the purpose of the visit, has no reason to search for concealed hazards and is poorly placed to find them. When the possessor has asked for the visit, fairness puts the burden of looking on the party who asked and who can look. That reliance explains why the traditional rules attach the duty of reasonable care to invitees, although a substantial number of courts now extend ordinary care to licensees or even trespassers.5
The two doors have different histories, and the difference explains the Restatement's wording. In most jurisdictions an economic-benefit test was once the only test, and the possessor's greater duty was the price of the benefit a visit brought.6 Courts stretched that test to cover browsers and others whose benefit to the possessor was only potential, indirect, or remote, and the strain showed that the test was too narrow.7 They then added a public-invitation test, which treats those who attend free public meetings, lectures, and church services as invitees although the possessor gains nothing economically.8 Section 332 now names both tests. The sections below take each branch in turn and then the invitation requirement that the branches share.
Public Invitees
Three phrases in § 332(2) define the first door. The entrant must be invited, which here means the possessor has opened the land to the public and so asked the public to come. The entrant must come as a member of the public, answering an offer of access that the possessor has made to everyone or to some segment of the community. And the entrant must come for a purpose for which the land is held open, which ties the status to what the possessor has invited the public to do there.9 The text says nothing about any gain to the possessor, and that silence separates this branch from § 332(3), which requires a connection to business dealings.10
The silence is deliberate. A possessor who opens land to the public controls it and can inspect it, while the visitors who respond cannot check every step and walkway, so they reasonably assume the place is ready for the purpose it was opened for. That reliance is justified whenever premises are opened to the public, whether or not the possessor earns anything.11 The public-invitation test, which § 332(2) codifies, therefore extends invitee status when the possessor invites the public or some segment of it to enter and the plaintiff enters for the purpose of the invitation.12
The qualifying settings share one feature: the land is open to the public for some purpose. Free public meetings, lectures, church services, college reunions, spectators at free amusements, and users of public or private land held open for a recreational or social purpose are invitees although the possessor gains nothing economically.13 Visitors to municipal parks, golf courses, swimming pools, and national parks have received the same status.14 In Smith v. United States, a camper in a public campground in a national forest was among those held to be invitees, in a setting where no economic transaction is even possible.15 And in Guilford v. Yale University, an alumnus attending a class reunion went into a dark area late at night, fell over a low retaining wall, and was held an invitee without regard to any question of mutual benefit.16
The same reasoning reaches a traveler who walks into a store in an airport terminal only to pass the time between flights. The traveler is an invitee despite intending to buy nothing, because the terminal is held open to travelers, and the children in tow, the friend being seen off, and even a photographer taking pictures of deplaning passengers are invitees too, so long as their presence fits the public invitation.17 Decisions that treated invitees only as business visitors had to defend such results with the farfetched suggestion that a visitor who buys nothing today might buy something at some indefinite time later. The public-invitee branch makes that suggestion unnecessary.18
A private home can be held open to the public as well, and Post v. Lunney shows how an economic-benefit test would have produced the wrong answer. While touring the Post estate, the plaintiff tripped on transparent vinyl laid over a valuable oriental rug and fractured her hip.19 The trial judge classified her as a licensee because Ms. Post received nothing for letting her into the house. The Florida Supreme Court rejected that reasoning and treated her as a public invitee, since Ms. Post had opened her home for a paid public tour.20 The purpose for which the house was held open carried the result, and any gain to Ms. Post played no part. A friend whom Ms. Post had asked to lunch at the same house would have been a social guest, and so a licensee, because the lunch would have been a private visit for which the house was not open to the public.
The opposite pole is the entrant whose presence rests on private permission and on no opening of the land to the public. A landowner who merely permits a hunter to use the land has issued no invitation at all, even an implied one, and the hunter is a licensee.21 The landowner has made a choice about one person, whereas a public invitation is a standing offer to everyone who comes for its purpose, and only the offer gives visitors reason to expect that the land has been made ready. The common exam error is to ask whether the possessor profited from the visit. That question belongs to § 332(3), and asking it of an airport browser or a park visitor, who qualify, if at all, under § 332(2), turns away entrants with every claim to invitee status.
The words “for a purpose for which the land is held open” also limit the status, because the invitation reaches only those who come for the purpose it was extended for.
Purpose also fixes how far an invitation reaches, a point the later sections on the area, time, and purpose of the invitation develop: a person may be an invitee on one part of the premises but not on another, or at one time but not at another.22 Two other refinements complicate the picture. When the possessor is a government, most courts have abandoned the old rule that status depends on whether the entrant came for the purpose for which the land was open, and instead owe reasonable care to everyone who comes onto the premises.23 And statutes in most states change the result for recreational land, so a person who uses land for recreation without paying may be treated differently from an ordinary public invitee; those recreational-use statutes are covered separately.24
Business Visitors
Section 332(3) supplies the second door: a business visitor is “a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.”26 Three phrases carry the definition. The entrant must be invited, so the possessor must have asked for the visit by words or conduct, a requirement taken up below. The invitation must be for a purpose, which makes the question what the visit is for, whatever the possessor's warmth toward the visitor. And the purpose must be connected with business dealings with the possessor, either directly, as when the entrant has come to buy, sell, or work, or indirectly, as when the visit supports dealings that come later or that someone else carries out. The last phrase sets the reach of the category, and most of what follows turns on how far it extends.
The definition looks to business dealings because the greater duty owed to an invitee began as the price of a benefit. In Indermaur v. Dames, a journeyman gasfitter came to a sugar refinery to test a patent gas regulator installed there by his employer, fell down an open and unguarded shaft in the floor, and was held to be owed a duty of reasonable care because he came “on business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied.”27 The Second Restatement's term business visitor reflects the theory that the occupier's duty of affirmative care is the price paid for the present or prospective economic benefit the visitor's presence brings.28 Two links make that price fair. A possessor who earns from visits has chosen to draw people onto land the possessor controls and can inspect, so the cost of looking for hazards falls on the party who collects the gain. The visitor, drawn by that commercial invitation and unable to examine the premises, has reason to assume the place is ready for the visit. The words present or prospective also explain indirectly in § 332(3), because a benefit that has not yet arrived still counts, and the benefit need not be an immediate sale.
The clear cases involve a direct benefit to the possessor. Customers and prospective customers of any business open to sell goods, provide services, or offer entertainment are easily business visitors, and so are employees, independent contractors, and the employees of independent contractors whom the possessor has expressly or impliedly invited onto the land.29 The contractor group includes those who deliver goods and those who haul out trash.30 A salesperson who comes in response to an implicit or explicit invitation belongs here too, because that person is dealing with the possessor in a potential economic exchange.31 Each of these entrants is on the land because of an arrangement with the possessor's business, so the possessor can point to a sale, a service, or a day's labor as what the visit produces.
The word indirectly starts to do visible work when the benefit is a prospect or a habit. A delivery person who brings a package nobody ordered may be a business invitee where the occupant has accepted such deliveries for years, on the theory that the deliveries give the occupant a material benefit, and Johnson v. Short is the decision cited for that result.32 The years of accepted deliveries are the connection, because they turn a stranger's drop-off into part of the occupant's established dealings.
Customers who are only looking show how prospective the benefit may be. A person who goes into a store intending to do business with it, then or at some later time, is an invitee, and actual or potential pecuniary benefit is easily found for the customer who means to buy and for the one who is only looking.33 One court rejected the argument that a regular customer who had not yet bought anything on the day of her injury could not be an invitee to use a restaurant's toilet facilities, observing that shoppers often spend a whole day in favorite stores without buying and that no business would call them non-invitees unless an injury had occurred.34 Courts have likewise treated persons who enter a place of business to browse, to use a public telephone or restroom, or to change a bill at a bank as invitees, on the ground that the economic benefit may be merely potential, indirect, or remote in time.35 The boundary is marked by the person with no intention, now or later, of becoming a customer, who cannot be held an invitee because nothing supports any thought of mutual benefit.36
Companions raise the question whose business counts. Friends or children who accompany a customer to a store or other place of business have been held to be invitees on the ground that the economic benefit may be potential, indirect, or remote.37 The rule is tied to the purpose of the visit, since those who accompany an invitee are themselves invitees when that is consistent with the purpose for which the invitation was issued.38 In Morris v. De La Torre, the plaintiff who went to a restaurant with friends, though he did not intend to eat, was an invitee, while in Vogt v. Murraywood Swim and Racquet Club a guest whom a club member invited onto the club's premises was held only a licensee.39 The pair shows that accompanying someone who has business at the premises does not decide the question by itself. The companion's presence must fit the purpose of the possessor's invitation.
Visitors to invitees are also invitees in some cases, and courts have so held for visitors to patients in a hospital and visitors to inmates in a correctional institution.40 The connection to the possessor's business in those settings runs only through the institution's dealings with the person visited, so these decisions mark an outer edge of the benefit idea.
The stretch stops where the visit gives the possessor nothing that the possessor's business deals in. In Johnson v. Investment Co. of the South, LLC, a former tenant hurt while moving out of her apartment was a licensee and not an invitee, because moving out conferred no material or commercial benefit on the landlord.41 A union member injured doing volunteer maintenance at the union hall was likewise a licensee in Slavin v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 29, because the hall was not open to the public and the member was really there for the member's own benefit.42 And in Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., a person who entered a car lot to see an independent seller, with no plan to deal with the lot's operator, was not an invitee of the operator.43 A shopper walking that same lot to price used cars would be a prospective customer and therefore a business visitor, so the only thing separating the two entrants is whether any dealings with the possessor stand behind the visit. The limit is needed because the greater duty rests on a trade. If entry with the possessor's permission were enough, the invitee's duty would reach everyone a possessor allows onto the land, and the licensee category would have nothing left to do.
Failing § 332(3) does not end the invitee inquiry, because § 332(2) separately reaches an entrant who comes as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open, a branch added because an economic-benefit test alone proved too narrow.44 The union hall in Slavin closed both doors, since it was not open to the public. An exam stem that places a plaintiff on commercial premises invites two opposite errors. One asks whether the plaintiff bought anything, which wrongly excludes the browser and the companion. The other treats every entrant on commercial premises as a business visitor, which wrongly admits the former tenant and the visitor to an independent seller. The definition asks a single question: whether the visit is tied, directly or indirectly, presently or prospectively, to dealings with this possessor's business.
Invitation and Assurance of Safety
Invitation is the gate that every invitee passes through. Section 332 divides invitees into public invitees and business visitors, and the definition of each branch uses the same word: the entrant must be invited to enter or remain on the land.46 The word is a term of art, a legal label whose content differs from the everyday word for a request to come. Few invitees ever receive a personal, formal, express invitation, and a rule demanding one would shut out the shopper who walks into a store, the traveler in an airport terminal, and the family in a public park.47
What the law examines instead is the possessor's conduct. Any conduct that communicates that the entrant's presence is desired will do, and in Cole v. Fairchild the West Virginia court described an invitation as arising when the possessor “exhibits conduct which makes others believe the possessor wants them to be on the premises.”48 Two forms of conduct recur. The first is the way the possessor holds the premises open, as with retail stores, airports, and public parks, and the second is the possessor's own arrangement for the plaintiff to be on the land.49 In both, the possessor has done something a reasonable entrant would read as welcome, so the entrant needs no separate message addressed to that individual, because the open door or the arrangement already delivers it.
Contractors illustrate the second form. Independent contractors, and the employees of independent contractors, whom the possessor has expressly or impliedly invited onto the land are invitees, a group that includes those who haul out trash.50 The trash-hauling example comes from Hull v. Bishop-Stoddard Cafeteria. Nobody at the possessor's business need have spoken to the hauler, because the possessor's decision to have the work done on the premises already tells the contractor that being there is wanted.
Private areas show conduct supplying an invitation where the setting does not. In Handleman v. Cox, salespersons were on a portion of the premises not open to the public, and the court regarded the parties' prior dealings as enough to support a jury finding that the salespersons had been invited to be there.51 The two decisions differ in where the message comes from. In Hull the possessor's arrangement for the work supplied it. In Handleman no arrangement covered that particular visit, so the history between the parties had to carry the message, and the invitation was something a jury could find from that history.
Invitation matters because of what it tells the entrant about the land. The invitation may be read as carrying an implied representation that the possessor has used reasonable care for the visitor's safety, and the visitor is entitled to rely on that representation.52 The possessor controls the land and can inspect it, while an entrant who follows the purpose of the visit has little occasion to search for hidden hazards, so a message that the entrant is wanted invites the entrant to assume the possessor has already looked. The principle can be stated without the word invitation at all: anyone who receives an implicit or explicit assurance of safety is entitled to invitee status and the reasonable care that goes with it, and the public-invitee and business-visitor definitions are efforts to find objective markers of that assurance.53 That is why courts read invitation from conduct and not from formal requests. A written invitation and an unlocked storefront both deliver the assurance, and the law protects the reliance either one produces.
Invitation is essential under both branches, but it does not by itself confer invitee status.54 A host who urges a colleague to come to a private dinner has invited the colleague in the everyday sense, yet the colleague is only a licensee, because neither a business purpose nor a public-use purpose stands behind the visit. The usual exam error is to stop at the question whether the possessor asked the entrant to come. That question settles only the first element, and § 332 goes on to require a purpose of the kind each branch names.55
The first outer limit of the doctrine is the visitor who has no invitation at all. A landowner who merely permits a hunter to use the land has issued no invitation, even implicitly, and the hunter is a licensee.56 Permission tells the entrant only that the possessor will not object to the entry. An invitation tells the entrant that the possessor wants the visit, and only a wanted visitor has reason to suppose the land was made ready. The same line appears where earlier dealings exist. In Bidiman v. Gehrts, an insurance agent had previously contacted the defendant about a policy renewal at the defendant's business and not at home, and the court found no implicit invitation to come to the defendant's home.57 Contact about business at the office communicated welcome at the office and left the home unaddressed, because an invitation reaches only as far as the possessor's conduct does.
The second outer limit is entry under an official privilege. A firefighter who enters a building under the authority of law is not an invitee at all, because what makes the entry lawful is the privilege and nothing the possessor said or did.58 The possessor could object, and the firefighter could enter anyway, so the entry carries no communication that the possessor wants the entrant there and no assurance that the premises are ready. Firefighters and police officers are accordingly treated more or less like licensees in many cases, a placement taken up in the earlier discussion of entrants privileged by law.59