Concept
Constant Trespassers on a Limited Area
Duty owed to adult trespassers
Constant Trespassers on a Limited Area
Sections 334 and 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts create the first of the exceptions this chapter takes up to the rule that a possessor owes trespassers no duty of care. Section 333 states that rule and reserves §§ 334 through 339 from it.1 Section 335 then supplies the test for conditions: a possessor who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area of the land is liable for bodily harm that an artificial condition there causes them, if he has failed to use reasonable care to warn them of the condition and the risk involved.2 The people who cross the land remain trespassers throughout. What changes is the possessor's position, because he can no longer say that he had no reason to expect them.
Two facts justify the change. Frequent intrusion makes the presence of intruders highly foreseeable, and the limited area makes protecting them cheap, since the possessor has to look after one place and not an entire tract.3 A railroad that knows the public habitually crosses its tracks at a particular spot, even as trespassers, must therefore use reasonable care for their safety in running its trains there, and it would owe them a warning if it decided to electrify one of the rails.4
The exception works through two branches. Section 334 governs the possessor's active operations on the limited area that create a risk of harm to the trespassers, and § 335 governs a dangerous artificial condition that the possessor has created or maintains and has reason to believe the trespassers will not discover.5 In each branch the possessor is liable for ordinary negligence, not merely for reckless misconduct.6 The next subsection takes up the threshold that both branches share. The three after it build the condition branch requirement by requirement, and the last turns to activities.
Constant Intrusion, Limited Area
Both branches begin with the same threshold, and a plaintiff who cannot meet it never reaches the question whether the condition or the operation was dangerous. Section 335 states it this way: the possessor must be one “who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area of the land.”7 The clause holds three ideas (how often, where, and what the possessor knows), and they fail for different reasons, so the paragraphs below take them one at a time.
The first idea, frequency, turns on the word “constantly.” The intrusion must recur as a habit of the public and not happen now and then. The court in Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp. speaks of “recurring intrusions” that the possessor knows of or should have known of.8 The requirement follows from the reason for the general rule, which excuses a possessor from precautions because he has no reason to expect anyone. Once the same kind of entry keeps recurring, he can see that people will come again, and the stranger he owed nothing becomes a visitor he can prepare for. A single crossing, or visits scattered across a season, show only that trespass is possible, and the general rule already covers that case.
The second idea, place, ties the exception to “a limited area of the land”: a crossing, a gap in a fence, a footpath, and not the possessor's holding as a whole. The exception covers frequent trespassers on a very limited area, within which the possessor must anticipate them and exercise reasonable care for their protection.9 Cost explains the limit. A warning or a guard at one known spot costs little, because the limited area reduces the burden of protecting the trespassers who come there.10 The same duty spread over thousands of acres would impose the unlimited burden of inspection that the general rule refuses to impose.
The third idea, knowledge, offers two routes. The possessor may actually know of the pattern, or the law may charge him with knowing it because the facts within his knowledge point to it. The second route gives the exception its force, since without it a possessor could escape the duty by never looking at a path that his own employees cross every day. The Imre court frames the duty the same way, as one that arises when recurring intrusions are known or, “from the facts within his knowledge,” should have been known.11 The phrase starts from facts the possessor already has. It does not require him to inspect the land to learn whether anyone is crossing it, so the exception does not become a general duty of inspection.
A path is the evidence that most often supplies those facts. In Imre, the existence of a well-defined path across the land was held sufficient evidence of frequent trespass.12 A path forms only when many people walk the same line over time, it marks one strip of ground, and it lies in plain view of anyone who works the land. One observation therefore establishes frequency and place and gives the possessor the facts from which knowledge follows.
The knowledge required here differs from what the known-trespasser rules demand. Section 335 asks whether the possessor knows of a pattern, meaning recurring entry at a particular place, and not whether he knew that a particular person was present when the injury occurred. The known-trespasser rules, taken up later in this chapter, ask about the individual entrant: the possessor must know or have reason to know that the trespasser is actually present.13 The constant-trespasser exception can therefore protect an entrant whom the possessor never noticed, because the habit of the public had already told him that someone would come.
The usual trap on this threshold is to treat foreseeability as the test. Under the Second Restatement, foreseeability of a trespasser is not enough; the possessor must know or have reason to know that the trespasser is actually present.14 Most courts still begin with the traditional classifications, but a substantial number have extended the duty of ordinary care to licensees and even to trespassers.15 The closing sections of this chapter return to those departures. For now, the first question on a fact pattern is which approach the jurisdiction follows, because in a Restatement jurisdiction facts showing only that trespassers could be expected do not satisfy § 335.
The third step does the most work on exams, because the possessor's testimony that he never saw anyone is beside the point when the facts he did have, like a plain path, would have told him.
The Dangerous Artificial Condition
Once the threshold is met, § 335 turns to the hazard. Liability reaches only bodily harm caused by “an artificial condition on the land,” and subsection (a) describes that condition by what the possessor did with it and what he knew about it.17 The condition must be one the possessor has created or maintains.18 It must also be, to his knowledge, likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the trespassers.19 The Imre opinion states the knowledge requirement the same way, describing a condition such in nature that the possessor knows it is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, and it adds the elements of concealment and failure to warn, which the next two subsections cover.20
The word artificial confines the exception to man-made hazards. A wire, a pit, a machine, or a rail is on the land because someone chose to build it or to keep it, while a ravine or a rock face is there whatever the possessor does. A natural feature therefore stays under the general rule, which relieves the possessor of any duty to make the land reasonably safe for trespassers.21 The limit fits the logic of the exception, which holds a possessor to account for hazards that his own choices put or kept on the land.
The possessor who builds the condition qualifies, and so does the one who did not build it but keeps it in place or in operation, as when a new owner leaves energized a fence wire that his predecessor strung.22 The reason is control. The person who creates or maintains a condition can remove it, guard it, or shut it off, and for him a warning costs least. A hazard that the possessor neither created nor maintains lacks the connection that would justify a duty toward people to whom he otherwise owes nothing.
Knowledge shapes the exception most. The condition must be, “to his knowledge, likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to such trespassers.”23 The text asks what the possessor actually knows about the danger, and it omits the “should know” alternative that appears in the threshold clause.24 The omission keeps the exception consistent with the rule it modifies. A possessor need not inspect his land for trespassers, and a knowledge requirement that an inspection could satisfy would bring the inspection duty back in through the exception. Actual knowledge confines the exception to dangers the possessor already has in mind, and the one precaution it demands, a warning, can be given without searching the land. His knowledge of the pattern of intrusion and his knowledge of the danger are separate findings, and proof of one does not supply the other.
The danger must also be grave, since the harm must be death or serious bodily harm, and it must be likely. The exception departs from the rule that an undiscovered trespasser is owed nothing, and the severity requirement confines that departure to stakes grave enough to justify it. The decided cases fit the text, because they mostly involve risks of serious bodily harm or death.25
The electrified rail ties the elements together. A railroad that knows the public habitually crosses at a particular spot and decides to electrify a rail has created an artificial condition that it knows can kill, which is the hazard § 335(a) describes.26 Whether it owed a warning then depends on whether the live rail was hidden from the trespassers, the requirement developed next.
A hazard can fail on severity or on artificiality even when everything else is in place.
A failure on the knowledge element looks different, because everything else about the hazard can be satisfied.
The first two steps rarely produce a real contest. The third usually does, because the question is what this possessor knew and not what a careful possessor would have found, and a trespasser who can show only that the danger was discoverable has not met it.
Hidden From the Trespasser
Section 335(a)(iii) adds that the condition must be of such a nature that the possessor has reason to believe the trespassers will not discover it.28 The earlier requirements described a man-made hazard that the possessor created or maintains and knows to be likely to kill or seriously injure. This one asks how that hazard presents itself to the people crossing the land, and it narrows the exception to concealed dangers. The test looks to the nature of the condition and to what the possessor can fairly infer from it. A steel rail carrying lethal current looks like any other rail, so the electrified rail from the preceding subsection qualifies: nothing in its appearance warns a walker, and a possessor who knows the public crosses there has reason to believe the danger will go unnoticed.
The requirement exists because of the one precaution the exception demands. A warning helps only when it tells the trespasser something he does not already know. A deep excavation, visible in daylight, needs no sign, because the trespasser can see it and protect himself. A hidden danger is different: the people who use the path have no other way to learn what the possessor already knows, and his silence is what causes the harm. Tying the duty to concealment keeps the exception narrow, because the possessor answers only for dangers that habitual users could not be expected to spot, which are the dangers a warning actually helps with.
The Imre court restated the elements as a condition that the possessor knows is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, that he has reason to believe the trespassers will not discover, and that he failed to use reasonable care to warn of.29 It then drew a consequence that runs against the plaintiff: as with a gratuitous licensee, a trespasser's awareness of the peril is an absolute bar to recovery, because the occupier's liability arises from the want of due care to warn of a concealed danger.30 The bar follows from the same logic as the concealment element. A trespasser who already knew of the peril lost nothing through the missing warning.
The opinion also draws on an English decision, Lowery v. Walker, that shows concealment outside the world of wires and rails. A landowner who knew that the public habitually crossed his field put a horse that he knew to be dangerous into it without warning, and he was liable to a walker the animal injured.31 A horse looks like any horse. Its savage temper, the very fact the owner knew, did not show to the people crossing the field.
Two inquiries are therefore at work. The statutory element is judged from the possessor's side: given the nature of the condition, does he have reason to believe that the trespassers will fail to discover it? The bar recognized in Imre is judged from the plaintiff's side: did this trespasser actually know of the peril? A condition can be hidden in the statutory sense and still defeat the claim of a trespasser who knew of it. In the other direction, a condition open to view gives the possessor no reason to believe it will go unnoticed, so the claim fails at this element however little the plaintiff happened to see.
Students most often go wrong by treating any dangerous condition as hidden because the plaintiff was hurt by it. The element looks forward from the possessor's position and asks what the nature of the condition gave him reason to believe about discovery. Concealment is what justifies the warning duty in the next subsection, because a trespasser who cannot learn of a danger by looking is protected only if the possessor tells him.
Failure to Warn
The final requirement shifts from the hazard to the possessor's conduct: liability attaches only if “the possessor has failed to exercise reasonable care to warn such trespassers of the condition and the risk involved.”33 The earlier requirements describe a concealed, man-made danger that the possessor created or maintains and knows to be likely to kill or seriously injure. This one asks what he did about it. Imre lists the element last, as “a failure of reasonable care to warn the trespassers of the condition and the attendant risk of injury.”34 A plaintiff who proves the hazard has proved only the setting for liability and must still show that the possessor withheld a reasonable warning.
The duty is a duty to warn. It does not require the possessor to inspect the land, repair the hazard, fence it, or redesign the premises. By this point the possessor knows of a concealed danger at a spot where people habitually cross, so the trespassers lack one thing, the information that would let them avoid it. A warning supplies that information cheaply, and because the intrusion is confined to a limited area, the possessor posts it in one place.35 A duty to make the land safe would impose an expensive obligation for the benefit of people with no right to be there, and it would revive the burden of precautions that the no-duty rule exists to prevent. The Imre opinion calls the duty the “natural duty of reasonable care to warn of the hidden risk of death or severe bodily injury” and treats it as equally compelling toward a bare licensee and toward a trespasser.36
The text asks for a warning of two things, the condition and the risk involved, and the two halves do different work. A warning of the condition tells the trespasser what is there, a warning of the risk tells him what it can do, and he needs both to decide to stay clear. A general “No Trespassing” sign tells entrants that the possessor wants them off the land, yet it names neither the condition nor the risk. A person already on the land despite the possessor's wishes learns nothing from it about the hazard underfoot, so a sign that speaks only of exclusion leaves the concealed danger as hidden as before, and the duty goes unmet unless some other warning names the condition and the risk.37
The railroad that electrifies a rail shows the element at work. A railroad that knows the public habitually crosses its tracks at a particular spot, albeit as trespassers, would have a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn them if it decided to electrify one of the rails.38 If it energizes the rail and posts nothing at the crossing, the failure to warn supports liability, because the one inexpensive step the law asks of it was never taken.
Plant A's sign names the condition and the risk where a walker will meet it, so a factfinder is likely to find reasonable care, and the argument that Plant A should have fenced or covered the pit asks for a precaution the duty does not include. Plant B's sign speaks only of exclusion and tells the walker nothing about the pit, so the danger stays as hidden as before and a factfinder could find that Plant B failed to warn. The warning is the fact that decides each case.
Breach is an issue the plaintiff must win. The known-trespasser rules taught later in this chapter likewise impose a duty of ordinary care, which is a duty to act reasonably and not a guarantee of safety.39 The question is whether the warning actually given was reasonable. A factfinder would ask whether it identified the specific hazard, whether it stood where a trespasser would meet it before reaching the danger, and whether an ordinary entrant could read and understand it in the conditions in which the crossing is used. A trespasser who walks past a clear, well-placed warning has not shown a breach.
Activities and Constant Trespassers
The activities branch, § 334, governs what the possessor does on the land, just as the preceding subsections governed what he leaves on it. A possessor who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area of the premises must use reasonable care in conducting active operations there that create a risk of harm to them.41 The threshold is the same one § 335 uses, so what this chapter has said about frequency, place, and knowledge drawn from facts such as a visible path applies unchanged.42 Only the resulting duty differs. Section 335 asks for a warning about a concealed, deadly condition; § 334 asks for ordinary care in how the possessor carries on his operations, and an operator who falls short answers for ordinary negligence.43
The railroad crossing is the standard illustration. A railroad that knows the public habitually crosses its tracks at a particular spot, even though the crossers are trespassers, must exercise reasonable care for their safety in running its trains at that point.44 Reasonable care there might include sounding a whistle on approach, slowing the train, and posting a lookout. A crew that does those things and still strikes a walker has not breached the duty, because the standard is care and not a guarantee of safety. Place matters as much as precautions. In Imre, a well-defined path across the land was held sufficient evidence of frequent trespass, and a possessor who faces that pattern must anticipate the trespassers and use reasonable care in his activities for their protection.45 The path marks the strip where the duty applies. A mile farther along the line, where no one crosses, the pattern ends and the general rule resumes.
The activities branch asks for more than a warning because of what a precaution costs when the hazard is an operation. A dangerous condition stays where it is, and making it safe usually means repairing or rebuilding the land, an expense that the law imposes on a possessor toward strangers only for a concealed and deadly hazard. An operation, by contrast, goes on moment by moment under the possessor's control, so once the place and the people are predictable he can fit the operation to them as it happens, by slowing or sounding a whistle, without redesigning anything. Two facts justify the duty: frequent intrusion makes intruders highly foreseeable, and the limited area reduces the burden of protecting them.46 Because the burden is so light, the rule is not confined to operations that threaten death or serious bodily harm, although most decided cases have involved that kind of risk.47
A question on this branch asks whether the operator had reason to expect people at that spot. The answer comes from facts about the place and not from how dangerous the operation was.
The lapse in the desert is the same as a lapse at the crossing, so the duty turns on what the possessor knew about the place.
Two rules require reasonable care in conducting operations toward a trespasser, and they turn on different knowledge. Section 334 is triggered by knowledge of a pattern of entry at a limited place, so it applies before the possessor has seen any individual: a crew that knows a crossing is in daily use owes reasonable care in operating there, and a pedestrian nobody noticed may recover if the operation was careless. Section 336 is triggered by knowledge, or reason to know, that a particular trespasser is on the land, and it covers physical harm caused thereafter by a failure to carry on activities with reasonable care for that trespasser's safety.48 Where neither a known pattern nor a known presence exists, § 333 controls, and the possessor owes no duty to conduct his activities so as not to endanger trespassers.49 An activity problem therefore sorts by what the possessor knew about the place and about the person: a pattern at a limited place, a particular trespasser, or neither.