Concept
Working Through the Exceptions
Duty owed to adult trespassers
Working Through the Exceptions
An adult trespasser who sues a possessor starts from a rule that favors the defendant. Except as Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 334 through 339 provide, a possessor owes trespassers no duty of reasonable care to put the land in a reasonably safe condition or to carry on activities so as not to endanger them.1 That default, § 333, governs whenever no exception fits, so the plaintiff's task is to fit the facts to one of the exceptions, and each exception has its own elements.
The exceptions exist because the equities sometimes favor the plaintiff over the rule. They arise where the foreseeable probability of trespassers and the extent of the foreseeable harm outweigh both the burden of precautions on the possessor and the value of his right to exclude others at will.2 Among the exceptions for adult trespassers, the fact that tips the balance is the possessor's knowledge. Sections 336 through 338 begin with a possessor who knows or has reason to know that a trespasser is present.3 Sections 334 and 335 begin with a possessor who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area.4 The first route concerns a person, the second a place, and a plaintiff needs only one of them.
The place route rests on foreseeability and cost: frequent trespass makes the presence of intruders highly foreseeable, and the limited area reduces the burden of protecting them.5 A possessor who knew neither the person nor the pattern keeps the full benefit of § 333. Because the person route usually announces itself in what the possessor saw, heard, or was told, the checklist below tests it first.
The second step asks about a person and the third about a place. Either can be met by actual knowledge or by facts within the possessor's knowledge that should have told him. A general awareness that trespassers sometimes come meets neither one: the place route demands constant intrusion, and it demands that intrusion upon a limited area.10
One set of facts can run through every step, and the question it poses is what a farmer who strings a cable across a trail owes the rider who hits it.
The rider is an adult trespasser: the farmer never gave permission and strung the cable to stop the riding. The known-trespasser sections fail at step two, because the farmer was asleep and nothing he held pointed to this rider on this night. The trail opens the other route. The farmer had watched riders follow it every weekend for years, so he knew that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area. The cable is a condition rather than an operation, so § 335 is the section to test and § 334 is not.11 Its elements then fall into place. The farmer created a dangerous artificial condition, left it unmarked in the dark where he had reason to believe riders would not discover it, and gave no warning of the condition or the risk.12 He is liable for failing to warn.
The result matches the standard railroad example: a railroad that knows the public habitually crosses its tracks at one spot must exercise reasonable care to warn them if it decides to electrify a rail.13 The farmer's knowledge that the cable could kill might also support a willful-and-wanton theory in a jurisdiction that recognizes one, but the warning duty makes that theory unnecessary.
Change the knowledge facts, and the answer disappears.
Both knowledge routes fail, so § 333 governs and the second farmer owed no duty to warn. The same default controls when a hiker wanders once into a remote shed and is hurt by a rotted step: the owner had no reason to know of the hiker or of any habitual use, and negligent maintenance alone creates no liability.14
The floor beneath § 333 stays in place in both scenes. The possessor's privilege does not reach intentional torts, because a possessor may not shoot trespassers merely for trespassing. Most jurisdictions also impose liability for willful and wanton or reckless misconduct, although some courts recognize no general rule of liability for reckless misconduct.15 Had the second farmer rigged the cable precisely to injure whoever crossed the pasture, his ignorance of any particular rider would not have protected him.
A single changed fact can open a different exception on the original trail:
- If the first farmer had been awake at the window and had seen a rider's headlight racing down the trail toward the cable, he would have known of a trespasser in dangerous proximity to a concealed, deadly condition, and § 337 would have required a warning without any proof that the trail was constantly used.16
- If he had been driving a grooming tractor along the trail and had seen a rider ahead, § 336 would have required reasonable care in carrying on that activity once he knew of the rider.17
- If he had not seen the rider but knew the trail was in constant use, careless driving of the tractor would have fallen under § 334, which requires reasonable care in active operations at the place of constant intrusion.18
- If he had been in immediate control of a force and had known a rider was in dangerous proximity to it, § 338 would have required reasonable care either to control the force or to give a warning reasonably adequate to enable the rider to protect herself.19
In every variant the exception asks for something modest. The duty is a warning, or care in running an operation, and it does not extend to making the trail safe. A farmer who hangs a reflective flag and a sign naming the cable has done what § 335 requires even though the cable stays up, because a warning of the condition and the risk leaves no breach to prove.20 The warning duties also depend on what the trespasser could be expected to appreciate: § 337 turns on the possessor's reason to believe the trespasser will not discover the condition or realize the risk.21 This checklist follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and some courts depart from it, as the next section shows.