Concept
The Section 339 Rule
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
The Section 339 Rule
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the test for most child-trespasser cases, and it works in two stages: a lead-in that screens the case, then five clauses that the plaintiff must satisfy. The lead-in makes a possessor of land liable for physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition upon the land, but only if the clauses that follow are met.1 Three limits are therefore fixed before clause (a) is reached: the harm must be physical, the injured person must be a trespassing child, and the cause must be an artificial condition. The last limit tracks the rule's exclusion of natural conditions. Almost all children can be expected to appreciate the hazards such conditions present, and the burden of altering or guarding them is usually disproportionately great, though the caveat and comment p to § 339 recognize that the risk of even a natural condition might occasionally be unreasonable.2
Once the lead-in is satisfied, the plaintiff must prove five clauses:
- (a) The place where the condition exists is one on which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass.3
- (b) The possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children.4
- (c) The children, because of their youth, do not discover the condition or realize the risk of meddling with it or of coming within the area it makes dangerous.5
- (d) The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared with the risk to the children.6
- (e) The possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.7
The rule joins these clauses with the word and, so each one is an element, and each screens out a different kind of case. Clauses (a) and (b) fix what the possessor knew. The possessor has no duty to inspect the premises, but is charged with the facts actually known and with the logical inferences from them.8 The words death or serious bodily harm in clause (b) reserve the rule for grave hazards rather than every childhood scrape. Clause (c) turns to the child. A risk is not unreasonable if the child whose trespass is anticipated can be expected to observe and fully appreciate the danger and avoid it, so a child old enough to do that falls back under the general rule governing trespassers.9 Clauses (d) and (e) then ask whether the possessor's response was reasonable in light of those facts.
Section 339 is an exception to the general rule of landowner liability to trespassers, and courts that adopt the Restatement formulation apply it strictly and only when all five elements are satisfied. The general rule governs a case unless and until the exception is shown to apply.10 Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. illustrates that approach, and one unproved clause returns the case to the general rule. The elements the section collects are common ground in many states. Bennett v. Stanley notes that knowledge of children's presence, the maintenance of a potentially dangerous force, and care by the owner commensurate with the danger are part of the attractive nuisance doctrine in most states, as § 339 reflects.11 The South Carolina Supreme Court went further. It called the Restatement a succinct and effective presentation of the considerations courts should weigh, adopted § 339, and held that future premises liability cases brought by or on behalf of child trespassers should be decided under its principles.12
A drowned child in an unfenced backyard pool tempts an exam answer that jumps straight to the fence: it was cheap, so the owner was negligent. That answer skips clauses (a) through (c), and the claim can fail at any one of them.
The second owner prevails because clause (a) fails, and since every element must be satisfied, the low cost of a fence never becomes relevant.13
Clauses (d) and (e) bring the section close to ordinary negligence analysis. Clause (d) weighs the utility of the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger against the risk to children, and clause (e) asks whether the possessor failed to use reasonable care.14 Comment o states the consequence directly: even a possessor who knows that children are likely to trespass, that the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to them, and that they are likely not to discover or appreciate the risk is liable only if the possessor fails to take the steps a reasonable person would take under the circumstances.15 That raises the question why the rule is written as a list of conditions instead of a bare command to use reasonable care toward foreseeable child trespassers. The answer lies in who decides what. Duty is a question for the court and negligence is a question for the jury, so stating the rule as conditions on liability lets a judge hold as a matter of law that a particular risk was not unreasonable, for example because the child could be expected to appreciate it, while clause (e) leaves the question of breach to the jury.16
The Third Restatement approaches child trespassers differently, a comparison taken up under Modern Trends and Limits. The next section covers the scope of the doctrine, namely artificial conditions and whether allurement matters, and the sections after it take up each of the five clauses in turn.