Concept
Scope of the Doctrine
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
Scope of the Doctrine
Before any of the five lettered clauses of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 comes into play, its lead-in has already narrowed the field to physical harm to trespassing children “caused by an artificial condition upon the land.”1 That phrase draws the first of two boundaries around the section. The second shows up as an omission: neither the lead-in nor any of clauses (a) through (e) asks whether the condition drew the child onto the land, although the older doctrine took its name from that very idea.
Both boundaries sort cases before the fact-intensive inquiry begins. A plaintiff who cannot identify an artificial condition falls back on the general rule for trespassers, which imposes no duty of reasonable care and reaches only willful injury or reckless disregard of the trespasser’s presence.2 A plaintiff who can identify one proceeds to the clauses, and allurement is not among them. The first boundary also fits the rest of the rule. Clause (d) weighs the burden of eliminating the danger against the risk to children,3 and that comparison presupposes a condition the possessor can fence, cover, alter, or remove.
The omitted element deserves separate attention because the older law treated it as essential: a possessor was liable only if the condition enticed or lured the child into exposing himself to the danger.4 Section 339 replaced that gate with five clauses. Clause (a) asks whether the possessor had reason to expect child trespassers at the place, and clause (c) asks whether the children’s youth kept them from discovering the condition or realizing the risk.5 Neither clause depends on why a particular child came onto the land. The subsections below take the two boundaries in turn.
Artificial Conditions Only
An artificial condition is one that people made or placed on the land: a structure, an excavation, a swimming pool, a machine, or equipment left outdoors. The possessor need not have created it. Clause (b) asks only whether the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition,6 so an open trench that a departed contractor left behind is an artificial condition on the possessor’s land.
Natural conditions of the land, such as a rock ledge, a stream, or a standing tree, generally fall on the other side of the line.7 The exclusion is a generalization about typical cases. In the usual case a natural hazard does not create an unreasonable risk, because almost every child can be expected to appreciate it and the burden of altering or guarding it is disproportionately great.8 A possessor who builds or keeps a structure, excavation, or machine, by contrast, controls the hazard and can often make it safe at modest cost, so the balance tends to tip toward liability. The generalization also leaves room for exceptions, because the Restatement’s caveat and comment p recognize that the risk even of a natural condition might be unreasonable under the circumstances.9
Water shows how the line works in practice. The modern trend is that a pond or other body of water is likely not an attractive nuisance, but the same reasoning does not necessarily carry over to swimming pools. Most litigated pool cases arise in densely populated urban areas, where child trespassers are more probable and keeping unwanted children out may cost less.10 Later sections return to water hazards in detail.
The section reaches conditions, not activities. A child hurt by something the possessor is doing on the land has no claim under § 339 and is left with the general trespasser rule,11 which still forbids willful injury and reckless disregard of the trespasser’s presence. The allocation tracks the section’s logic. A condition stays put until someone fixes it, so a possessor can be asked to fence, cover, or remove it in advance; an activity is conduct the actor can adjust from moment to moment.
Classifying a hazard as artificial is a separate step from asking whether a child could have appreciated its danger, and the two are easy to run together. In Laster v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. a railroad argued that § 339 has no application to a train on active tracks, whether the train is moving or stopped. The court replied that the threshold question is whether the injuring condition is natural or artificial, that the railroad offered no viable theory under which a train is not an artificial condition, and that the railroad had confused that inquiry with the analysis that follows once § 339 applies.12 The court acknowledged that a train might be an obvious danger under clause (c), as the court in Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. had concluded, but held that obviousness does not turn a train into a natural condition.13
A train therefore clears the threshold and may still lose at clause (c). That clause carries its own proof burden: the plaintiff must show that the child, because of age and inexperience, did not recognize and fully appreciate the risk. The question is distinct from contributory negligence, since a child too young to be negligent still cannot recover if he knew of the condition and fully understood the danger.14 On an exam, follow the same order: ask first who made or placed the hazard, and ask only afterward whether a child of the likely age could see the risk. Trains receive fuller treatment in the hazards section below.
Allurement Not Required
Section 339 imposes liability when an artificial condition causes harm and the five clauses are met, and nothing in its text asks whether the condition drew the child onto the land.16 The one clause that speaks to the child’s presence looks at the possessor’s side of the encounter: whether the place is one where the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass.17 Anderson v. Cahill quoted the Restatement’s comment to that clause, which makes two points. The possessor need not know that the condition is likely to attract children, and the children’s trespasses need not be due to its attractiveness. It is enough that the possessor knows or should know that children are likely to trespass on a part of the land where he maintains a condition likely to be dangerous to them because of their childish propensities to intermeddle; he is then liable even to children who knew nothing of the condition until after they entered.18
The older law treated enticement as essential, and the reasons for dropping it show best against the case that applied it most strictly. Legal dictionaries define an allurement as an attractive object that tempts a trespassing child to meddle when the child ought to abstain,19 and a rule built on allurement yields a limit almost automatically: a child already on the land when the hazard first came into view was never lured by it. In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt two children trespassed on the defendant’s land and then discovered a pool of water that looked clear but was poisoned with sulfuric acid. They went in and were harmed. Justice Holmes held the attractive-nuisance doctrine inapplicable because the pool had not attracted the children onto the land in the first instance.20 The result gave the doctrine its allurement limitation: it does not apply when the child was already a trespasser before noticing the object that caused the harm.21
The limitation gave way because enticement was never what made the possessor’s conduct unreasonable. The children in Britt were as young and as unable to recognize the danger of the pool as they would have been had it drawn them in, and a possessor who knew children roamed the area would have found them just as foreseeable. Whether they entered because of the pool or for some other reason says nothing about whether the possessor should have guarded a deadly hazard. The Second Restatement rejected the result by eliminating the element of allurement and enticement.22 The Missouri court called that change the fundamental difference between the Restatement rule and Missouri’s earlier attractive-nuisance doctrine, and the Restatement approach has since been widely accepted.23
The Missouri decision shows how the change plays out. Before Missouri adopted § 339, a possessor was liable only if the condition that injured the child enticed or lured him into the danger. After adoption, the distances from the playground and Liberty Street to the construction site no longer defeat recovery by showing that the site could not lure children. They may be considered, along with other evidence, only in determining the foreseeability of trespassing children.24 A possessor who argues that a hazard sat too far from the places children gather is therefore arguing about clause (a), not about allurement.
Henson ex rel. Hunt v. International Paper Co. reached the same place by a different road. Reasoning that a court which recognizes a duty to protect children from dangers to which they will not be attracted, and which disregards the child’s attraction onto the property, has left no useful distinction between attractive nuisance and unguarded dangerous condition, the court concluded that premises liability has a single exception to the trespasser rule: dangerous conditions that injure children. It found that view consistent with § 339, which has been widely accepted in this area.25 The Missouri case changes what counts as evidence in one dispute, while this decision changes the shape of the doctrine itself. In a § 339 jurisdiction there is one child-trespasser rule, and it has no allurement element.
Attraction has not vanished from the analysis; it has moved from a threshold requirement to a piece of evidence. A feature children find irresistible, such as a climbable machine or a swimming pool, tends to show that children will come to that part of the land and meddle, so it helps prove clause (a). Where the feature is absent, the plaintiff can prove the same fact in other ways: the nearness of a school playground, for example, or a habit of neighborhood children cutting across the land.26
Dropping allurement does not turn the possessor into an insurer. Clause (e) still requires that the possessor fail to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children.27 That requirement matches the general position of the courts, which have not adopted the view that compensation outweighs justice or that tort liability should be strict, and which have not displaced fault as the most common basis for liability.28
Not every court has abandoned the limitation. The allurement limitation continues to restrict the doctrine’s scope where courts retain it,29 and Idaho, in Nelson v. City of Rupert, is among them. In such a state the Britt facts come out as Holmes decided them: children already trespassing when they found the acid pool cannot recover, because the pool did not draw them onto the land, and the court never reaches clauses (a) through (e). Unless the governing jurisdiction demands attraction, apply § 339 as written; an answer that stops at the absence of a lure stops one step too early.
Dropping allurement removes a question about how the child came to meet the hazard. It does not remove the requirement that the child be on the land without permission. The lead-in of § 339 still speaks of children trespassing,30 and the treatment of children who enter as licensees or invitees is taken up in the modern-trends discussion below.