Concept
Working Through a Case
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
Working Through a Case
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a possessor of land liable for physical harm to trespassing children, caused by an artificial condition on the land, only if five conditions, lettered (a) through (e), all hold.1 Every problem under the section therefore runs the same route in two stages. Two threshold questions come first: who was hurt, and by what kind of hazard. The five conditions follow, each tested against the facts. Because all five must hold, the plaintiff has to establish each one, and a vivid injury or a cheap precaution cannot settle the outcome alone.
Take the conditions in the order the facts build them. Conditions (a) and (b) fix what the possessor knew about the place and the condition, (c) fixes what the child could understand, and (d) and (e) judge the possessor's response against that background.2 Notice comes first because a possessor cannot fairly be asked to weigh a burden against a risk the possessor had no reason to anticipate. Conduct comes last because care can be judged only against facts already settled. The same order helps each side. A defendant needs only one condition to fail and so hunts for the thinnest proof; a plaintiff needs all five and so builds the record where the pressure is greatest. A finished answer names that condition for each side.
A residential pool puts every condition in play, so it makes a good first problem for the method.
Both threshold questions favor the plaintiff. The five-year-old entered without permission, and a pool is a man-made structure, so the harm came from an artificial condition. Condition (a) is easy because the owner actually knows that children often swim in the pool, and the plaintiff need not rely on inference from the surroundings.3 Condition (b) turns to the condition itself. A pool whose bottom drops away out of sight threatens a small child with drowning, and an owner who maintains it should realize as much.4
Condition (c) is the plaintiff's hardest. Comment (j) to § 339 says the rule generally does not apply to dangers of fire, falling from heights, and water, which children normally understand absent other factors that create additional risks for children who cannot appreciate the nature of the harm.5 Two facts take this case outside that presumption. The child is five, and the deep end was hidden from anyone at the edge, so the child neither discovered the depth nor realized the risk of going in.6 One court analyzing a drowning claim put the point this way: the common character of a danger such as drowning in a pool should not bar relief when the child is too young to realize it, because the ability to appreciate danger varies with a child's age and mental capacity, and what matters is whether children fully understand the danger.7
Conditions (d) and (e) finish the problem. A fence would have cost little and left the owner's use of the pool intact, so the utility of keeping the pool unenclosed and the burden of enclosing it are both slight beside the risk of drowning.8 Condition (e) asks what the owner did about the danger, and the owner did nothing.9 In Gregory v. Johnson, the pool owners showed only that the child had not been invited and that they did not know of that particular child. The court held that those facts did not establish an absence of negligence as a matter of law. Issues remained about the owners' knowledge of children who could not appreciate the danger, and about whether failing to build a fence, under all the circumstances, was a failure of reasonable care.10 All five conditions can be proved here, and the claim reaches the jury. The plaintiff's weakest point is condition (c), because that is where the defendant would press the presumption about water.
Conditions (a), (b), (d), and (e) stand where they stood at the first house, so everything turns on (c). Nothing hid the water and nothing distracted the child, and children normally understand water. The presumption in comment (j) therefore bears hard on a plaintiff who has no additional risk factor to point to.11 The child's age and the visibility of the hazard are the two facts that moved the first problem. A very young child may satisfy the condition even at a clear pool, because the ability to appreciate danger varies with age. An older child may satisfy it where a concealed depth or some other extra factor kept the danger out of view.12
Condition (a) decides this problem. It asks whether the contractor knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass, and reason to know reaches what the surroundings would tell a reasonable contractor.13 The empty record of earlier trespass and the pit's being out of view are evidence for the contractor. Two schools next door point the other way and support an inference that children were likely to come. A missing history of trespass does not close the question, because the condition requires only reason to know.
If the plaintiff clears condition (a), the pit itself helps on the rest. In one reported excavation case, the pit was about ten feet deep, with water covering the bottom and metal form ties protruding from the foundation wall into the opening, and the court said a jury could find that condition to be one the defendant knew or reasonably should have known involved an unreasonable risk of death or bodily harm to trespassing children.14 The defendant there argued that a normal child of four years and ten months has, as a matter of law, enough mental development to appreciate the risk of falling into an excavation. That is an attack on condition (c), and it shows why the child's age must be fixed before the condition is tested.15
The weak point moves again. Conditions (a) through (c) remain contestable, but condition (e) is where the plaintiff is thinnest. The court in Gregory framed the question as whether failing to erect a fence was a failure of reasonable care, and this owner erected one, with a self-latching gate.16 Without evidence that the enclosure fell short, such as a gate that would not latch or a gap a small child could pass through, the plaintiff has little to put before a jury. A drowning at this pool proves nothing about care by itself, because a landowner is not an insurer of children's safety and need not guard against remote or improbable injuries.17
Across the three pools each changed fact landed on a different condition, and that is the pattern to look for in any stem:
- The child's age, and whether anything hid or disguised the hazard, move condition (c).
- What the possessor actually knew, and what nearby schools, playgrounds, or neighborhood habits would show a reasonable person, move condition (a).
- How grave the hazard is, and whether the possessor knew of it and should have realized the risk, move condition (b).
- The cost of a safeguard compared with the risk moves condition (d), and whether the possessor actually installed an adequate one moves condition (e).