Concept
Licensees Compared With Other Entrants
Duty owed to licensees
Licensees Compared With Other Entrants
A guest, a customer, and a stranger cutting across a yard can trip over the same loose stair, and the law asks a different question about each. The traditional scheme sorts entrants by how they came onto the land. The licensee holds the middle rung, above the trespasser, who has no consent, and below the invitee, who comes on business or as a member of the public. The Second Restatement draws the licensee's claim tightly. A possessor is liable for a harmful condition "if, but only if" the possessor knows or has reason to know of it, should realize that it poses an unreasonable risk to licensees and expect them not to discover it, and fails to use reasonable care to make it safe or to warn of it, and the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk.1 The test for the possessor's activities is just as confined.2
Those limits come into focus beside the neighboring rungs. A trespasser enters without consent or privilege, so the possessor has had no hand in the visit. A licensee enters with consent, which tells the entrant that coming onto the land is allowed but says nothing about whether anyone has prepared it for visitors. An invitee enters either for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor or as a member of the public on land held open to the public.3 Each step up adds a burden. Permission obliges the possessor to pass along what the possessor already knows about hidden dangers; a business or public invitation adds the work of finding and fixing them.
Two variables settle every comparison below: what the possessor knew, and what the entrant's status required the possessor to find out. The first subsection climbs to the invitee; the second descends to the trespasser.
Licensees Versus Invitees
Section 343 runs parallel to § 342, and one phrase does most of the work of separating them. It makes a possessor liable to an invitee for a condition the possessor "knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover" and should realize involves an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees.4 Section 342 reaches a condition the possessor "knows or has reason to know of."5 The words "would discover" bring an inspection duty into the invitee's case. An invitee's possessor answers for what a reasonable inspection would have turned up, including a hazard no one on the premises ever saw. A licensee's possessor answers only for what the possessor knew or had reason to know.
Decisions applying § 342 generally demand something very close to actual knowledge, so a host who never noticed a hazard owes the guest nothing about it.6 For an invitee, reasonable care may require the possessor to inspect the premises, keep them in safe repair, remove hazards where invitees are likely to walk, and deal with slippery conditions, and a warning becomes the fallback only when a hazard cannot reasonably be reduced or eliminated.7 The licensee's possessor has fewer options. A possessor who knows of a concealed danger may satisfy the duty by repairing it or by warning of it.8
The duties differ because the entrants arrive on different footing. An invitee comes in connection with the possessor's business dealings or onto land the possessor has opened to the public. Inspection and repair then become a cost of the possessor's own enterprise, and the possessor is the party best placed to bear it. A licensee comes on permission alone, and permission speaks to access, not to the condition of the house. The licensee therefore takes the premises largely as found, and the possessor's duty shrinks to passing along what the possessor knows. A sentence costs a host little; a periodic audit of the home would cost far more.
Slip-and-fall claims show the contrast most sharply, because the typical hazard is short-lived: a spilled liquid. A host seldom knows of a spill and has no duty to hunt for one, so a guest must watch for such hazards unaided. The possessor of land open to invitees must instead seek out and correct such conditions within a reasonable time after they arise.9 How long a spill must lie before a careful possessor would have found it is a question for the jury. As the California Supreme Court said in Ortega v. Kmart Corp., "Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations."10
The spill and the injury are the same in both scenes. What changes the result is the entrant's status, which fixes whether the possessor's knowledge is measured by what inspection would reveal or by what the possessor actually knew. Students often give the guest a claim because the host should have wiped the counter; that error borrows the invitee's inspection duty and applies it where it does not belong.
The invitee's rule is easy to overread, because the possessor is not a guarantor of the invitee's safety and owes only reasonable care.11 In Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, a shopper slipped in a clear puddle on a concrete floor in a busy aisle, and the Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed summary judgment for the store. No footprints or tracks tied the puddle to any employee, and the plaintiff offered next to no evidence of how long it had been there, so the store had no constructive notice, which is notice imputed to a possessor because a hazard lasted long enough to be found.12 An invitee must still prove that the possessor created the hazard or that it lasted long enough for a careful possessor to discover it. Section 343A adds a further limit: a possessor is not liable to invitees for dangers known or obvious to them unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite that knowledge or obviousness.13 The better modern view treats obviousness as bearing on the possessor's breach or the invitee's own fault, not as a limit on duty.14
Licensees Versus Trespassers
Section 342 gives a licensee what an ordinary trespasser lacks. A possessor who knows or has reason to know of a concealed condition, should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees, and should expect them not to discover it must use reasonable care either to make the condition safe or to warn of it, so long as the licensees do not already know of the danger.16 A trespasser, who enters without the possessor's consent or any other privilege, can demand no such warning.17 In most other respects the two stand alike: each takes the premises as found, and neither can require the possessor to inspect or repair the land for the visit.18 Because the static-condition duties so nearly match, the warning is the chief point of separation.
The traditional rule for trespassers appears most clearly in the railroad cases. In Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co. a man walking on a railroad's tracks slipped, caught his foot between the rail and a cattle guard, and could not free it; a train whose crew did not see him until it was almost upon him ran over the foot.19 The court called him a mere intruder, technically a trespasser, and stated the prevailing doctrine: the company has a right to a free track, is not bound to act in anticipation of trespassers, and a person who enters the track for his own purposes assumes the risks of the conditions he finds there, including the operation of engines and cars.20 The doctrine had limits even then. The court acknowledged that a trespasser is not an outlaw, that a company that wantonly injures one must answer in damages, and that some care is owed once the danger becomes apparent.21 Until the crew knows anyone is there, though, the railroad owes nothing, so the rule limits the duty before discovery and does not eliminate it.22
The reason for the rule lies in the nature of the entry. A trespasser has come without permission, so nothing the possessor did brought that person onto the land, and the possessor had no occasion to learn who would arrive or where. A duty to warn of hazards or to prepare the land for such entrants would require the possessor to guard the whole property against people the possessor has no reason to expect, which in practice means fencing, patrolling, and marking every hazard on every acre. The law declines to impose that burden for the benefit of someone whose entry was wrongful from the start.
Consent accounts for the licensee's advantage on static conditions. A possessor who permits a visit knows that someone will be on the land, usually knows best what is wrong with it, and can pass the information along at the cost of a sentence. Silence then turns permission into a trap, so the law entitles the licensee to be warned of concealed dangers that the possessor actually knows about and the licensee does not and is unlikely to discover. The Restatement says "knows or has reason to know," but decisions have generally required something very close to actual knowledge.23
Neither entrant is owed inspection or repair of static conditions, and both are protected against willful or wanton misconduct.24 In active operations the licensee's protection reaches further. Most courts now hold that a possessor conducting active operations owes licensees reasonable care, a duty that extends to licensees whose presence might reasonably be anticipated, not only to those the possessor has discovered. A trespasser receives ordinary care in active operations only once the possessor discovers him.25
The walk, the hollow, and Okonkwo's knowledge are identical in the two scenes, and consent is what turns that knowledge into a duty. Students often let the possessor's knowledge of a hazard decide the question alone, but it triggers the warning duty only toward an entrant whose presence the possessor permitted, discovered, or knew to be likely. The opposite error excuses the host because an owner need not inspect, which overlooks that an owner who actually knows of the defect has nothing left to inspect.
Two exceptions narrow the distance between trespasser and licensee. A possessor who has discovered a trespasser must use ordinary care in active operations, which includes controlling forces already in motion or warning against them.26 And a possessor who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude on a limited area must use reasonable care to warn of certain hidden artificial conditions; the rule covers children as well as adults.27 Both belong to the law of trespassers and appear here only to show where the contrast narrows. They work the same way. The ordinary rule rests on the possessor having no reason to expect anyone, and each exception supplies that reason.
Frequent intrusion on a limited area comes closest to erasing the line, and Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp. illustrates it. There the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the rule that a possessor who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area is liable for bodily harm from an artificial condition he created or maintained, if he knows the condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, has reason to believe the trespassers will not discover it, and has failed to use reasonable care to warn of the condition and the risk.28 The facts must show the frequency, and a well-defined path across the land was held sufficient evidence of frequent trespass.29 A possessor who has watched a path wear into one corner of a lot has the same information and the same inexpensive warning available as a host who knows of a hidden defect, while a possessor who has never seen anyone cross a large tract has no comparable knowledge to be charged with. The court described the duty to warn of a hidden risk as in principle as compelling toward the trespasser in that situation as toward the bare licensee, and it added that, as with a licensee, the trespasser's awareness of the peril is an absolute bar to recovery, because the liability arises from the failure to warn of a concealed danger.30
Even so, the frequent-trespasser rule does not give a trespasser everything § 342 gives a licensee. By its terms it covers an artificial condition that the possessor created or maintained and that is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, whereas § 342 reaches any condition involving an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees.31 The gap narrows without closing. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 51 abolishes the distinctions between entrants, an approach taken up at the end of this chapter.32