Concept
Modern Abolition of Categories
Duty owed to licensees
Modern Abolition of Categories
Every licensee rule in this chapter assumes that the jurisdiction still sorts entrants into classes before it measures the possessor’s duty. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 341 and 342 speak only of licensees, so they govern only where that label still carries legal weight.1 Some courts have stopped sorting, and where they have, the licensee’s limited protection dissolves into a single duty of ordinary care.2
The traditional scheme is itself the departure. In Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme Court observed that the rules governing a possessor’s liability depart from the fundamental concept that a person answers for injuries caused by carelessness. The court noted that this departure has been traced to history: the high place land has held in English and American thought, the dominance of the landowning class in England when the rules took shape, and the heritage of feudalism.3 The categories also strained the courts that applied them. In an apparent attempt to avoid the general rule limiting liability, courts broadly defined active operations, sometimes giving the term a strained construction where the occupier already knew of the danger.4 You met that pressure in the line between conditions and activities, and abolition removes the incentive to stretch.
A dinner guest and a customer who step on the same rotted board meet the same danger, yet the labels give them different protection. The licensee is owed a warning only of conditions the possessor knows or has reason to know about.5 The invitee is owed protection against conditions the possessor knows of or would discover by the exercise of reasonable care.6 Courts that abandon the categories decline to let the label decide how much care the possessor owes.
West Virginia merged the two classes outright. Mallet v. Pickens restates the rule of O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, a 1977 decision since overruled in part: “The common law distinctions between licensees and invitees are hereby abolished and the standard of reasonable care is applicable to both.”7 The court then states the possessor’s duty in the invitee’s formulation. The possessor is liable for a condition he “knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover,” if he should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk, should expect that entrants will not discover the danger or will fail to protect themselves, and fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them.8 Read together, the two holdings suggest that once the categories merge, the inspection that § 342 withholds from licensees becomes part of reasonable care.
Wisconsin reached ordinary care through a landlord case. In Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, a decision that followed Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, the Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote: “Abrogating the landlord’s general cloak of immunity at common law, we hold that a landlord must exercise ordinary care toward his tenant and others on the premises with permission.”9 The standard attaches to everyone on the premises with permission, so the label a visitor wears no longer fixes the possessor’s duty.
Classification nonetheless remains the usual first step. Most courts continue to begin the analysis of landowner duties by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, although a substantial number have held that the duty of ordinary care extends to licensees or even trespassers, as well as to invitees; the Supreme Court’s rejection of the common-law classifications in admiralty in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique belongs to the same movement.10 An answer therefore begins with the traditional categories and then asks whether the jurisdiction has departed from them.
The unified standard is most secure for entrants whom the possessor invited or permitted, and the courts divide over trespassers. There is considerable agreement that the general negligence standard should apply to all persons invited or permitted on the premises, but less accord about how to treat the trespasser.11 In Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., a college student was electrocuted when he tried to unscrew a street lamp outside his apartment bedroom window, and the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that the negligence standard applies to trespassers.12 Many cases adopting Rowland did not involve trespass, and in some that did, courts declined to extend the duty to trespassers. Wood v. Camp and Nelson v. Freeland are examples.13 Permission supplies the footing, so a court can merge licensees and invitees and still treat the trespasser under the older rule.
Reform can also come without abolition. A statute that fixes the duty owed a social invitee at the level owed a business invitee works the same way for dinner guests: the host’s duty then follows the invitee standard, which reaches conditions the possessor would discover by reasonable care.14 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 51, comment e, points the same direction by extending the possessor’s liability to a failure to warn of dangers the possessor should reasonably have known about.15 In each setting, actual knowledge stops being the only trigger for a duty.
The error that costs points on a licensee question is to stop once the entrant has been classified, because the classification does its work only in a state that still uses it.
The rotted tread, the host’s ignorance, and the guest’s injury are the same in both states; only the governing standard differs. Where the categories survive, the guest’s status ends the case at the duty stage. Where they have fallen, status matters little, and the inquiry turns to what reasonable care demanded of the host.