Concept
Who Is an Invitee
Duty owed to invitees
Duty Owed to Invitees
Who Is an Invitee
A possessor of land is liable under the Restatement (Second) of Torts for physical harm that a condition on the land causes to invitees, but only if the possessor knows or would discover the condition and should realize it poses an unreasonable risk, should expect invitees not to discover the danger or not to protect themselves against it, and fails to use reasonable care to protect them.1 The word invitee carries the weight in that rule, because the traditional common law does not owe every visitor the same duty.
The traditional scheme sorts entrants into trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Only the invitee is owed the standard duty of reasonable care, which requires the possessor to take the precautions that a reasonably prudent possessor would take to make the premises reasonably safe.2 A licensee is owed less: in most jurisdictions, a duty to repair or at least warn of hazards that the possessor knows about or has reason to know about but that would be concealed from the licensee.3 Most courts still begin a premises problem by classifying the entrant, although a substantial number have extended the duty of ordinary care to licensees and even to trespassers.4 Where classification still matters, the first question is whether the plaintiff was an invitee.
The higher duty follows from the invitation itself. A possessor who invites a person onto the land, whether to deal in business or to use space held open to the public, has arranged the visit, and the visitor may reasonably assume that the premises have been made reasonably safe for it. The lesser tiers have a more practical origin. The trichotomy comes from nineteenth-century English courts, where judges feared that jurors, who were usually not landowners themselves, would sympathize with an injured visitor and apply an open-ended reasonable-care standard against the possessor. Narrower rules let judges rule for possessors as a matter of law and keep such cases from juries.5 That history explains why classification so often decides a premises case: placing the plaintiff inside or outside the invitee group can determine whether a jury ever hears the claim.
Social guests, and police or fire personnel visiting the premises, fall among the licensees and not among the invitees.6 Invitee status is therefore the gateway to the standard that the rest of this chapter develops, and every later rule assumes it has been established. Two routes lead to that status, and the invitation has boundaries that a visitor can cross. The subsections below take them in turn, beginning with the visitor who comes to deal with the possessor in business.
Business Visitors
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 defines a business visitor as a person invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.7 Two features of that wording matter. The word invited ties the status to the possessor's own conduct, so a visitor cannot create invitee status by deciding for personal reasons to walk in. The phrase directly or indirectly connected reaches past the person in the middle of a transaction to anyone whose presence is tied to the possessor's business dealings. The rationale is a rough bargain. A possessor who profits from the visit pays for that profit with an affirmative duty to make the premises reasonably safe, and the invitation carries an implied representation that reasonable care has been taken, which the visitor is entitled to rely on.8
The clear cases show the bargain at work. In Indermaur v. Dames a journeyman gasfitter came to the defendant's sugar refinery to test a patent gas regulator that his employer had installed, fell down an open and unguarded shaft in the floor, and recovered because he came “on business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied.”9 Customers of stores, banks, and theaters, people making or receiving deliveries, the possessor's employees, and independent contractors doing work on the premises belong in the same group, because each one's presence serves the possessor's business.10
Harder questions come from the person who buys nothing. Courts reached browsers, people who come in to use a public telephone or restroom, someone entering a bank to change a bill, and friends or children accompanying a customer, reasoning that the economic benefit to the possessor may be potential, indirect, or remote in time.11 One court refused to hold, as a matter of law, that a regular restaurant customer who had not yet bought anything on the occasion of the injury was outside the class. It observed that shoppers often spend a whole day in favorite stores without a single purchase and that no business would say they were not its invitees until someone was hurt.12 The test it applied came from Kinsman v. Barton & Co.: a person who goes into a store with a view of doing business with it, then or at some other time, is an invitee.13 The same reasoning marks the limit. A person who has no intention of presently or later becoming a customer gives the possessor no prospect of benefit, so no mutual benefit supports the higher duty.14 Companions fit when their presence matches the purpose of the invitation, which is why a child brought along on a shopping trip is treated like the parent.15
The effort needed to reach browsers and companions exposes a weakness in the economic-benefit idea. Courts had to describe the benefit as potential or remote to reach results that felt right, which suggests the test is too narrow to cover everyone who deserves invitee status. That strain is the reason a second, public-invitation route developed.16
The opposite pole is the social guest. An invitation is essential to invitee status but does not by itself confer it, so a guest whom the host urges to come is still not a business visitor when the purpose of the visit is social.17 Two refinements follow. Small services that a guest performs do not change the classification, because the services must be substantial enough that the guest could reasonably expect extra protection in return. A business motive hidden inside the invitation does not change it either.18 The social guest therefore stays in the lower tier, traditionally the licensee, and receives the lesser duty.19
Public Invitees
Section 332 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes two routes to invitee status: a person qualifies either as a business visitor or as a public invitee.21 The second route covers a person invited to enter or remain on land “as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.”22 The definition has two parts, and both must be present. The possessor must have invited the public, or some segment of it, onto the land, and the plaintiff must have entered for a purpose that the invitation covered. Neither part asks whether the possessor profits from the visit. That silence separates this route from the business-visitor route above, which asks whether the visit connects to dealings with the possessor, and it is why a free lecture and a public park both fit here.
The second route exists because of what the higher duty protects. Every invitee is entitled to expect that the premises have been made reasonably safe for the visit, since an invitation can be read as an implied representation that the possessor has used reasonable care for visitors' safety, and visitors may rely on it.23 A possessor who opens land to the public makes that representation to everyone who accepts, whether or not the possessor earns anything. If the duty attached only to profitable visits, a person who relied on a standing public invitation to a free concert would lose the protection of reasonable care because the host charged no admission, although that person's reliance would be exactly the same. The public-invitation test closes that gap. It also removes the need for the stretched reasoning the business-visitor route required, in which a browser or companion was said to confer a potential or remote benefit on the possessor.24
The public route reaches a wide range of settings. Persons attending free public meetings, lectures, church services, and college reunions qualify, as do spectators at free public amusements and those who use land held open to the public for a recreational or social purpose, all without any economic benefit to the possessor.25 In Bunnell v. Waterbury Hosp. a Salvation Army meeting counted as a free public meeting, in Caldwell v. Village of Island Park the plaintiff was using a village park, and in Edwards v. Gulf Oil Corp. the plaintiff came to a filling station for comic books being given away. Each plaintiff was held to be an invitee.26 Statutes in most states have modified the common-law rule for recreational land, so a park case may also require a look at the state's recreational-use statute.27
Airports show how much easier the public route makes the classification. A traveler who ducks into an airport shop to pass time between flights, with no plan to buy anything, is a public invitee, because the shop is held open to travelers and the traveler's presence fits that opening.28 The same holds for children in tow, for a person who comes to see a friend off, and even for a photographer taking pictures of deplaning passengers. In a public park or national forest, where no economic transaction is even possible, the business-visitor test could never apply, yet the public invitation still does. The second half of the definition keeps the route from covering everyone who steps through an open door: the invitation reaches only the purposes for which the land is held open, and the entrant's presence must be consistent with them. The subsection on the scope of the invitation develops that limit.29
A door-to-door salesperson tests whether you can keep the two routes apart, because the same occupation lands in three different places. A salesperson who arrives uninvited at a private home is not an invitee, since the home is held open to no one and the salesperson has no invitation of any kind. A salesperson who comes in response to an express or implied invitation is a business visitor, because the invitation exists and the visit belongs to a potential economic exchange. A salesperson who enters a storefront or other place open to the public should qualify as a public invitee, because the premises are held open to salespeople along with everyone else.30 The occupation stays constant across the three scenes, and the presence or absence of an invitation decides the status. The same logic explains why a landowner who merely tolerates a hunter on the land has issued no invitation, even implicitly, and why the hunter reaches neither route.31
Scope of the Invitation
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 makes invitee status depend on where, when, and why the visitor is on the land: a possessor is subject to liability to another as an invitee only for harm sustained while the visitor is on the land within the scope of the invitation.34 The two prior subsections explained how a person qualifies as an invitee, either as a business visitor or as a public invitee, but qualifying at the entrance does not settle the question for the rest of the visit. Status is tested again at the moment of injury, and a visitor can lose it by moving to another part of the premises, by staying past the time the invitation covers, or by using the land for a different purpose. The reason lies in what the higher duty rests on. An invitation carries an assurance that the premises have been made reasonably safe for the visit, and that assurance is only as broad as the preparation the possessor has actually made. A possessor readies the areas held open for the purpose for which visitors come, during the hours the land is open, and has no reason to expect visitors anywhere else or for any other end. Outside those limits the visitor can no longer claim the assurance that justified the higher duty.
Place is the limit that comes up most often. The Restatement describes the invitee's area as the part of the land on which the possessor gives the visitor “reason to believe that his presence is desired for the purpose for which he has come,” and it adds that the purpose for which the land is held open, or the particular business purpose of the invitation, is of great importance in fixing that area.35 Whelan v. Van Natta shows the limit working against a plaintiff. The plaintiff entered a store on business, made a purchase, and then went into the storage room to get a box, where he fell. The trial court treated him as a licensee, who is owed only the lesser duty, and the appellate court affirmed after framing the question as whether his status changed from invitee to licensee once he had made his purchase and gone into the storage room.36 His business at the counter gave him reason to believe he was wanted where customers are expected. A storage room is space the store arranges for its own use, so the preparation behind the higher duty did not reach it, and crossing into it took him outside the invitation.
What the visitor becomes after crossing the line depends on the possessor's consent. An invitee who goes outside the area of the invitation becomes a trespasser if the possessor has not consented to the presence there, and a licensee if the possessor has.37 The Restatement's own illustration involves a shop that occupies part of a building whose remainder is the possessor's residence. A customer who walks into the residential part without the shopkeeper's consent is a trespasser, while one whom the shopkeeper permits to use the bathroom, or invites to pay a social call, is a licensee.38 Consent therefore moves the visitor up from trespasser to licensee and stops there. Permission tolerates a person's presence, but only an invitation carries the assurance that the space has been made safe for that person's purpose, which is why even a permitted visitor in a private area does not regain invitee status.
The same inquiry can come out the other way, because the test asks what the possessor gave the visitor reason to believe, and the visitor's belief must be a reasonable one. A customer who is looking for a public restroom in the store and reasonably enters a storeroom by mistake is still an invitee.39 That customer is doing exactly what the store holds its premises open for, since the restroom is something the store supplies to customers, and the layout of the premises led the customer astray. The nature of the invitation, custom, and the invitee's reasonable expectations are usually a clear guide, and the layout of the premises can be instructive as well.40 A possessor can also widen the area by words or conduct, since the test looks to where the possessor gives reason to believe the visitor's presence is wanted.
Time limits the invitation in the same way that place does. An invitee ceases to be an invitee once a reasonable time has passed for accomplishing the purpose of the visit, and whether the person then becomes a trespasser or a licensee depends on whether the possessor consents to the person remaining.41 A restaurant customer is an invitee when she parks and retrieves her car during serving hours, but not when she leaves the car in the lot and returns for it after the restaurant has closed.42 The possessor prepares the lot for people who come while the business is open, and nothing about the business invites anyone to use it after closing.
Purpose is the third limit, and it overlaps with place. A shopping-mall visitor may be an invitee on the parking lot but not while cutting through a flower bed, because the planting is not part of the route the mall holds out for customers.43 Courts have also held that an invitation to enter for one purpose may carry no assurance of safety when the entrant uses the land for an inconsistent purpose.44 In Markle v. Hacienda Mexican Restaurant the plaintiff drove into a shopping center to eat at a restaurant, saw a friend, and was moving an item from his vehicle to the friend's when he fell in a pothole. The court treated it as a jury question whether that activity was within the scope of the invitation.45 In Chapman v. Willey a man had the landowner's permission to visit his wife at a motel, and he was held a trespasser when he went there to fight another man.46 The difference between the two is how far the entrant's use departs from what the possessor held the land open for. Handing an item to a friend is a modest detour from a restaurant visit that a jury may find consistent with the invitation, while a fight cannot be anything the possessor invited anyone to do.
The same purpose limit applies to the public invitee from the prior subsection, whose invitation reaches only the purposes for which the land is held open. Exam facts rarely announce the scope question. They hide it in a back room, a shortcut, a return after closing, or a side errand, so the entrant's invitee status cannot be assumed to cover every part of the premises at every time and for every use. When a fact pattern places the plaintiff somewhere unusual or at an unusual hour, ask what the possessor gave the plaintiff reason to believe was wanted there, then, and for that purpose.