Concept
Dangerous Conditions on the Land
Duty owed to invitees
Dangerous Conditions on the Land
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 states what a possessor owes an invitee when a condition on the land causes physical harm. The possessor is subject to liability "if, but only if," three things are true:1
- The possessor knows of the condition, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover it, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees.2
- The possessor should expect that invitees will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.3
- The possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the danger.4
The words "if, but only if" make the requirements conjunctive: a plaintiff who proves two and misses the third has no claim under § 343. That structure keeps the invitee duty a negligence rule rather than strict liability, and each clause screens out a different kind of case. The first limits the possessor to dangers that the possessor knew of or that a reasonable inspection would have revealed. The second looks at the visitor, because a hazard that visitors can be expected to see and avoid on their own gives the possessor little reason to warn or repair. The third looks at the possessor's conduct, so that a possessor who took reasonable steps against a danger does not pay for an injury that reasonable care could not have prevented.
Courts apply the rule in this three-part form. In Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court set out all three clauses and added, in the same passage, that when the danger to the invitee is known or obvious, the possessor's liability is limited by § 343A(1).5 The pairing follows from the rule's design, because clause (b) and § 343A both turn on what an invitee can be expected to notice. A later section develops § 343A in full; this one takes the three clauses in order, beginning with what the possessor knew or should have found.
Knowing or Discovering the Condition
Clause (a) gives the plaintiff two routes to the possessor's awareness: actual knowledge, and constructive knowledge, which the law attributes to a possessor when reasonable care would have turned the condition up.6 A concurring opinion in Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc. reads § 343 the same way, as a standard of care for conditions that the possessor knows about or could reasonably discover, so that a possessor charged with that knowledge can be liable if the remaining requirements are met.7 The clause works as a gateway. Until the plaintiff shows the possessor's actual or attributed awareness of the condition, the questions about invitees' carelessness and the possessor's response never arise.
Actual knowledge is clearest when the possessor's own employees create the hazard. A grocery clerk who spills a slippery substance, or a crew that negligently waxes a floor, has made the danger itself, and these are the clear slip-and-fall cases.8 The possessor cannot disclaim such a condition, because the special liability rules for landowners extend to conditions created on the land by someone acting for the possessor.9 The plaintiff need not prove how long the hazard lay there or whether an inspection would have caught it. The store made the hazard, so the open questions fall under clauses (b) and (c).
A store's method of doing business can supply the same knowledge. When a store negligently markets goods in a way that makes it likely other customers will dislodge them, the injury flows from the store's own design, and once an inference of negligence arises in these mode-of-operation cases most courts shift the burden of producing evidence of non-negligence to the defendant.10
Most hazards come from a source the possessor never saw, such as another customer who drops a substance on the floor. The store did not create that danger, but it may be negligent in failing to inspect periodically for such mishaps, and here the reasonable-care language of clause (a) does the work.11 Because the clause asks what the possessor would discover by reasonable care, the invitee duty carries an affirmative duty to inspect. Reasonable care may require the possessor to inspect the premises for dangerous conditions, keep them in safe repair, remove hazards where invitees are likely to walk, and obviate slippery conditions.12 That duty is the sharpest contrast with the licensee, who takes the premises as found, is not entitled to have them made safe for the visit, and cannot require the possessor to inspect for the licensee's benefit.13 The difference follows from the invitation. A possessor who invites visitors onto the land controls the premises and is far better placed than any visitor to find a hidden hazard, so the law asks the possessor to look.
The wording of the clause also limits the inspection duty. Reasonable care does not always call for inspection, so where conditions appear to be safe, the possessor is not negligent in failing to inspect for dangers.14 A hazard that no reasonable inspection would reveal falls outside the clause, which keeps the rule a negligence standard, since a possessor who had to uncover every concealed defect, however well hidden, would become an insurer of invitees' safety. The second half of the clause adds a separate screen. The possessor must be in a position to realize that the condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm, because knowing that a condition exists is different from appreciating that it endangers invitees. Courts often compress the whole requirement into actual or constructive knowledge, which is another way of saying that the plaintiff must prove the possessor knew or should have known of the danger.15
When an unknown person creates the hazard, the plaintiff must show something about how long it lay there. Courts tend to say that if the substance was present for a long period, the trier of fact can infer that the store was negligent in failing to inspect or discover it.16 In J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Thompson, an old, black-looking leaf lay far from the vegetable display, and its discoloration supported an inference that it had been on the floor for two days despite the store's regular cleanups.17 The court in Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc. reasoned from a much shorter span. Workers had stood nearby for fifteen minutes without hearing a bottle break, so the substance, perhaps a lotion, might have been on the floor longer than that, and fifteen minutes was enough time for a reasonable store to discover it and make it safe.18 Ortega v. K-Mart Corp. treats a long failure to inspect as warranting an inference that the substance had been present for a long time.19 Where courts accept this reasoning, the time inference favors plaintiffs so strongly that the results sometimes look almost like strict liability.20
A plaintiff with no evidence of duration sometimes argues that the fall itself should carry the case, but courts usually refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine that lets a jury infer negligence from the nature of the accident, to slip-and-fall cases.21 Without evidence supporting an inference that the condition was present for a substantial period, the jury has no basis for concluding that the defendant was negligent.22 The refusal follows from what clause (a) asks. A fall proves that a hazard existed, but the clause asks whether the possessor knew of the hazard or would have found it in time, and that depends on how long the hazard had been there. A plaintiff who cannot say, and who has nothing from which a jury could infer it, has proved an injury without proving the possessor's knowledge.
Expecting Invitees Not to Notice
Clause (b) shifts attention from the possessor's awareness of the condition to what the possessor can foresee about the people who will meet it. The possessor must be one who should expect that invitees will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.24 The Lugo concurrence reads the clause as naming three ways an invitee can fall short. The invitee may fail to discover the condition, may fail to appreciate the danger once the condition is found, or may fail to protect against the danger even after discovering and appreciating it.25 A possessor who should expect any one of those failures satisfies the clause, so the plaintiff needs to prove only one.
Foreseeability enters the rule for conditions on the land at this clause. A landowner is not negligent at all if no harm is foreseeable, and that is the situation when the landowner can reasonably believe that the invitee will see the danger and avoid it.26 A possessor who can count on visitors to notice a hazard and step around it has nothing left to guard against, because the visitors' own attention is already doing the protective work. A possessor who cannot count on that attention is the person best placed to act, since the possessor controls the premises and can repair, move, or warn about the hazard at a cost that is usually small beside the injury it prevents. The clause therefore directs the duty at harm the possessor can foresee, and the bare possibility that some visitor might someday be hurt is not enough.
The expectation is easiest to establish when the danger is hidden. Nothing on the surface gives the invitee anything to notice, so a possessor who knows of the condition, or would find it by reasonable care under clause (a), has every reason to expect invitees to walk into it. Comment (a) to § 343 tells courts to read the section together with § 343A, and the Lugo concurrence draws from that comment the point that hidden or unknown conditions can be distinguished from known or obvious ones, with § 343 designed to allow liability and § 343A designed to limit it.27 For a concealed hazard, clause (b) is ordinarily easy to satisfy, because the same concealment that keeps the invitee from seeing the hazard tells the possessor that invitees will not see it. The real contest moves to whether the possessor responded reasonably.
The harder cases involve a danger that anyone who looked would see. The clause asks what the possessor should expect invitees to do, and invitees do not always look where the hazard lies. A store arranges its aisles to draw customers' eyes to merchandise, so a store that leaves a hazard at floor level among its displays can hardly expect the same customers to be watching the floor, and customers with full arms may not be able to see it at all. Customers may rely to some extent on the proprietor to keep walkways reasonably safe, and courts have sent to juries the questions whether a drugstore's employees could have anticipated a customer tripping over a pallet and whether a homeowner had reason to suspect that an intoxicated guest would be distracted and miss the danger of diving into a pool.28 Where reasonable people can differ about whether the possessor should have foreseen the plaintiff's encounter with the hazard, the answer belongs to the jury.29
The step is the same in both stores. What changed the answer is what the possessor could expect from the people walking past it, which is all that clause (b) measures. Visibility is evidence on that question, and the surrounding circumstances decide how much weight it carries.
A visible hazard also falls within § 343A, and the two rules are easy to run together. Both turn on what the possessor can expect of invitees, and the Restatement directs that they be read together.30 The known-or-obvious rule is nevertheless a separate limit on liability, and it carries its own exception for harm the possessor should anticipate despite the danger's obviousness.31 That limit and its exception are developed in a later section, so here clause (b) should be treated as one element of the basic liability test that the plaintiff must prove.
The invitee's own carelessness raises a different question from the one clause (b) asks. Whether the possessor should have foreseen that an invitee would meet the danger goes to the possessor's negligence, while whether the invitee exercised reasonable care for the invitee's own safety goes to contributory fault, and both are questions of breach for the jury.32 Clause (b) belongs to the first question. It is judged from the possessor's side, by asking what the possessor should have expected, and it does not ask whether this particular plaintiff was in fact careless.
Failing to Use Reasonable Care
Clause (c) turns from what the possessor knew and expected to what the possessor did. Liability attaches only if the possessor "fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger."34 Liability under § 343 requires all three clauses, so a plaintiff who proves a known hazard and foreseeable inattention still has no claim when the possessor's response was reasonable. The standard is ordinary negligence, measured by the precautions a reasonably prudent possessor would take under the circumstances to make the premises reasonably safe.35
The hazard decides which precaution reasonable care requires. Depending on the facts, the possessor may have to inspect the premises, keep them in safe repair, remove hazards from places where invitees are likely to walk, or deal with slippery conditions. When a hazard cannot reasonably be reduced or eliminated, the possessor must use reasonable care to warn invitees of it.36 The order of that list has a reason behind it. A repair or removal takes the danger away for every visitor, including the one who is distracted, hurried, or carrying packages. A warning only supplies information and leaves each visitor to do the avoiding. When the possessor can remove a danger at modest cost, relying on thousands of visitors to stay watchful is the more expensive and less dependable safeguard, so the law treats a warning as the fitting response for dangers that cannot reasonably be removed.
A warning often discharges the duty but does not always do so. Even when the invitee knows of the danger, the possessor may be found negligent if the danger would not be difficult to eliminate and the possessor should anticipate that the invitee might still be hurt by it. Wilk v. Georges is cited for the point that posting warning signs does not necessarily discharge the duty.37 The inquiry weighs the cost of removing the danger against the likelihood of continuing injury. A "Caution" sign beside a curling carpet edge that a clerk could tape down in a minute invites a finding that the possessor fell short, while a clear sign at a hazard that cannot reasonably be removed is the kind of response that can discharge the duty.
The law places this burden on the possessor because the possessor is the party best positioned to carry it. In Dalury v. S-K-I Ltd., a ski-area case, the court explained that responsibility for maintaining land belongs with those who own or control it. Those parties have the expertise and the opportunity to foresee and control hazards, to inspect the premises, and to train employees in managing risk. They can also insure against injuries and spread the cost across their customers, while a visitor can neither find and correct the hazard nor insure against the possessor's negligence.38 That reasoning fits the content of clause (c), because inspection, repair, removal, and warning are all precautions that only the person controlling the premises can carry out.
The same policy that puts the burden on the possessor also limits it. The duty is reasonable care, and the possessor is not a guarantor of an invitee's safety.39 If every fall on the premises produced liability, a possessor who inspected, mopped, and warned would pay exactly what a possessor who did nothing would pay, and the incentive that justifies the burden would disappear. Requiring a failure of reasonable care keeps the reward for taking precautions in place.
Reasonable care is judged for the possessor even when someone else does the work. The possessor's duty to invitees is non-delegable, which means the possessor is liable if an employee, or an independent contractor hired to perform the duty, performs it improperly.40 Courts have applied the rule at the entrance of a business. In Thomas v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., the store owed an invitee a non-delegable duty to act reasonably to ensure that floor mats supplied by another company at its entrance were safe, and in Backiel v. Citibank, N.A. the landowner's duty to keep entryways and common passages safe was likewise non-delegable.41 A possessor who could discharge the duty by hiring out the work could reduce it to nothing, because the possessor chooses the contractor, controls access to the premises, and is the party the invitee relies on for a reasonably safe visit. The rule does not turn every contractor mishap into liability, because the standard stays reasonable care, and work done carefully by an employee or contractor discharges the duty just as the possessor's own careful work would.
Proving clause (c) establishes breach but not the whole case. The plaintiff must still prove that the possessor's negligence was the actual and proximate cause of the injury, and a violation of a building code's safety provision can establish negligence per se or at least furnish evidence of negligence.42