Concept
Known or Obvious Dangers
Duty owed to invitees
Known or Obvious Dangers
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) provides that a possessor of land is not liable to invitees for physical harm caused by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.1 The rule cuts back liability that the preceding sections impose. Section 343 makes a possessor answerable for a condition on the land if, but only if, its three requirements are met, and § 341A does the same for the possessor's activities.2 Each of those sections already asks whether the possessor should expect invitees to miss the danger or fail to protect themselves against it. Section 343A approaches the same concern from the other direction and says when the answer is no.
The limit rests on the difference between a visible danger and a hidden one. An invitee who has seen a hazard, or already knows of it, can protect against it by stepping around it, slowing down, choosing another route, or turning back. A possessor can usually count on that response, and when it comes, a repair or warning adds little to what the invitee has already done. A hidden danger gives the invitee no such chance, because no one can avoid a risk he cannot see. The law therefore relieves the possessor where invitees can be expected to avoid the danger and keeps liability in place where they cannot.
Because the exception sits in the same sentence as the limit, the rule works as a default and not as a flat bar. The first subsection below asks when a danger counts as known or obvious. The second takes up the circumstances in which a possessor must still anticipate harm from a danger the invitee can see, and the third adds a factor that weighs heavily in those cases when the invitee is using public land or a utility's facilities. The last subsection places obviousness inside a negligence case that also asks about breach and comparative fault.
The Obviousness Limit
Courts that follow the Restatement apply § 343A(1) as written. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, has said that where the danger to an invitee is known or obvious, the landowner's liability is limited by § 343A(1).3 The word limited is exact. Section 343 says when a possessor answers for a condition on the land, and § 343A(1) cuts that liability back for one class of dangers, those the invitee already knows about or can plainly see. The two sections state separate rules, which is why they are read together.
The rule reaches two kinds of danger, and each word does its own work. A danger is known when the invitee actually knows of it, because an employee warned the invitee or the invitee met the hazard before. A danger is obvious when an invitee using ordinary attention would see it, so a plaintiff who simply failed to look gains nothing from the lapse. Both words track the possessor's ground for relief, since a possessor may reasonably expect an invitee who knows of or sees a danger to avoid it.4 Both are also measured against the danger itself. An invitee who notices a rug without suspecting the rotted boards beneath it has discovered an object but has not appreciated a danger, and the concurring opinion in Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc. treats failing to discover a condition, failing to appreciate its danger, and failing to protect against it as three separate shortfalls.5 Either word suffices, so a danger known to this invitee falls within the rule even if no one passing by could have seen it.
Knowledge, not visibility, brought that case within the rule.
The rule is negligence reasoning applied to a recurring set of facts. A possessor is not negligent when no harm is foreseeable, and no harm is foreseeable when the possessor can reasonably believe that an invitee will see the danger and avoid it.6 A visible hazard carries less risk than a concealed one of the same size, because those exposed to it can take their own precautions, and a repair or warning from the possessor would add little to what those precautions supply.7 The reasoning cuts the other way too. A possessor who can foresee that an invitee will meet the danger despite its visibility is negligent for failing to take reasonable steps against it, and the exception in the rule's own sentence preserves that result.8 The rule removes liability only where the usual basis for liability, foreseeable harm, is missing.
The Second Restatement moved obviousness from the question of duty to the question of foreseeability. Following the First Restatement, courts often said, and some still say, that a possessor owes invitees no duty to make the premises safe or to warn of dangers known or obvious to them. That ended the case whenever the danger was plain, even if the possessor could expect invitees to be hurt anyway.9 Some states add that the plaintiff must prove the possessor had superior knowledge of the danger, a showing no plaintiff can make when the danger is equally plain to both sides.10 The Utah Supreme Court put the difference compactly: the old no-duty rule in effect excused the possessor's negligence, while the Restatement rule defines negligence by the ordinary test of foreseeability.11 Under the old rule a plain danger could relieve a careless possessor. Under the Restatement rule it relieves the possessor because the harm was not foreseeable, so the possessor was not negligent in the first place. Critics call the no-duty version an anomaly. Obviousness bears on whether the injury was foreseeable, which goes to the possessor's negligence, and on whether the invitee used reasonable care, which goes to the invitee's own fault, and both are questions of breach for the jury, not questions of duty.12 The last subsection returns to that point.
Because § 343A(1) takes away liability that § 343 would otherwise impose, it is best learned as its own rule and not as a fourth requirement of § 343. The Lugo concurrence reads it that way: the general rule is that a possessor is not liable for injuries from activities or conditions whose danger is known or obvious, and the clause preserving liability where the possessor should anticipate the harm is the exception to that rule.13 The same opinion notes that comment (a) to § 343 directs readers to § 343A, and that both sections assume a duty arising from the possessor-invitee relationship and address only when liability can be imposed or limited.14 Two consequences follow. The limit covers any activity or condition, so it reaches the possessor's conduct under § 341A as well as hazards under § 343.15 And because the exception sits in the same sentence as the limit, a plain danger does not finish the analysis. You must still ask whether the possessor should have anticipated the harm anyway.
Whether a danger counts as obvious depends on the setting in which the plaintiff met it.
Visibility decided the difference between the two lobbies. Even the bank's case is not a complete defense, because the last clause of the rule keeps the possessor liable where harm should be anticipated, which the next subsection develops.
Anticipating Harm Despite Obviousness
The rule closes with a clause that keeps the possessor in the case: no liability for known or obvious dangers “unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”17 That clause is why obvious-danger cases are not automatic wins for possessors. The Washington Supreme Court has held that, in limited circumstances, § 343A creates a duty to protect invitees even from known or obvious dangers, which happens when the possessor should anticipate the harm despite that knowledge or obviousness.18 The exception follows from the reason for the limit. A possessor is not negligent when no harm is foreseeable, and none is foreseeable when the possessor can reasonably believe the invitee will see the danger and avoid it. A possessor who can foresee that the invitee will meet the danger anyway, and who takes no reasonable step against it, is negligent however plain the danger is.19
Seeing a danger protects an invitee only if the invitee can act on what he sees. The exception collects the situations in which that chain from knowledge to avoidance breaks. The invitee's attention may be foreseeably elsewhere, the invitee may have no reasonable alternative to meeting the hazard, or the hazard may be cheap to remove. In each, the possessor controls the premises, can foresee the injury, and can often prevent it at less cost than the invitee can avoid it. A rule that excused the possessor there would let it rely on a danger it knew people would meet anyway.
The first situation arises when the possessor can expect the invitee's attention to be elsewhere. Stores arrange their aisles to draw customers' eyes to goods, so a customer scanning shelves may foreseeably miss something at floor level. Spectators are the other familiar group. In Baker v. Mid Maine Medical Center the court framed the inquiry as whether the defendant has reason to expect harm from an obvious risk in circumstances where the plaintiff's attention might be distracted from the risk, so that the plaintiff forgets to protect himself.20 Golf shows the point. Spectators assume the inherent dangers of the sport, yet sponsors must still provide reasonably safe premises, and in Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club a spectator struck in the eye by a ball in a roped-off concession area was owed reasonable care as a business invitee.21 A sponsor that draws a crowd to watch the players has every reason to expect the crowd to watch the players, so the spectators' general awareness of the sport's risks does not show that they will guard against a particular ball. A possessor that offers a safe place to sit stands on different ground. In Friedman v. Houston Sports Association a stadium owner had no duty to warn a spectator hit by a foul ball behind the first-base dugout, because the owner had met its duty by providing adequately screened seats for those who wanted them, even though spectators chose to sit elsewhere.22 The protection was on offer, so the unscreened seat reflected the spectator's own choice.
The second situation arises when the invitee has no reasonable choice but to meet the hazard. In Wood v. Mercedes-Benz of Oklahoma City a car dealership owed a duty to protect an employee of a catering service from slipping on accumulated ice on its premises, and the court noted that the dealership knew of the ice and that she would encounter it in furtherance of her employment.23 The ice was plain to anyone who looked, so obviousness could not settle the question. Knowing about ice protects a person only if she can choose to stay off it, and a worker on an errand cannot. A possessor who knows the errand will be performed can therefore foresee the fall.
The open side door separates this customer from the caterer's worker, who could not do the job without crossing the ice.
The third situation looks at the possessor's side of the ledger. A danger that the invitee knows about can still support liability when it would not be difficult to eliminate and the possessor should reasonably anticipate that the invitee might be injured by it anyway. Posting warning signs does not necessarily discharge the duty, as Wilk v. Georges illustrates.24 The reasoning compares costs. A warning leaves each visitor to do the avoiding, and every visitor carries some chance of hurrying, forgetting, or being unable to step clear. A repair that costs little removes the danger for all of them at once. Where that cheap step was available and skipped, the invitee's knowledge is a weaker safeguard than the step the possessor passed up, so the injury remains foreseeable.
Each situation depends on its facts, and the exception is narrow. Whether a defendant should have foreseen the plaintiff's encounter with a particular obvious hazard is a jury question where reasonable people can differ.25 Treating “open and obvious” as a complete answer for the possessor loses the cases the exception exists to preserve, and applying the exception to every careless plaintiff erases the limit it modifies. The exception needs facts that make the encounter foreseeable: a pull on attention that the possessor created or relies on, a lack of choice, or a cheap fix left undone. A plaintiff who simply failed to look at a plain hazard in an uncrowded aisle with an open alternative has none of these, and the lapse counts as the plaintiff's own fault, a point the last subsection takes up.
Public Land and Utilities
Subsection (2) of § 343A tells courts how to weigh one consideration in applying the exception. In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.27 The factor works inside the exception. The Lugo concurrence reads the last clause of § 343A(1), which keeps the possessor liable where harm should be anticipated, as the exception to the open-and-obvious rule.28 Subsection (2) feeds the question whether harm should be anticipated, alongside the invitee's foreseeable distraction and the cheapness of a repair. A plaintiff who relies on it must still satisfy § 343 or § 341A, because the factor bears only on whether obviousness relieves the possessor.
The factor carries weight because of what makes an obvious danger safe enough to excuse a possessor in the first place. Obviousness helps only when the invitee can act on what he sees, by stepping around the hazard, choosing another route, or staying away. A person entitled to use public land or a utility's facilities often has no such choice. The stairway is the only way up to the pool, the road is the only way to the destination, and declining to use the facility means doing without a service the person has a right to receive.29 The public possessor knows this. A private store shapes who comes in and by which door, and its customers can shop elsewhere. A public possessor cannot turn entitled users away and can predict that they will meet whatever hazard lies on the way. Predicting the encounter is what the exception means by anticipating the harm, which is why the Restatement calls the entitlement a factor of importance. A person who must reach a service that a public utility alone provides stands in the same position, since staying clear of the hazard means giving up the service.
The defect was equally visible at the store and on the stairway, so visibility did not separate the two outcomes. The entrant's practical freedom to avoid the hazard did. At the store, the customer's presence at that particular door was a choice, and the safe entrance gave the store every reason to expect the crack to be avoided. On the stairway, the right to use the pool and the lack of another route made the encounter foreseeable, so the city could not treat the residents' own caution as the safeguard.
The factor adds weight and does not decide the case. The Restatement calls it a factor of importance, and whether a possessor should have foreseen an entrant's encounter with a particular obvious hazard is a jury question where reasonable people can differ.30 A finding that harm should be anticipated also clears only the obviousness limit. The plaintiff must still show that the possessor failed to use reasonable care, so a city that repaired the step, closed the stairway behind a barrier, or otherwise protected users has done what the standard requires. And because § 343A speaks of invitees, the entrant must qualify, as a person using land held open to the public ordinarily does. Two errors recur on exams. One reads the factor as a free-standing rule that makes every public body answerable for every obvious hazard. The other overlooks it and treats “open and obvious” as a complete answer on public land, where the entrant's lack of choice is the reason the answer fails.
Obviousness and Comparative Fault
Section 343A(1) reads as a statement of non-liability,32 and that wording leaves open where obviousness sits in a negligence case. It can operate as a threshold question that the judge decides, ending the claim before any jury weighs what either side did. Or it can operate as one fact among several that the jury considers in deciding whether the possessor was careless and whether the invitee was. The Lugo concurrence treats the matter as one of liability and not of duty: it reads §§ 343 and 343A as assuming that a duty already arises from the possessor-invitee relationship and as addressing when liability can be imposed or limited.33 Courts have not settled on one placement, and the choice decides whether an invitee who walked into a plain hazard reaches a jury, recovers a reduced amount, or recovers nothing.
A court that still treats an open and obvious danger as the absence of duty decides the question at the threshold, and that placement sits awkwardly with comparative fault.34 A comparative-fault system asks the jury to compare what the plaintiff did with what the defendant did and to divide responsibility between them. A no-duty ruling removes the possessor from that comparison before it begins, whether or not the possessor was careless, and it leaves the invitee's own conduct unweighed for the same reason. As the Utah Supreme Court said in Hale v. Beckstead, “Where there is no duty, there is no fault to compare or distribute under the comparative fault scheme.”35 A possessor who could have removed a plain hazard for almost nothing, and who should have expected invitees to cross it anyway, pays nothing under a no-duty rule, although the same possessor would be assigned a share of the fault if a jury were allowed to weigh the facts.
The natural-accumulation rule for snow and ice carries the same all-or-nothing logic into a familiar hazard. Courts have sometimes said that a possessor is not liable to invitees for injuries from natural accumulations of snow or ice, and a number of jurisdictions hold that when an obvious hazard is also a natural one, such as snow, ice, or rainwater, the possessor owes no duty to an invitee who slips on it.36 The rule's footing is narrower than it first appears. Some decisions cited for it involve the public sidewalk beside the land and not the possessor's own premises, and others simply apply the open-and-obvious rule.37 Where the accumulation rule is applied on the land itself, it therefore rests on obviousness and presumably changes when that rule changes.38 Some courts have followed that logic. In Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., the Massachusetts court cited the earlier modification of the open-and-obvious rule in holding that natural and unnatural accumulations of snow and ice are treated alike in a premises claim.39
The two states in that scene differ only in where they place obviousness, and the Restatement (Second) approach sits between them. In Richardson v. Corvallis Public School District No. 1, a Montana decision, the court put open-and-obvious danger at the center of the question, gave the natural character of the condition no weight, and adopted a standard that tracks § 343A(1).40 The court kept the vocabulary of no duty but attached the foreseeable-harm exception to it, so a possessor who should anticipate that an invitee will meet the hazard anyway can still be liable.41 That position still decides obviousness at the threshold, subject to the exception.
The emerging and better view goes a step further. It treats the obviousness of a danger as merely one fact bearing on whether the possessor was negligent or on the invitee's own fault, and it denies obviousness any status as a per se limit on duty.42 The Restatement Third takes a similar approach,43 and it applies to entrants generally, not only to invitees, which ties this subject to the unitary standard discussed in a later section.44 The Nevada Supreme Court stated the idea directly in Foster v. Costco Wholesale Corp.: the open and obvious character of a hazard does not automatically relieve a landowner of the duty of due care, and it bears on whether reasonable care was exercised.45
Under that view the evidence of obviousness does two jobs, one on each side of the case. For the possessor, a known or obvious risk is smaller than a comparable hidden one, because the people exposed to it can take precautions, so a possessor who can reasonably expect invitees to see and avoid the hazard may not have been negligent at all.46 The circumstances from the prior subsection push the other way. An invitee whose attention is foreseeably elsewhere, who has no realistic alternative to the hazard, or who faces a danger the possessor could have removed cheaply is an invitee the possessor should expect to be hurt, and those facts become evidence of negligence. For the invitee, an entrant who meets an obviously dangerous condition without reasonable self-protective care is at fault for that failure.47 Both questions concern breach and fault, not duty, so each goes to the jury, which can find the possessor negligent, the invitee negligent, or both, and then allocate responsibility under the state's comparative-fault rules.48 A jury can weigh how likely invitees were to notice and avoid the danger and how much care each side used. A threshold ruling cannot, because it treats visibility alone as the answer to every one of those questions.
An exam stem that shows an invitee hurt by a plainly visible hazard will often say nothing about which rule the state follows, so the answer has to supply the map. In a state that treats obviousness as the absence of duty, the visibility of the hazard ends the claim at the threshold. In a state that follows the Restatement (Second), the question becomes whether the possessor should have anticipated the harm despite the obviousness, which turns on the distraction, lack-of-choice, and cheap-fix facts developed earlier. In a state that follows the emerging view or the Restatement Third, the visibility goes to the jury as evidence on the possessor's negligence and the invitee's fault, and the jury may divide responsibility. The same plainly visible hazard can therefore produce a dismissal, a finding of liability, or a reduced recovery, depending on which approach the jurisdiction follows.