Concept
Child Invitees
Duty owed to invitees
Child Invitees
The invitee rules assume an entrant who can look out for himself. Clause (b) of § 343 asks whether the possessor should expect that invitees will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.1 Section 343A(1) excuses the possessor from liability for a danger that is known or obvious to invitees, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite that knowledge or obviousness.2 Both rules ask whether the entrant will notice and avoid the hazard. An adult who sees a hazard steps around it. A child may fail at every stage: she may not recognize that a visible object is dangerous, may not grasp what could happen, or may understand and still be unable to act.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343B answers with a floor. In any case where a possessor of land would be subject to liability to a child for physical harm caused by a condition on the land if the child were a trespasser, the possessor is subject to liability if the child is a licensee or an invitee.3 The section states no test of its own. It borrows the rule for trespassing children and promises a child with a higher status at least that much protection. Without it, a child who entered with an invitation could end up worse off than a child who entered without one.
The discussion takes two steps. The first subsection teaches § 343B itself: the child-trespasser rule it borrows and how it operates beneath the ordinary invitee analysis. The second returns to the known-or-obvious limit and shows what happens to it when the person who met the danger is a child.
The Child-Trespasser Floor
Section 343B works by cross-reference. A court applying it sets aside the child's actual status, pictures the same child on the same land as a trespasser, and asks whether the possessor would answer for the injury under the rules that protect trespassing children.4 If the possessor would, the child's real status as licensee or invitee cannot pull liability below that point. Invitee status can add to a child's protection; it never subtracts from what the trespasser rule already gives.
The borrowed rule descends from the attractive-nuisance doctrine, and Justice Holmes cut that doctrine short in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt. Two children had trespassed on the defendant's land, found a pool that looked clear but was poisoned with sulfuric acid, and were harmed. Holmes held that the doctrine did not apply, because the pool had not attracted the children onto the land and induced them to trespass in the first instance.5 The Second Restatement rejected Britt. Under § 339, it is not essential that the child be attracted or lured onto the premises by the thing that injured him.6
In summary form, § 339 makes a possessor liable for an artificial condition when three things are true. The possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass at the place. The possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children. And the children, because of their youth, do not discover the condition or realize the risk. The possessor's burden of eliminating the danger must also be slight compared with the risk, and the possessor must have failed to use reasonable care to eliminate it or otherwise protect the children.7
The borrowed rule limits what the floor can deliver. Section 343B speaks of harm caused by a condition on the land, so a child hurt by a possessor's activity gets nothing from it and must rely on the ordinary invitee rules.8 Those rules require reasonable care in conducting active operations on the premises and in warning of a hazard that cannot reasonably be reduced or eliminated.9
The floor has no content of its own. It carries over whatever child-trespasser rule the jurisdiction applies, so identify that rule before saying what the floor requires. Most courts still begin by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, though a substantial number now extend the duty of ordinary care to licensees or even trespassers.10 The Restatement (Third) points the same way. Section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm imposes on a possessor a duty of reasonable care to entrants with regard to natural and artificial conditions, and it supersedes § 339. Comment i addresses child trespassers and keeps the principles behind § 339 relevant to whether the possessor acted with reasonable care.11 Where a jurisdiction applies one standard of care to every entrant, § 343B has nothing to add, because no child is owed less than reasonable care to begin with. The floor matters where the ladder of statuses survives, and the unitary-standard section later in this chapter takes up that shift.
Two decisions show that breach still decides the outcome. In Wal-Mart Stores v. Lerma, a child in a store while her mother shopped was injured swinging on a clothing rack, and the store was held liable. In Bae v. Dragoo & Associates, a child invitee drowned in a pool, and the court found no breach of duty by the landowner in maintaining it.12 A possessor who did not breach its duty is not liable whatever the child's status, and § 343B does not supply a breach the facts lack.
In the garden center, status never mattered because the borrowed rule already imposed liability. In the lumber yard, the floor stayed silent because the borrowed rule imposed none. Those two results mark the section's limits. It is a floor and not a ceiling, because a child invitee whose trespasser-rule claim fails can still recover under § 343 on ordinary invitee terms.13 It does not make a possessor answerable for every injured child, since the borrowed rule still demands a failure of reasonable care. The next subsection takes up the place where children and the ordinary invitee analysis collide most often, the known-or-obvious limit.
Children and Obvious Dangers
Section 343A(1) relieves a possessor of liability for a danger that is "known or obvious to them," meaning to the invitees exposed to it, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite that knowledge or obviousness.15 When the invitee is a child, the pronoun matters. The limit asks about the entrant who was actually hurt, and what an adult shopper sees at once may escape or baffle a four-year-old. Section 343B guarantees a child invitee at least the protection a trespassing child would receive,16 but a claim under the ordinary invitee rules must still get past obviousness. States handle that problem differently, so an exam answer should name the rule it applies.
Obviousness excuses a possessor because it bears on foreseeability and on the invitee's own care. That makes the rule something of an anomaly, since both questions go to breach and are for the jury rather than the court.17 The rule's premise is that an invitee who sees a hazard will protect himself, so the possessor may expect the hazard to be avoided. That premise depends on three steps an adult ordinarily completes: the invitee notices the hazard, appreciates that it can cause harm, and acts on that understanding. A young child can break the chain at any link. She may look straight at a stack of boxes and see only something to climb, may understand that an escalator moves without understanding that it can trap a hand, or may grasp the danger and still be unable to resist it. Each failure matches a clause of § 343(b), which asks whether the possessor should expect that invitees will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.18 When the person at risk is a child, the premise weakens, and so does the case for excusing the possessor.
Because the limit turns on what this child could notice and understand, obviousness in a child's case is commonly a jury question. Where reasonable people can differ on whether a danger was obvious, the issue goes to the jury, as in Kopczynski v. Barger, an Indiana decision involving a child jumping on a neighbor's trampoline.19 The judge takes the issue away only if every reasonable juror would have to find the danger obvious to a child of that age and experience, and that rarely happens. A finding that the danger was not obvious ends only the obviousness defense. The claim must still satisfy the three requirements of § 343, including a failure of reasonable care.20
The jury question is strongest when the possessor knows something about the particular child. In Morse v. Goduti, a New Hampshire decision, a landowner's knowledge of a particular child's inability to appreciate risk, together with knowledge that the child might be present, could create a question of fact whether the landowner should have foreseen that even an apparent danger was unreasonably risky to that child.21 That knowledge supplies the missing basis for the possessor's reliance. Obviousness to adults normally lets a possessor count on invitees to protect themselves, but a possessor who knows this child cannot do so, and knows the child may be on the premises, cannot count on it. Such a possessor falls within the exception § 343A(1) writes into its own text, which preserves liability where the possessor should anticipate the harm despite the danger's obviousness.22
Not every court leaves the question to the jury. A competing line treats some hazards as obvious to children as a category, so that the possessor owes no duty to warn of them. In Ahmed v. Pickwick Place Owners' Ass'n, an Illinois decision, the landowners owed no duty to warn a seven-year-old resident of an apartment complex about the dangers of a retention pool in which the child drowned, because landowners do not owe children a duty to warn of the hazards of drowning in water.23 The premise is that children learn the danger of deep water early, so a warning would tell the child nothing new. The categorical rule and the particular-child inquiry answer the same question at different levels. Ahmed fixes the answer in advance for a class of hazard, while Morse makes it depend on what this child could appreciate and what the possessor knew about that child.
A second competing rule shifts the focus from the child to the adult accompanying the child. Illinois has adopted a rule that absolves a landowner of a duty to a child who is harmed by an obvious danger while under parental supervision, or when the parent knew of the dangerous condition.24 Harlin v. Sears Roebuck & Co. applied the rule when a two-year-old hit her head on a display stand in the defendant's store while her mother was shopping, and the store was not liable.25 The rule rests on a substitution. The self-protection that the obviousness limit assumes can come from the adult at the child's side, because a parent walking beside a toddler can see the display stand, understand the risk, and steer the child away. A parent who already knew of the condition has the same information, so the possessor can reasonably expect the danger to be avoided even though the child could not avoid it alone.
Lerma, discussed above, sits on the other side of the split in a similar setting. A child was injured swinging on a clothing rack while her mother shopped, and the store was held liable.26 Parental presence is common to both cases, so the contrast shows that results depend on the rule the state has adopted and not on the facts of the child's circumstances.
The structure of the state's premises law also affects the answer. In states that have abolished the entrant categories and apply reasonable care to everyone on the land, the general standard protects children along with other entrants, as in Silva v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. and Morse.27 In those states the child's age and capacity, along with the visibility of the danger, enter the ordinary negligence inquiry. The later section on the unitary standard returns to that setting.
Because these results come from state variation, an answer to a child-invitee problem should say which rule it is applying and, where the stem names no jurisdiction, flag the split and apply more than one view. Work through the problem as an ordered series of questions.