Concept
Impact Rule and Parasitic Damages
Negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical harm: threshold rule
Impact Rule and Parasitic Damages
Suffering alone does not make a negligent defendant liable. Compensation is one goal of tort law, but courts have not made it the controlling goal: they have not adopted strict liability across the board, and they do not order compensation in every case in which a defendant causes harm. Fault remains the most common basis for liability.1 That reluctance matters for distress claims. Under § 436A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an actor whose negligence creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm or emotional disturbance, but results in emotional disturbance "alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage," is not liable for the disturbance.2
Courts drew the line between compensable and noncompensable distress in three steps, and each step explains the next. They first allowed distress as an add-on to a physical injury. They then made physical contact the price of admission for fright claims with no other injury behind them. Most finally dropped contact in favor of a bodily consequence of the distress itself, the idea on which the Restatement's exception builds.
Parasitic Damages
Negligence that physically injures a plaintiff opens the door to damages for the plaintiff's emotional suffering as well.3 Beyond compensation for physical pain, most courts allow the plaintiff to claim fright and shock sustained during the event; anxiety about the future, physical or economic, unless the fears are clearly unfounded and unreasonable; loss of peace of mind or mental health, from depression through neuroses and psychoses; humiliation or embarrassment over the injury, disability, or disfigurement; distress at losing the ability to enjoy a normal life; and the inconvenience of daily activities.4
Courts call these damages parasitic because they feed on a host. They can be added to a recovery for physical injury, but they cannot sustain an action by themselves.5 The plaintiff sues for the injury, and the suffering rides along.
The host injury also screens claims for genuineness and size. A plaintiff who recovers parasitic damages has already proved a breach and a bodily injury that can be examined, so the court need not take the plaintiff's word alone that anything happened, and the jury has something concrete to anchor a figure to. Stand-alone distress claims lack both advantages.
Two collisions show how much the host matters. If Marat's car knocks DuBarry down and breaks a leg, DuBarry recovers for the leg and for the pain, fright, and humiliation that accompany it.6 If Marat's car narrowly misses DuBarry, DuBarry recovers nothing for the fear, however badly frightened, because no injury is there to carry it.7 The second case is where the next doctrine begins, because courts had to decide what minimum "something" would let fright through the door.
The Impact Rule
The impact rule stretched the parasitic idea outward. Where parasitic damages needed a physical injury to carry the distress, the impact rule needed only physical contact from the defendant's negligence, and it conditioned damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress on that contact.9 Courts reached it by extending the familiar principle that distress accompanying physical injury is compensable: they permitted recovery for the psychic trauma and its physical consequences even when the impact was very slight and itself caused little or no bodily harm.10
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. shows the rule at work. The plaintiff was about to board a railway car when the defendant's team of horses was driven at her. By the time the horses were stopped she stood between them, though they never touched her, and she later suffered a miscarriage. The New York Court of Appeals denied recovery for fright alone.
The rule lasted because it screened. It eased fears of fraudulent claims, perjured or at least exaggerated testimony, and excessive damages driven by jury sympathy. It premised liability on an objective fact that could be proved or disproved, and in a very rough way it filtered out frivolous claims while allowing the most serious ones to proceed.11 Contact was an early, blunt answer to the worries about genuineness and proof that support the baseline rule of nonliability.
The flaw shows when the rule meets real cases. The Mitchell plaintiff, standing between the horses and later miscarrying, recovered nothing because the animals never touched her. In Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., the plaintiff got dust in her eyes, the court found the impact requirement satisfied, and she recovered fully for the emotional distress from the accident.12 Conder v. Wood is a more recent example of the same leniency. Dust in the eye opened the door; a miscarriage after a near miss did not.
Courts found enough impact in a slight blow, jolt, or jar; a trifling burn or electric shock; dust in the eye; and the inhalation of smoke. They even found it in a physical response the plaintiff produced in reaction to the fright.13 With impact so easily satisfied, courts had gone far beyond the concept of parasitic damages. The true function of the requirement was to provide a circumstantial guarantee that the plaintiff's claim was valid.14 A few courts, in Georgia and Arkansas for example, still apply the rule at least in some types of cases.15
From Impact to Bodily Consequences
Most jurisdictions have abandoned the impact requirement.17 A growing majority of courts concluded that the physical consequences of the fright, or the circumstances of the accident itself, give sufficient assurance that the claim is genuine.18 New York's highest court, which had decided Mitchell, overruled that decision in Battalia v. State in 1961, observing that the rule had been repudiated in England, rejected by most American jurisdictions, and diluted by exceptions in the few that kept it.19
Daley v. LaCroix shows what replaced it. At about 10:00 p.m., the defendant's vehicle left the highway, traveled 63 feet through the air and 209 feet beyond the edge of the road, and sheared off a utility pole. High-voltage lines snapped and struck the lines leading into the plaintiffs' house, and a great electrical explosion followed, causing considerable property damage.20 The Michigan Supreme Court overruled the impact requirement. Where a definite and objective physical injury results from emotional distress that the defendant's negligence proximately caused, the court held, the plaintiff may recover for those physical consequences even though nothing touched the plaintiff at the time of the shock.21
The holding carries two limits. The defendant's conduct is measured against the reactions of normal persons, absent knowledge of a plaintiff's unusual sensitivity. And the plaintiff must prove that the physical harm is the natural result of the fright, in the sense that people of ordinary experience and judgment can conclude that the harm flows from the distress.22
Impact and bodily consequence screen for different things. Impact asks whether the defendant's negligence touched the plaintiff, a fact that can be trivial and says little about whether the suffering is real. A bodily consequence of the distress can be examined and proved, and it supplies the assurance of genuineness that contact supplied only crudely. Return to DuBarry, narrowly missed by Marat's car and then felled by a heart attack brought on by fright. The impact rule turned that plaintiff away; under the newer approach the documented heart attack is the objective proof the court wants. It is also bodily harm, which takes the claim outside § 436A's bar on emotional disturbance "alone."23 The Restatement's exception for bodily harm resulting from emotional disturbance, taken up in the next section, builds on that distinction.24