Concept
Modern Departures From the Threshold
Negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical harm: threshold rule
Modern Departures From the Threshold
The Second Restatement's two threshold rules remain the baseline, but most states have moved past them. Section 436A withholds liability for emotional disturbance that occurs alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage.1 Section 313(2) withholds the bodily-harm exception from a plaintiff whose distress arose solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the actor's negligence has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.2 Traditionally no claim existed for negligently caused distress without physical injury. Today most jurisdictions recognize one, but each sets its own limits.3
Courts moved past the old rules in the second half of the twentieth century, once they realized that the risk of false claims does not justify denying legitimate ones. They kept limits, however. A cause of action lies only where the circumstances create some inherent assurance of genuineness, where the equities favoring liability are strong, or where some combination of the two is present.4 Compensation is one goal of tort law, but courts have not ordered it in every case in which the defendant causes harm, and the distress limits fit that pattern.5
Four departures follow: the zone-of-danger rule for a plaintiff's own fear, bystander claims by close relatives, the Third Restatement's organization of the field, and the loosening of the physical-manifestation requirement. States differ on all four, so an answer should first identify the governing approach. Where the facts name no jurisdiction, state the Second Restatement baseline and then note the modern alternative.
Zone of Danger and Direct Fear
The impact rule once defeated the claim of a pedestrian whom a negligent driver narrowly missed, even though the pedestrian stood in the path of the danger and legitimately feared injury. Most jurisdictions have abolished that requirement and allow such plaintiffs to recover on satisfactory proof, so the zone-of-danger rule is now the majority view.6 The rule has a foothold in the Second Restatement itself, because § 313(2) lifts its bar when the actor's negligence has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.7 The zone of danger now does the screening that physical contact once did, limiting claimants to those whom the defendant's negligence actually endangered.
Courts applying the rule generally deny recovery to a person who was neither in the zone nor in fear for personal safety.8 In Stacy v. Rederiet Otto Danielsen, A.S., the Ninth Circuit allowed the operator of a small fishing vessel, threatened by a large freighter, to recover because he was himself in the zone of danger. It did so even though he did not witness the death of the captain of a nearby fishing vessel.9 The Supreme Court adopted the same rule for claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall.10
In direct cases, a common limitation pairs the zone with a physical manifestation of the distress. Courts read that requirement liberally to include heart attacks, ulcers, headaches, and nausea, as well as psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, and nightmares.11 A plaintiff inside the zone who also watches a close relative be threatened or hurt by the same negligence recovers for that distress too, as the earlier discussion of Bovsun v. Sanperi showed.12 A plaintiff who was never endangered and fears only for someone else falls outside the rule, and the bystander cases begin there.
Bystander Claims Without Own Peril
A parent who watches from complete safety as a negligent driver kills the parent's child falls outside the zone-of-danger rule. The Second Restatement leaves that parent without a claim, because the distress arose solely from peril to a third person.14 California confronted that result in Dillon v. Legg. The mother there watched a negligently driven vehicle collide with and roll over her infant daughter as the child lawfully crossed a street, and the mother was not herself in danger.15 The California Supreme Court found a rule denying recovery for shock and resulting injury unless the plaintiff was personally threatened incongruous, and it overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. only five years after deciding it.16 Ordinary negligence principles permit recovery, the court reasoned, because a negligent driver can foresee that a child's mother will be in the immediate vicinity, will witness the event, and will suffer severe shock.17
Foreseeability alone proved too loose a stopping point. Dillon itself proposed guidelines that looked to the plaintiff's nearness to the scene, to whether the shock came from sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident or from learning of it afterward, and to how closely the plaintiff and the victim were related.18 Later decisions left the limits unsettled and created more uncertainty, and they gave little attention to the unlimited exposure that a pure foreseeability test invites.19 In Thing v. La Chusa, the California Supreme Court took up the question whether Dillon's guidelines needed refining to create greater certainty.20 It answered with rule-based requirements, which most courts that recognize a bystander claim have since adopted.21 The plaintiff must show three things:
- The plaintiff is closely related to the person who was injured.
- The plaintiff actually witnesses the traumatic event as it happens, and does not merely learn of it from someone else.
- The plaintiff suffers serious emotional distress, meaning a reaction beyond what a disinterested witness would experience and one that is not abnormal under the circumstances.
Courts also require that the shock-producing event be sudden, as opposed to something like an extended illness. They acknowledge that such lines are somewhat arbitrary, and they defend them as necessary to keep liability within reasonable bounds and to restrict it to indisputably genuine claims.22
Perception separates the two California decisions. Dillon's mother saw the vehicle strike her child and recovered. Maria Thing was nearby but neither saw nor heard the accident; a daughter told her that her son had been struck, and she rushed to the scene and found him bloody and unconscious in the roadway.23 The trial court granted summary judgment against her because she had not contemporaneously and sensorily perceived the accident.24 Under requirements that demand contemporaneous perception of the injury-producing event, a mother who learns of the accident from another person and arrives afterward has no claim, however close the relationship and however severe the shock.
The states have not moved in unison. Most now follow Dillon or some variation of it, though some courts have expressly rejected it, as New York did in Tobin v. Grossman.25 Some states allow a bystander to proceed under either the zone-of-danger test or the bystander test.26 Pennsylvania's decision in Sinn v. Burd, which involved a bystander mother, is another departure from the Restatement position. A separate opinion in the case observed that, even where distress causes physical harm, the Restatement takes a position against recovery when the distress is for one's child rather than for one's own physical safety.27
The Third Restatement's Categories
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm sorts the modern field into three categories. Two of them, in § 47, concern directly inflicting emotional disturbance on another. An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm is subject to liability if the conduct places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the emotional harm results from that danger. The same is true if the conduct occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.29 The first category restates the zone-of-danger rule. The second reflects the direct-victim cases, in which a plaintiff recovers although no contact or threat of physical harm occurred, because the defendant's activity or relationship with the plaintiff made serious distress especially likely.30 In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, a hospital and doctor owed a duty directly to the husband of a patient who had been erroneously diagnosed with syphilis and told to have her husband tested. The husband recovered as a direct victim, not as a bystander.31
Section 48 stands apart because the negligent conduct is directed toward someone else. An actor who negligently causes sudden serious bodily injury to a third person is subject to liability for serious emotional harm caused thereby to a person who perceives the event contemporaneously and is a close family member of the person injured.32 The plaintiff must perceive the event contemporaneously but need not see the injury itself, and perception is not limited to sight. A plaintiff who hears a crash and immediately runs to see the aftermath may satisfy the section, as may parents who watch their house burn knowing that a child is inside.33 A relative who learns of the event afterward from someone else stands where Maria Thing stood, because that relative never perceived it.
Sections 47 and 48 mark the main departure from the Second Restatement. Each treats serious emotional harm as the injury, so neither requires the bodily harm that § 313(1) demands. Section 48 also dispenses with the plaintiff's own peril, which § 313(2) required before a third-person-peril claim could proceed.34 The Third Restatement still keeps limits where the older rules put them: immediate danger or a special undertaking for direct claims, and a close family relationship, a sudden serious injury, and contemporaneous perception for bystanders.
Loosening the Physical-Manifestation Requirement
The Second Restatement's requirement of resulting illness or bodily harm has also lost ground, though less uniformly than the impact rule did. Most states still require some physical manifestation of the distress, and two exceptions are well recognized.36 The death-telegram rule allows recovery for emotional harm resulting from the negligent transmission of a message announcing a death. It is a minority rule followed by a number of states, and the federal rule allows recovery only if physical harm results.37 The second exception covers negligent interference with dead bodies, where liability gives incentives for careful handling of human remains in light of the uncertain property rights that loved ones hold in a corpse.38
Some courts have dropped the requirement for particular claims. Alaska and Illinois eliminated it in direct victim cases only, and the Pennsylvania abolition turned out to govern only bystander cases.39 Tennessee took a broader step in 1996, abolishing its special rules for emotional distress and substituting a general test of foreseeability. The Tennessee court recognized that the test might produce much the same results as the restrictive rules, and it has since added a requirement of expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury.40 In Osborne v. Keeney, Kentucky's highest court reversed longstanding precedent and held that physical impact is not required. A plaintiff there must prove the elements of negligence plus, through expert testimony, a severe or serious emotional injury.41 In states of this kind, the assurance of genuineness moves from the body to the proof. Courts ask whether expert evidence establishes a serious injury, where the Second Restatement asked whether an illness resulted. Most courts also hold that the plaintiff can recover only if a normally constituted person would suffer and the plaintiff in fact suffered severe distress.42 At the far end, a very small number of states, Arkansas among them, continue to reject the stand-alone distress claim.43
These departures leave a patchwork in which the same facts can yield different answers in neighboring states. A near miss followed by a diagnosed physical consequence supports recovery in a zone-of-danger state. A mother who arrives after the crash and did not perceive the event has no claim under rule-based bystander requirements. A death-telegram claim depends on whether the state recognizes that exception. In each case, identify the governing approach first, use §§ 436A and 313 as the baseline where the jurisdiction is unspecified, and then test the plaintiff against the requirements of any modern approach.