Concept
Causation and Proof Limits
Bodily harm resulting from emotional disturbance and extent of liability
Causation and Proof Limits
Two Restatement rules lead into this section. When negligent conduct has caused bodily harm for which the actor is liable, the actor also answers for the fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance that results from the harm or the conduct, and for further bodily harm that results from the disturbance.1 When the actor breaches a duty of care designed to protect another from fright that involves an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm arrives solely through the internal operation of the fright gives the actor no protection.2 Both rules make bodily harm the thing to prove. Neither says how real that harm must be, whose reactions the defendant's conduct is measured against, or how the plaintiff ties the harm back to the defendant.
The usual guarantee of genuineness is weakest where harm travels through the plaintiff's own mind. Emotional disturbance alone stays outside liability for three reasons: it may be too temporary and trivial to justify the burden of compensating it, it may too easily be feigned when it rests mostly on the plaintiff's testimony, and mere negligence is not so culpable that it should pay for a purely mental disturbance.3 Resulting bodily harm supplies the guarantee that testimony cannot. Fright claims reopen the worry, because the harm shows up in the body but must be traced to the mind, and many conditions that follow a shock have other sources.
Three limits press on the links where that chain is easiest to doubt:
- The injury must be definite and objective, and distress at harm to a family member must be serious and verifiable.
- The defendant's conduct is measured against the reactions of normal persons, unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff's unusual sensitivity.
- The plaintiff must show that the physical harm is the natural result of fright the defendant's conduct proximately caused, even where the plaintiff was already vulnerable.
Limits of this kind appear throughout negligence law. In Bradshaw v. Rawlings, for example, a college rule against drinking at off-campus college-sponsored events was not enough, by itself, to place the college in a custodial relationship with its students or to support a duty of protection.4 The first limit asks what kind of physical injury is enough.
Real and Objective Harm
A plaintiff who says fright injured her body must show an injury that others can see, measure, or hear a physician describe. Daley v. LaCroix, which announced a new rule in place of Michigan's impact requirement, held that where a “definite and objective physical injury” results from emotional distress that the defendant's negligence proximately caused, the plaintiff may recover for those physical consequences even though nothing touched the plaintiff at the time of the shock.5 Most jurisdictions no longer apply the impact rule, although some continue to champion it.6 The rule works as a standard of proof: the plaintiff's body must show something a judge or jury can examine, so the claim does not rest on the plaintiff's own account of how upset she felt.
The demand follows from the reasons that keep emotional disturbance alone outside liability. Resulting bodily harm answers the worry that distress is easily feigned, because it supplies a guarantee of genuineness that the plaintiff's testimony cannot.7 Daley moved the gate for no-impact claims from contact to injury, so that a claim passes only if the plaintiff suffered a definite and objective physical injury.8
Estelle Daley's record shows how a plaintiff clears the line. A negligently driven car left the road, traveled 63 feet through the air, and sheared off a utility pole; high-voltage lines snapped, struck the electrical lines leading into the plaintiffs' house, and caused a great electrical explosion.9 The plaintiffs repeatedly testified to her sudden loss of weight, her inability to perform ordinary household duties, and her extreme nervousness and irritability, and the court held that these were facts from which a jury could find or infer a compensable physical injury.10 It further held that the record let a jury find a causal relationship between the fright and the injuries alleged, so the trial court erred in taking her case from the jury.11 Observable changes in how she functioned, together with a psychiatrist's causal testimony, carried the claim, and no dramatic organic injury was demanded.
Timothy Daley's claim sat nearer the line. The court called the question a close one, but on a favorable view of the evidence it found facts from which a jury could reasonably infer a causal relation between the negligence and the injuries alleged, and it gave him a new trial at which to try to prove his claim.12 The requirement is therefore a threshold on proof and not a categorical bar. A thin record leaves the plaintiff at the edge of the threshold, and a favorable view of the evidence may still carry the plaintiff over it.
Chief Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Kelly, accepted the same requirement and drew the opposite conclusion from the record. He said that a case of definite and objective physical injury without impact might warrant adopting the Restatement's rule in § 436(2), but he found that the plaintiffs suffered “indefinite and subjective” injury.13 Traumatic neurosis, emotional disturbance, and nervous upset, he wrote, are the very complaints that restricting no-impact claims to definite and objective physical injury is meant to eliminate, and he would have affirmed the directed verdict.14 Majority and dissent drew the same line and put this record on opposite sides of it. The majority saw weight loss, lost household function, and a causal opinion; the dissent saw complaints that depend on the plaintiffs' say-so. A claim framed in terms of nerves, upset, or neurosis invites the dissent's reading, and a claim framed in terms of physical change and medical testimony invites the majority's.
Consider two pedestrians who face the same near miss.
The single difference between the two is the physician's documentation of a physical condition. Delgado's fright may have been as real as Pruitt's, but a claim resting only on his description of his own state of mind is emotional disturbance alone, for which a negligent actor is not liable.15 Courts that require physical manifestation have construed the requirement liberally, to include heart attacks, ulcers, headaches, and nausea as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, and nightmares.16 Even poor sleep can count, then, but only once someone proves that the condition exists and traces it to the event, so the burden of proof does not move. Students often read “objective” to demand impact, permanence, or a dramatic injury. The cases show that a documented condition of any of the kinds just listed can qualify.
The same demand for verifiable harm governs shock at a family member's peril. In Bovsun v. Sanperi, the New York Court of Appeals said that trifling distress will not support recovery under the zone-of-danger rule: the emotional disturbance must be “serious and verifiable,” and it must be tied by proximate causation to the observation of the family member's serious injury or death, which the defendant's conduct must have caused.17 The court also refused to let the risk of dishonest claims close the door. The question of proof in individual situations, it said, should not be the arbitrary basis for barring all actions; in difficult cases courts look to the quality and genuineness of the proof and rely on medical sophistication and on the court and jury to weed out dishonest claims.18 That answer completes the picture of the requirement as a standard of proof. The risk of feigned claims justifies insisting on verifiable harm in each case. It cannot justify excluding every case, because verification is how genuine claims are told from invented ones.
Jurisdictions phrase the proof requirement differently, and the string citations that accompany the topic set decisions on one side against “but see” decisions on the other.19 An answer should therefore state the formulation the governing court uses. The formulations include these:
- Michigan requires a definite and objective physical injury produced by distress that the defendant's negligence proximately caused.20
- Williams v. Baker took no position on whether physical injury is required, but agreed with New York that the claimed distress must be “serious” and “verifiable.”21
- Maryland accepts some clearly apparent and substantial physical injury, shown by an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state, an elastic approach that makes the question a medical one.22
- Missouri treats the physical-injury requirement as arbitrary and allows recovery where the distress is medically diagnosable and severe enough to be medically significant.23
Each formulation asks for something beyond the plaintiff's say-so, so they converge on one practical question: can someone other than the plaintiff observe and verify the claimed harm? Diagnosis, documented symptoms, and expert testimony are the usual answers. A proven injury must also be one the defendant could foresee and one the plaintiff can tie causally to the defendant's conduct, which are the limits taken up next.
The Normal-Person Standard
The Restatement rule for duties designed to protect against fright reaches only fright that the actor “should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.”25 “Should recognize” sets an objective measure: what would a careful person in the defendant's position have foreseen? Daley adds a limit on whose reactions count. The defendant's standard of conduct is measured by the “reactions to be expected of normal persons,” and absent specific knowledge of the plaintiff's unusual sensitivity there is no recovery for “hypersensitive mental disturbance where a normal individual would not be affected under the circumstances.”26 Dillon v. Legg puts the limit in terms of foreseeability: recovery follows where the defendant should foresee “fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally constituted.”27
The reason for measuring conduct against the ordinary person lies in what a duty asks of a defendant. Care consists of adjusting one's conduct to dangers one can foresee, so a defendant can perform a duty only against risks that can be anticipated. Dillon says as much: the defendant owes a duty only with respect to those risks whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and hence negligent, in the first instance.28 Ordinary reactions can be anticipated, because anyone knows that a violent explosion frightens people badly and that a quiet footstep does not. A rare susceptibility leaves no trace the defendant could detect, so no care measured against the world as it appears would protect that plaintiff. The same rule appears in claims for infliction of emotional distress: the defendant is not liable to the extent the plaintiff's response falls outside the range of normal human reactions, and the conduct must be such that a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity would experience severe distress.29
The rule has two halves, and each has its own logic. The normal-person baseline fixes what the defendant may assume about people in general. The knowledge exception withdraws that assumption for the plaintiff whom the defendant actually knows to be fragile. A known heart condition changes the situation because the sensitivity is no longer hidden: it is a fact in the defendant's hands, a reasonable person adjusts conduct to it, and the risk of collapse falls within the duty.
Daley itself falls on the near side of the line. A car sheared off a utility pole and snapped high-voltage lines into a great electrical explosion,30 and an explosion of that size frightens ordinary occupants badly. The normal-person limit therefore posed no obstacle, and the contest was over proof of physical injury. The limit does its work in the opposite kind of case, where the trigger is trivial and the reaction extreme.
The two scenes differ in one fact: what the defendant knew. The shopper's collapse may be as medically genuine as the customer's cardiac event, and that does not matter. The standard asks what the defendant could foresee, so a defendant without knowledge is judged against ordinary reactions, and a defendant with knowledge is judged against the sensitivity that knowledge revealed.
The limit governs the first link of the chain, the link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's emotional disturbance. It does not tell a court to discount a plaintiff's physical injury once an ordinary person would have been affected. How much of this plaintiff's harm the event actually caused, including what a preexisting condition contributed, is a separate question that the next subsection takes up.
Students often treat the standard as a ceiling on damages, when it is a threshold on what the defendant could foresee.
Causal Link and Preexisting Conditions
Daley assigns the plaintiff the burden of proving that the physical harm or illness is the natural result of fright proximately caused by the defendant's conduct, and it states the test in terms of jurors. Once the plaintiff has offered enough testimony to form an intelligent opinion, people of ordinary experience and judgment must be able to conclude that the harm is a natural consequence of the disturbance and that the defendant proximately caused the disturbance.32 The Restatement's wording makes the same demand, since further bodily harm must be harm resulting from the disturbance.33
That burden has two links, and the plaintiff must prove both. One runs from the defendant's conduct to the fright; the other runs from the fright to the plaintiff's body. “Proximate cause” needs care here, because the term is loosely used to cover both cause in fact and the policy considerations that limit liability to persons and consequences bearing a reasonable relationship to the tortious act; strictly, it names the second.34 The plaintiff must therefore show both that the fright did produce the illness and that the illness bears a reasonable relationship to the defendant's wrong. Physical conditions that appear after a shock have many possible sources, and the plaintiff's own account supplies much of the story. A rule that charged the defendant with every symptom that followed a frightening event would reach harm that has other causes. A requirement of a natural, proximately caused link confines liability to what the defendant's conduct produced.
Estelle Daley's record shows the burden met despite a vulnerability. Her psychiatrist testified that the trauma was “the triggering point for her breaking the balance in her.”35 The phrase presupposes a balance that existed before the explosion and that the explosion upset. The Michigan Supreme Court nonetheless held that her claim of physical consequences naturally arising from fright proximately caused by the defendant's conduct was amply supported by the record.36
A preexisting vulnerability does not defeat the claim, because the causation burden asks what produced the breakdown when it came. A defendant whose tort precipitates an illness to which the plaintiff was predisposed is liable for the harm it causes even though a normal person would not have suffered that illness, and the same is true where the tort reactivates a condition that had been brought under control or aggravates an existing one.37 The compensatory aim confirms the measure. In admiralty, which uses damage categories similar to those of state law, damages for negligent injury to property serve a compensatory function: they place the aggrieved party in as good a position as before the accident.38 Carried over to injury to a person, that aim points to the harm the event added, so the defendant answers for the breakdown the explosion triggered and not for the condition it found. Had the testimony instead shown that the symptoms would have appeared on the same schedule whatever happened that night, jurors would have nothing from which to find that the fright produced them, and the claim would fail for want of causation.
This point is easy to confuse with the normal-person standard, and the two answer different questions. The normal-person standard asks whether the defendant should have foreseen any disturbance at all, a question about the scope of the risk that is measured against ordinary reactions unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff's sensitivity. The causation burden asks whether the event actually produced or aggravated this plaintiff's physical harm, a question about what happened that is answered with evidence about this plaintiff. Daley treated the two as separate limits on its new rule.39 An explosion that brought down power lines near a house would badly frighten an ordinary occupant, so the first question needed no special knowledge of Estelle Daley's fragility, and her fragility mattered only at the second. The usual error is to let one question answer the other, either by treating a plaintiff's fragility as a reason to deny that a foreseeable fright caused the illness, or by treating the foreseeability of the fright as proof that it caused this plaintiff's illness.
The same causal discipline governs the family-member cases. In Bovsun v. Sanperi the New York Court of Appeals required that the compensable distress be tied, as a matter of proximate causation, to the observation of the family member's serious injury or death, and that the injury or death have been caused by the defendant's conduct.40 Two separate ties are at work. The first runs from the plaintiff's distress back to what the plaintiff saw, and the second runs from what the plaintiff saw back to the defendant's negligence.
The zone of danger, the family relationship, and the verifiable illness are present in both versions, so the fact that moves the answer is whether the harm the mother observed and mourned came from the driver's conduct. A court asking about causation is not asking whether the mother suffered, since she plainly did, but whether the defendant's negligence is the source of what she suffered over.
Whether the evidence is enough to reach a jury recurs across torts. Timothy Daley's close case turned on it, and the battery materials ask the same sort of question about a teacher who grabbed a parent's arm or shoulder to turn her around and told her, “I don't care who you are, move it”: was that evidence enough to let the jury decide whether the touching was offensive?41