Concept
Forms of Intangible Harm
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Forms of Intangible Harm
The Restatement (Second) of Torts names two items that a jury may compensate without proof of pecuniary loss: bodily harm and emotional distress.1 Section 924(a) lists the same pair first among the items that a person whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded may recover.2 Both labels are broad on purpose. They establish that the jury may pay for suffering itself, with no receipts. They do not say what the suffering consists of, and no plaintiff’s experience arrives as a single item priced in one step.
The law therefore sorts intangible harm into four components: physical pain and suffering, mental distress, impairment and disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life. The components overlap, and the overlap causes most of the errors. A visible scar is a disfigurement and also a source of embarrassment. A lost pastime is distress and also a loss in its own right. If a verdict form lets one experience be counted under two names, the defendant pays twice. If a component is dropped because its label is unfamiliar, the plaintiff goes uncompensated for a real loss. Jurisdictions also differ on whether some components are items of damages in their own right or only ways of describing another one.
The division of labor from the opening section carries through every component below. The court decides whether the kind of harm claimed is legally compensable, and the jury decides whether this plaintiff suffered it and what it is worth.3 Physical pain is the baseline against which the other components are measured, so it comes first.
Pain and Suffering
Past and future physical pain are compensable as pain and suffering, and within broad limits the jury values them in its own discretion.4 The element exists because a plaintiff injured in body has lost more than wages and medical bills, and an award limited to those items would leave the most immediate consequence of the injury unpaid.5 Suffering does not occur in money, so the jury translates it into money, and the award serves a largely symbolic function.6
The element reaches well beyond the raw sensation of pain. Virtually any form of conscious suffering, emotional or physical, qualifies. The suffering need not flow directly from the tort: pain or distress caused by later medical treatment counts so long as it is a proximate result.7 Pain has a past and a future aspect, and the jury counts both.8 Proof of future pain is largely an inference from evidence that the injury will continue and that medical attention cannot relieve it.9 The probability standard from the previous subsection governs how sure the jury must be about that future.
These damages are of necessity not subject to precise measurement, and they depend on the evidence presented in the particular case.10 The amount therefore belongs to the jury, and the later section on measuring awards explains how courts police the figure it reaches.
Some courts will not merely permit an award for pain but will require one once the jury finds that physical injury was inflicted.11
The logic is internal consistency. A jury that pays for the surgery has found that the injury was real and needed treatment, and a finding that the plaintiff needed this treatment for this injury already contains a finding that the plaintiff was hurt. Awarding nothing for that pain contradicts the verdict’s own premise, since the award for medical expenses must reflect a finding that some compensation for pain is also due.12
The element has a limit that follows from what it compensates. Suffering describes the way a person perceives pain, so the award answers to something the plaintiff lives through.13 Most courts therefore reject a pain and suffering claim when the plaintiff is not aware of pain, as when the plaintiff is comatose, because money paid for a pain no one feels would punish the defendant and console no one.14 The comatose plaintiff’s medical expenses and lost earning capacity are unaffected, because those items rest on money spent or lost and not on what the plaintiff feels. Whether lost enjoyment of life can be recovered without awareness is a separate question that some courts answer differently, and it is taken up under that component below.
How much conscious suffering is enough depends on the evidence. In Childs v. United States, the court denied pain and suffering to a woman killed in a traffic collision because it was undisputed that she died within minutes and that any pain she felt was momentary and fleeting.15 In Maracallo v. Board of Education of City of New York, a fourteen-year-old drowned in a waterpark wave pool during a school trip. The court found that he was conscious for six to seven minutes with an awareness of impending death, and held that the evidence supported an award of not less than $2,000,000.16 The difference lies in how long the victim consciously suffered, and Maracallo also treats terror at an approaching death as suffering that counts.
On an exam, a stem that pairs a grave injury and large medical bills with a plaintiff who never regained consciousness is testing awareness. The seriousness of the injury and the size of the bills are beside the point on the pain element, and the bills remain recoverable as pecuniary items. A stem with a conscious plaintiff and a verdict that pays medical expenses but nothing for pain is testing the required-award approach.
Mental Distress
Most courts allow a physically injured plaintiff to claim six kinds of mental harm, and the list shows how wide the category runs:18
- Fright and shock sustained during the occurrence, including terror at an approaching injury.19
- Anxiety about the future, whether physical (premature death, disability, illness, harm to an unborn child) or economic (for the plaintiff or for others), unless the fear is clearly unfounded and unreasonable.
- Loss of peace of mind, happiness, or mental health, ranging from depression through neuroses and psychoses.
- Humiliation, loss of dignity, or embarrassment caused by the injury, disability, or disfigurement.
- Mental distress from the loss of the ability to enjoy a normal life.
- Inconvenience in performing the daily activities of life.
The list is long because the standard is wide. Any unpleasant emotional reaction to the injury or its consequences supports recovery if it is proximately related to the tort, and suffering can take forms as different as fear, frustration, and grief.20 Each item is an example within one category, so a plaintiff who proves fright and humiliation but no anxiety about the future recovers for the two that were proved. The items also overlap, since a single scar can produce embarrassment and a narrowed life at once. That is why impairment and lost enjoyment get their own subsections.
This breadth belongs to distress that accompanies a physical injury. The stand-alone tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which a later section takes up, demands extreme and outrageous conduct and a severe emotional response, and courts there decline to redress minor psychic harm. A plaintiff who is briefly unhappy or humiliated and loses a night or two of sleep cannot recover.21 The same humiliation, when it accompanies a broken bone, is a recognized mental harm that the jury may compensate. A student who carries the severity threshold from the stand-alone tort into a bodily-injury case will wrongly strike items such as embarrassment and inconvenience that the list expressly includes.
Anxiety about the future is the one item that carries a qualifier, and the only filter on it is reasonableness. The fear is compensable unless it is clearly unfounded and unreasonable.22 The reason for screening this item alone lies in what each kind of distress rests on. Fright was felt during an event, and humiliation attaches to a scar or disability that other people can see. Anxiety about the future rests on a belief about what may happen, and a belief can run ahead of the facts. A reasonableness test lets the jury reject a fear that has no real basis while still paying for the fears that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would share. The word clearly keeps the exclusion narrow, because a fear need not be likely to come true to be reasonable.
A dog-bite victim who reasonably worries that the bite will lead to rabies, and who lives with real distress until treated, may recover for that worry even if the disease never develops. So may a burn victim who worries about cancer, since both are suffering over the future course of an injury already inflicted.23
Both plaintiffs are anxious about something that has not happened. What differs is the footing of the fear. The dog-bite victim’s worry rests on a real medical possibility that comes with the injury, while the wrist plaintiff’s rests on a link the medical evidence refutes. The probability standard taught earlier in this chapter governs how sure a jury must be before it awards money for future losses. It answers a different question from the one posed here, which is whether a present worry is one a reasonable person would share. A student who rejects the dog-bite claim because rabies is unlikely has applied the wrong standard, and a student who accepts the wrist plaintiff’s claim because he really was afraid has overlooked the qualifier.
Impairment and Disfigurement
A permanent loss of function, such as lost hearing or a hand that no longer works, and a lasting change in appearance, such as a scar, are bodily harm in its most durable form.25 Courts price that harm in one of two ways. Under the first, the jury values the pain, inconvenience, and mental distress that the impairment produces, and disfigurement counts as a source of mental pain or embarrassment even if others could not normally see it.26 Under the second, which some jurisdictions use, the jury is told to value the impairment itself. Where the injury impairs eyesight, hearing, the use of an extremity, the ability to bear children, or any other bodily function, or where the plaintiff is disfigured, the jury compensates that loss as such and not merely its mental consequences.27
The range of losses under either approach is wide. Decisions allow juries to compensate loss of taste and smell (Purdy v. Swift & Co.), incontinence (Thoren v. Myers), scars and other disfigurements (Gray v. Washington Water Power Co.), and a change of personality and of attitude toward other people (Fjellman v. Weller).28 The common thread is a lasting change in what the body can do or how it looks, and the harm is the cost of living with that change day after day.
The direct instruction does not open a new pool of money. Compensation for the impairment is in addition to what the jury awards for any economic loss and for pain resulting from the injury.29 It also changes the verdict very little, because whichever instruction the jury hears, it is in reality valuing the plaintiff’s experience of the loss, which is to say its mental effects.30
The element needs a lasting loss to value.
The overlap between the two approaches sets a trap. A jury given one line for impairment and another for mental distress is at risk of valuing one experience twice, so a visible scar compensated as disfigurement and again as embarrassment pays the plaintiff twice for the same suffering. Labeling the harm under one head or two does not make it a larger harm. The same concern returns in the next subsection, where loss of enjoyment of life is sometimes treated as one more form of mental distress and sometimes as an element of its own.
Loss of Enjoyment of Life
A plaintiff who can no longer pursue the activities and pleasures that made life better has suffered a loss that physical pain does not capture. A person whose injury forecloses hearing music, seeing a sunset, or pursuing a chosen vocation may feel no physical pain and still be aware of the loss and suffer from it.32 Courts compensate that loss. The standard list of personal-injury damages names it,33 an injured seaman may recover for the mental and physical effects of the injury on his ability to engage in activities that normally contribute to the enjoyment of life,34 and the loss of pleasure is recoverable alongside the sensation of pain.35 Almost without exception it is as compensable as any other negative emotional state that results from tortious injury, and older decisions that denied recovery altogether are largely obsolete.36
The reason follows from what pain and suffering covers. A rule that excluded the loss would let a defendant who left a plaintiff deaf but free of pain escape liability for the suffering that follows, which would be a surprising result.37 The recognized mental harms accordingly include mental distress resulting from the loss of the ability to enjoy a normal life.38 Like other general damages, these are of necessity not subject to precise measurement and depend on the evidence in the particular case.39
The litigated issues concern how the loss is packaged and proved. Courts ask whether lost enjoyment is its own element or part of pain and suffering, whether the plaintiff must be aware of the loss, and whether an expert may testify to its dollar value.40 On the first question, most courts treat loss of enjoyment as one form of pain and suffering, which by universal agreement includes mental distress, since lost enjoyment is a mental reaction to injury.41 Other authorities list it as a separate element of personal-injury damages.42
The double-counting danger in separate treatment is concrete. In Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., a defendant’s employee negligently injured a plaintiff who had been very active, playing several sports and working long hours, and afterward she could play no organized sports and could not work long hours. At trial an expert economist offered mathematical calculations for her hedonic damages, and the judge gave separate instructions on pain and suffering and on loss of enjoyment.43 The California Court of Appeals held that admitting the expert was error, because such damages cannot be computed by formula. It also called the separate instructions improper, because they could mislead the jury into a double recovery.44 The mechanism is easy to trace. Jurors told to award damages for pain and suffering may draw on all of their feelings for the injured person, and if they are then told to award a second sum for lost enjoyment, they may draw again on some of the same feelings. The suggested cure is a single instruction that pain and suffering includes all forms of mental distress and a sense of lost enjoyment or lost opportunities in life. That wording keeps a jury from reading pain and suffering as bare physical hurt without inviting a second payment.45 It is the same concern raised in the previous subsection about a scar paid for once as disfigurement and again as embarrassment.
Awareness is the second contested point. Most courts reject lost enjoyment as a separate element when the plaintiff is unaware of the loss, as when the plaintiff is in a coma, although a few cases have allowed such damages under the label “disability” even though the plaintiff is not conscious of the loss.46 Two reasons support the majority view. Lost enjoyment is a species of pain and suffering, which depends on experience, and an award to a plaintiff who cannot perceive the loss would be punitive rather than compensatory.47
The violinist and the pedestrian have lost the same kind of pleasure, so the exam question is whether the plaintiff can perceive the loss, and the seriousness of the injury does not answer it. The third question, expert testimony on the value of lost enjoyment, is also contested. The court in Loth refused to admit an economist’s formula, and the jury is left to value the loss from the evidence of what the plaintiff can no longer do.48
Three errors recur on exams. Students demand proof of a pecuniary loss before the jury may award for lost enjoyment, although the item is a mental reaction compensable without receipts. They add a separate lost-enjoyment award on top of a full pain and suffering award without considering double counting. And they allow the award to an unaware plaintiff without noting that most courts refuse it.