Concept
Contracting Parties and Products
Claims for pure economic loss
Contracting Parties and Products
When plaintiff and defendant have a contract, the economic loss rule asks what their bargain says about the risk that materialized. Courts commonly defend the rule on the ground that it preserves the contract’s limitations on liability and its other allocations of loss.1 A tort claim for the same harm would let the plaintiff collect what the contract withheld.
The reason for the bar changes with the setting, and that shift organizes everything below. Against strangers, the Restatement points to losses that proliferate long after the physical forces have spent themselves, to lawsuits that grow more numerous, complex, and expensive, and to liability that turns indeterminate and out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.2 Contracting parties raise little of that fear, because the defendant knows who the plaintiff is and what the exchange was for. What carries the bar here is respect for the bargain: the parties set a price, a warranty, and a remedy with a particular division of risk in mind.3 The Restatement’s fourth justification, that victims can often protect themselves by means other than a tort suit, also changes character. Against a stranger it predicts that victims can buy first-party insurance; between contracting parties, recovery in contract is itself the protection, and the plaintiff could negotiate for it before the loss.4
The unit follows the contract strand in two steps. The next subsection teaches the rule in its simplest form, a contract performed carelessly. The one after it carries the rule into the setting where it arises most often, the defective product that fails or damages only itself. There the buyer’s loss is financial, the product is deemed to have damaged itself, and the buyer is left to whatever contract rights it had.5
The Contract Version of the Rule
When plaintiff and defendant are in a contractual relationship, the economic loss rule bars the plaintiff from recovering purely economic loss in tort and limits her to the remedies the contract provides.6 Where the contract expressly or impliedly covers all the parties’ responsibilities for performance, she recovers what the contract allows, and the contract may allow nothing if it disclaims liability. Seely v. White Motor Co. recognized that a disclaimer of warranty as to economic loss is permitted, and Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc. called the rule particularly appropriate where the parties’ contract excludes liability for economic harm.7 The defendant stays answerable in contract, but only on the contract’s terms.
Two ordinary pictures show the rule at work. A seller who has contracted to deliver wheat on October 1 carelessly fails to acquire it and cannot deliver. The buyer has a claim for breach of contract and none in negligence, because negligent breach of contract is still breach of contract.8 The Restatement draws a related line elsewhere, in discussing when conduct counts as an independent legal wrong: such a wrong “does not include an act of negligence or breach of contract.”9 In the second picture, a seller delivers a truck that does not work, the buyer cannot deliver goods to a customer, and the buyer loses the profit on that sale. With no personal injury and no property damage, the lost profit is pure economic loss, and the buyer must seek it, if at all, in an action for breach of contract.10 In both pictures the defendant was careless and the loss was foreseeable, yet the plaintiff’s entitlement comes from the agreement alone.
Courts give three reasons for the rule in this setting: it maintains the distinction between tort law and contract law, it protects commercial parties’ freedom to allocate economic risk by contract, and it encourages the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss to assume, allocate, or insure against it.11 None of the three depends on foreseeability or on the number of possible claimants. The defendant knows exactly who the plaintiff is, so a student who defeats a contracting-party claim by calling the loss too remote has applied the wrong strand. The answer should rest on what the contract allocated.
Because the plaintiff is left with the contract claim alone, four consequences follow:12
- Recovery is limited to the damages contract law allows, which ordinarily exclude punitive damages.
- Any valid limitation on liability in the contract applies, so a sales contract that effectively disclaims any warranty ends the matter.
- The contract statute of limitations may bar the contract action.
- When the rule bars the tort claim and contract rules bar the contract claim, the plaintiff has no common law remedy at all.13
The bar reaches only the risks that the contract allocates. If the contract does not address the conduct or risk behind the tort claim and does not make the contractual remedy exclusive, no allocation exists to preserve, and an otherwise viable tort claim may go forward.14 A court should therefore read the contract before it reads the tort claim.
The limit that most often decides an exam question is the independent duty. The rule does not bar a tort claim for economic harm when the defendant breached a duty of care independent of the contract, meaning a duty that did not arise from the contract and is not interwoven with the contractual duty of performance.15 Lawyers are the standard example: a client who contracted for a representation may still sue the lawyer for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, even though the loss is purely economic, because the professional relationship generates duties that tort law enforces alongside the contract.16 That result follows from the rule’s own purpose. The rule protects the allocation of risk that the parties bargained over, and a duty that arises from the professional undertaking itself is not a term they bargained over, so enforcing it in tort disturbs no allocation, so long as the contract has not released the defendant from that duty.17 This is the contract-side counterpart of the special-relationship exception taught earlier in this chapter.
Batchelar v. Interactive Brokers, LLC shows the limit at work outside the traditional professions. A customer alleged that an online broker’s trading software was negligently designed, so that an automatic liquidation of his positions cost him thousands of dollars more than it should have.18 The federal court accepted that the economic loss doctrine bars tort claims when the defendant’s duty arises exclusively out of the contract, because the doctrine holds the aggrieved party to its bargain, but it denied the motion to dismiss. The customer had alleged a duty arising from conduct independent of the contract, conduct that breached no contract term but did breach the broker’s duty of due care. Duty, after all, is a legal obligation to conform to the reasonable-person standard of care to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm, and that obligation can exist apart from a contract.19 The truck seller stands at the other pole: its only obligation was the promise to deliver a working truck, and no duty independent of that promise exists for tort to enforce.
Steps 3 and 4 do the sorting. A stem that describes a contract and a careless performer invites the bar, but the stem usually signals an independent duty through a professional relationship or through conduct the contract never covered.
Defective Products and Other Property
Section 21 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability carries the contract version of the rule into the setting where it arises most often, the product that fails. The section counts economic loss as harm to persons or property only when it is caused by harm to the plaintiff’s person, by harm to another’s person that interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law, or by harm to the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.22 Pure economic loss falls outside all three, and courts have moved strongly toward leaving such losses to contract rather than to strict products liability.23 Contract law then supplies the remedy in Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, whose rules on limitation periods, privity, notice, and disclaimer ordinarily govern when the Code applies.24 Tort recovery stays open when the plaintiff also suffers physical injury or damage to property other than the object of the contract.25 The section therefore sorts every product-defect case by what the defect physically did.
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. fixed the rule’s modern shape, and its facts show what injury to the product itself looks like. Turbines that Delaval supplied for supertankers malfunctioned; on one ship a steam reversing ring disintegrated and damaged other parts of the turbine.26 The charterers had taken the ships as is, after inspection, and had assumed responsibility for maintenance, repairs, and certain insurance, so the contractual responsibilities were clearly laid out.27 Because the case arose in admiralty, where tort jurisdiction depends on a maritime locality and a maritime connection,28 the Court exercised its traditional discretion to choose a rule. It adopted an approach like Seely’s and held that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty, under either negligence or strict products liability, to prevent a product from injuring itself.29 Each turbine had been supplied as an integrated package and was treated as a single unit, so no other property was damaged.30
The Court’s reasons run on two tracks. Damage to a product itself means the product did not meet the customer’s expectations, which is what express and implied warranties address, so the buyer may sue for breach of warranty, or reject the product or revoke its acceptance and sue for breach of contract.31 On the other track, the parties wrote their own terms. A manufacturer can limit its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties or restricting remedies, and the purchaser pays less in exchange. Because commercial dealings generally involve no large disparities in bargaining power, the Court saw no reason to intrude on that allocation.32 The warranty remedy is a real one, since expectation damages give the buyer the full benefit of its bargain and would have given the charterers their repair costs and lost profits.33 The charterers had accepted responsibility for those costs by contract, and the Court saw no reason to extricate them from their bargain.34 The distinction between tort recovery for physical injury and warranty recovery for economic loss, the Court said, rests on “the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.” When a product injures only itself, the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.35
The line also marks where contractual freedom stops. Liability for injury from a defective product can virtually never be disclaimed in advance, a possibility that died after Henningsen when one-size-fits-all tort liability displaced warranty as the principal basis of liability.36 A disclaimer of warranty as to economic loss, by contrast, is permitted.37
The same rule governs a homeowner who bought a finished house. In Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., concrete with excess salt corroded the steel inside it, and the concrete cracked and broke off from the houses built with it. The owners sought purely economic damages: no one was injured, and no property other than the structures built with the supplier’s concrete was damaged. They argued that holding them to contract remedies was unfair and that homeowners should be excepted from the rule, and the court disagreed.38 Their loss was a set of “disappointed economic expectations,” which contract law protects, and a buyer’s desire to enjoy the benefit of the bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects.39 Casa Clara reflects the majority position in the United States, the same position East River adopted in admiralty.40
Physical harm changes the analysis. A defective automobile that destroys only itself leaves its owner to warranty, but if it also destroys the adjacent home, the homeowner may sue in tort for the home, because the home is property other than the defective product itself.41 Personal injury works the same way, and the Restatement lists consortium losses to family members among the recoverable harms alongside the economic loss that flows from the injury.42 In each claim the economic loss rides on physical harm, the tack-on pattern taught earlier in this chapter, so the defect’s physical result decides which body of law governs.
Everything therefore turns on what counts as other property, a question that is sometimes difficult because nearly every product is assembled from components.43 The Products Restatement asks whether the product is an integrated whole.44 If it is, damage to the whole by a component is not damage to other property; the product is deemed to have damaged itself, which leaves the plaintiff to whatever contract rights it had and excludes the tort claims.45 East River applied that logic to its integrated turbines, observing that all but the very simplest machines have component parts, so a contrary holding would find property damage whenever a product damages itself and would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict products liability.46 Casa Clara supplies the working test: to classify a loss, a court looks to the product the plaintiff purchased and not to the product the defendant sold.47 House buyers bargain for a finished dwelling and care little how its components are obtained, so the concrete, once it became an integral part of the house, did not damage other property.48 The bargain defines the boundary because the contract allocated the risk of the thing the buyer bought, and property outside the deal was never part of the allocation.
Maritime decisions draw the same line from both directions. In Nicor Supply Ships Associates v. General Motors Corp., a time charterer recovered the value of seismic equipment installed on a chartered vessel, because the equipment differed from the defective product, the vessel and its engine.49 Where the product bargained for is a vessel component that malfunctions and damages the vessel itself, the vessel is other property, and the Supreme Court held in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co. that equipment added to a vessel after the initial purchase is other property when the original-issue equipment malfunctions.50
Courts still disagree in the middle ground, where a defective component is built into something larger. In construction cases they struggle to decide whether a defect in one part of a building gives rise to a claim for damage to the rest of it, and defectively installed windows are a frequent example.51 See, e.g., Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc. A court faced with defective resin that ruined $4 million of irrigation pipe being manufactured from it rejected negligence and strict liability and left the plaintiff to its warranty remedies under the Code.52 An answer should name the product the plaintiff bargained for and defend that classification, because the label decides the result.
Suppose the product fails in a sudden, dangerous event rather than by gradual deterioration. East River refused to turn the answer on how the product was injured, and it found the intermediate positions, which turn on the degree of risk, too indeterminate to let manufacturers structure their business behavior.53 When no person or other property is harmed, even an abrupt, accident-like event leaves the purchaser with repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits, which is a failure to receive the benefit of the bargain.54 In Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the plaintiff argued that its turbine loss was not economic because it was sudden and catastrophic. The court found the loss economic and barred the tort claim, and it rejected the argument that the warranty’s twelve-month limit was unconscionable, since the limit was common in the industry and the buyer knew of it.55 Some jurisdictions disagree. Georgia has permitted compensation for the defective product itself if it fails in a sudden and calamitous manner, while Tennessee, deciding a bus-fire case, joined the majority in declining to recognize that exception.56 Some courts also allow a limited exception when the defect presents a hazard to human safety or other property, as Maryland did for cars with dangerously defective seat backs that gave rise to a clear danger of death or personal injury.57 Relabeling the claim as a failure to warn does not escape the rule, because the better view bars recovery for injury to the product itself under any products theory.58
The sharpest objection to the majority rule comes from the homeowners’ side. The dissent in Casa Clara denied that the premise of the rule holds for homeowners, since parties in a business context can allocate economic risks and remedies in contract negotiations and homeowners cannot. It also disagreed that the defective concrete had damaged no other property, because the houses’ individual components were harmed.59 The majority answered that the homeowners’ loss was a set of disappointed economic expectations, which contract law protects.60 Contract law is not empty for home buyers: courts recognize an implied warranty of quality in a new-home sale between builder-vendor and initial buyer, and Speight extended that warranty to subsequent purchasers.61
A critic of the majority rule called the line arbitrary: a traveling salesman’s lost earnings would be recoverable if a defect broke his leg in an accident but not if the same defect disabled only his car, though the losses are identical and both chains of causation are proximate.62 East River replied that the distinction “is not arbitrary and does not rest on the ‘luck’ of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury,” and rests instead on the nature of a manufacturer’s responsibility in distributing its products.63 The collision between warranty and contract on one side and the torts of strict liability, negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation on the other has produced more chaos than Professor Franklin anticipated, and the situation remains complex.64
Step 3 does the work. A stem that describes a spectacular failure of the product itself invites an answer in tort, and a stem that describes a component wrecking the finished product invites an answer that the finished product is other property. In each case the controlling question is what the plaintiff bought from this defendant.