Concept
Measuring Recoverable Economic Loss
Claims for pure economic loss
Measuring Recoverable Economic Loss
Recoverability settles whether a plaintiff may claim an economic loss; it does not say how much the plaintiff receives. The Restatement (Second) of Torts answers that second question once the first is closed, whether the loss tacked on to a physical injury, fell within an exception to the stranger bar, or arose under a statute. A plaintiff who does not elect a restitutionary measure is generally entitled to interest on the amount found due, and a lump-sum award for future pecuniary loss is measured at the present worth of what the plaintiff would have received later.1 Two more rules concern the lawsuit itself. The damages in a tort action do not ordinarily include attorney fees or other expenses of the litigation,2 and under survival and revival statutes the death of either party before or during trial generally leaves the damages for a tort not involving death unaffected.3
One standard organizes all four rules. Compensatory damages aim to place the plaintiff where the plaintiff would stand had the defendant not committed the wrong, and that aim looks forward: it reaches losses that will occur after judgment as well as losses already suffered.4 Time makes the measurement harder. A plaintiff who has gone without money for years has lost the use of it, and a plaintiff paid today for a loss that will not arrive for a decade can invest the payment in the meantime. Courts therefore account for the use and changing value of money by awarding interest and by reducing awards of future losses to present value.5
The ordinary limits on compensatory awards still apply to a loss held recoverable: damages cannot be too remote, speculative, or uncertain.6 The economic loss doctrine is itself one of the limits that can leave a plaintiff short of the rightful position,7 and that question is settled before any adjustment begins. The subsections below take the adjustments in the order a court meets them: interest and present value, which carry a loss across time; litigation expenses; and the death of a party.
Interest and Present Value
Between the date of a loss and the date of payment, money changes value, and the Restatement corrects for that in two directions. Section 913 carries past losses forward, and section 913A brings future losses back. Under section 913, a plaintiff who does not elect the restitutionary measure is entitled to interest in two situations. First, when land, chattels, or other property was taken, detained, or destroyed and its value can be ascertained from established market prices, interest runs from the time adopted for valuation to the time of judgment. Second, for other harms to pecuniary interests, interest runs from the accrual of the cause of action to the time of judgment, if paying it is required to avoid an injustice.8
The two clauses differ in how readily interest follows, and the difference tracks what a court can know. A destroyed machine with an established market price had a definite value on a definite day; from then on the owner was out a known sum and went without its use. Interest compensates for that wait, and the market price supplies the figure on which to compute it. The second clause reaches pecuniary harms that have no market price, and there the Restatement conditions interest on the need to avoid injustice, which leaves the court to ask whether the delay has actually left the plaintiff short. Both clauses apply the general principle that courts account for the use and changing value of money.9
The rule does not extend to every kind of award. Subsection (2) bars interest on an amount found due for bodily harm, emotional distress, or injury to reputation, although the time that has elapsed between the harm and the trial may be considered in determining the amount of damages.10 The permission to consider elapsed time keeps the delay from going unrecognized, but it works through the size of the verdict and involves no interest calculation. A separate interest charge on top of that would count the delay twice. A baker injured in the same crash therefore recovers interest on the oven and none on the award for her bodily harm.
Section 913A runs the other way. It measures a lump-sum award for future pecuniary losses at the present worth of the full amount of what the plaintiff would have received at the later time.11 The reduction is necessary because the award is paid all at once at the conclusion of the trial and money earns interest. An undiscounted award would leave the plaintiff overcompensated.12 Future lost earnings and future medical expenses fit the rule comfortably, because they are special damages: economic losses open to objective measurement.13
The rule's own words limit its reach. It speaks of pecuniary losses, and in most jurisdictions damages for future non-economic harm, such as pain and suffering, mental distress, disability, and disfigurement, are not reduced to present value.14 The line tracks the familiar split in personal injury cases: lost earnings and medical and other expenses are special damages subject to objective measurement, while pain and suffering and emotional distress are general damages whose loss, though real, is fundamentally non-economic.15
Inflation complicates the discount. Interest rates already include an inflation factor, so reducing future damages to present cash value at an interest rate while denying the plaintiff the matching inflation would shortchange the plaintiff. Almost all jurisdictions therefore allow evidence and argument on inflation, and some treat inflation as offsetting the discount rate, so that the plaintiff's future economic loss is not reduced at all.16 Richardson v. Chapman shows one accepted way through the problem. The court found reasonable the approach of the plaintiff's expert, Professor Linke, who worked from the differential between two rates and so did not have to predict future growth and inflation rates. He treated inflation consistently, and his method neither undercompensated nor overcompensated the plaintiff.17 An answer should state the principle, that a future pecuniary loss is reduced to present worth with inflation taken into account, and leave the arithmetic aside.
Read together, the two rules apply one idea at opposite ends of a timeline whose pivot is the day of judgment. A market-valued past loss is carried forward to that day with interest, and a future pecuniary loss is brought back to that day by discounting. The next subsection leaves the value of money over time and turns to the expense of the lawsuit itself.
Litigation Expenses
Section 914(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets the default: the damages in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensation for attorney fees or other expenses of the litigation.20 Contingent-fee practice shows the rule at work. Jurors are not informed about the contingent fee and are not to add it to their verdict, so the plaintiff absorbs the cost of bringing suit, and the fee may pay the lawyer far more or far less than a reasonable fee for the effort.21 The tacked-on items taught earlier, such as medical expenses and lost earnings, are special damages, objectively measurable economic losses;22 the fees of the lawsuit that is deciding the claim are not among them.
The default rests on a distinction between the harm a tort causes and the cost of enforcing a remedy for it. By the time the plaintiff hires a lawyer to sue the tortfeasor, the harm is complete, and the fee is the price of pursuing compensation for it.
Section 914(2) makes an exception for an earlier suit. One who, through the tort of another, has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorney fees, and other expenditures suffered or incurred in that earlier action.23 What matters is that the earlier action is a separate lawsuit against a different opponent, and the defendant's tort is what pushed the plaintiff into it. Those expenses are consequences of the wrong, as a hospital bill is a consequence of a collision. The word reasonable limits recovery to what the earlier action fairly required in time, lawyers, and other outlays.
The line between the two rules therefore runs between the instant suit and the earlier one. A plaintiff who wins a negligence verdict and asks the court to add the attorney fees from that very trial is asking for what section 914(1) withholds. The same plaintiff's fees from a separate suit against someone else are another matter.
A stem that hands the plaintiff a stack of legal bills invites two opposite mistakes: awarding every dollar because attorney fees are pecuniary loss, and denying every dollar because tort damages exclude fees. The sound approach asks which lawsuit generated each bill. Bills from the case now being decided stay with the plaintiff, and bills from an earlier suit against a third party, forced by the defendant's tort, are recoverable to the extent they were reasonable.
Death of a Party
Section 926 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts asks what the death of a party does to a pending tort claim. Under statutes providing for the survival or revival of tort actions, which keep a claim alive after a death instead of letting it end, the damages for a tort not involving death are not affected by the death of either party before or during trial, subject to two exceptions.26 The exceptions track the two sides of the caption: a death on the plaintiff's side cuts off harms that would have come after the death, and a death on the defendant's side cuts off punitive damages.
The general rule rests on the timing of the harm. All states have enacted statutes that preserve a cause of action for losses suffered by a decedent before death. If, before dying, the decedent incurred medical expenses or suffered pain as a result of the defendant's tort, the estate may recover damages for those losses, and the recovery passes through the estate to those entitled to inherit it.27 The rationale is that the tortfeasor should compensate the victim's estate for what the victim suffered before dying, even though the victim died before suing, and it applies equally whether the victim dies of injuries the tortfeasor inflicted or of an unrelated cause.28
The first exception limits what the estate of an injured person recovers. When the injured person dies, recovery for loss or impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress, and all other harms is confined to the harms suffered before the death.29 The estate takes the claim as the decedent held it on the last day of life: expenses, lost earnings, and pain already incurred count, and the years the death ended do not.
The stroke also leaves no wrongful death claim in that suit. The wrongful death claim fails because the death was not caused by the tort, and under basic negligence law a defendant is not liable for damages the defendant did not cause.30
The second exception applies when the tortfeasor dies: the death of the tortfeasor terminates liability for punitive damages.31 Compensatory damages answer for the plaintiff's harm, which exists whoever is left to pay, so the estate still owes them. Punitive damages are a different thing, because they exceed the plaintiff's rightful position,32 and ending them therefore costs the plaintiff nothing needed to restore that position.
Section 926 governs a tort not involving death; a tort that kills falls under a different regime. The measure of damages for causing the death of another depends upon the wording of the statute creating the right of action and its interpretation.33 Even the existence of a death claim has been contested. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the Supreme Court took up whether The Harrisburg, which held in 1886 that maritime law does not afford a cause of action for wrongful death, should any longer be regarded as acceptable law.34
The two kinds of statute do different work. A wrongful death statute compensates the survivors for their own losses resulting from the decedent's death, and it imposes no liability for sums that would have been in the decedent's estate had the decedent died a natural death. A survival statute does the reverse: it preserves the decedent's own claim for losses before death, and the recovery passes through the estate. Some states, partly for that reason and partly out of solicitude for survivors, have enacted both.35 The statutes can also work together. When a tortfeasor dies after causing a death, the wrongful death statute supplies the survivors' claim, and the survival statute lets that claim proceed against the tortfeasor's estate.36
A fact pattern in which a party dies mid-suit therefore tests whether the answer keeps these claims apart. Awarding the estate of an unrelated-cause decedent a full career's future earnings treats a survival action like a wrongful death action. Dismissing the suit because the defendant died overlooks the survival statute. Awarding punitive damages against the estate overlooks the second exception.