Concept
The Employer's Duty to Employees
Direct negligence in using or permitting an incompetent agent, and the employer's duty to the employee
The Employer's Duty to Employees
Everything earlier in this chapter asked when an employer must answer to an outsider, such as a pedestrian, a customer, or a neighbor, for harm done by a worker, a contractor, or a borrower. This part reverses the direction. The person who needs protection is the employee, and the employer may have had no hand in creating the danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314B states two affirmative duties that a master owes a servant, which are the Restatement's terms for employer and employee: reasonable care to avert imminent danger to the servant, and first aid and care when the servant is hurt and helpless.1
The law ordinarily imposes no duty to take affirmative steps to help someone in peril, even when the defendant is well placed to help. Employment is one of the relationships that departs from that default. The standard illustration is a factory owner who fails to assist an employee trapped in an elevator in the course of the job, and the duty rests on two facts: the employer is uniquely situated to mitigate the harm, and the employee is on the premises for the employer's benefit.2 Because the duty comes from the relationship, the employer can be liable even though it did not produce the danger.
Three rules follow. The first concerns the conditions the employer itself sets up: a safe place, safe tools, and competent coworkers. The other two apply once danger has appeared: the duty to avert imminent harm, and the duty to give first aid to a servant who is hurt and helpless.
Safe Workplace and Competent Coworkers
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh states what a master owes a servant for the workplace the master arranges. A master who employs a servant impliedly engages that the place of work, and the tools or machinery the servant will use or be surrounded by, will be reasonably safe.3 Because the master provides the place, the tools, and the machinery, hiring a servant carries an implied assurance that there is no danger in them beyond what is “obvious and necessary.”4 The duty is positive. The master must take reasonable precautions to secure safety, and it matters not to the employee who secures it.5
The duty covers people as well as things. Baugh quotes a summary of the common law under which the master assumes a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, reasonably safe machinery, tools, and implements, reasonably safe materials, and suitable and competent fellow-servants.6 The list parallels the Restatement's rule in § 307, which condemns using an instrumentality, “whether a human being or a thing,” that the actor knows or should know to be too incompetent or defective for safe use.7 Section 307 speaks of harm to others, whereas the workplace duty runs to the worker who is stationed beside the defective machine or the unfit supervisor.
Two limits keep the duty from becoming insurance. First, some places of work and some machinery are more dangerous than others, and that danger inheres in the thing itself and cannot be obviated.8 A furnace is hot and a saw cuts, so dangers of that kind are obvious and necessary to the work and fall outside the master's implied engagement. Second, the duty is not a guarantee of safety. It requires reasonable precautions, and the parallel duty to put fit and competent persons in charge is discharged when reasonable precautions have been taken to do so. Neither duty carries an absolute guaranty, and each is satisfied with reasonable effort and precaution.9
The master cannot shed the duty by handing it to someone else. Whenever the master delegates to any officer, servant, agent, or employee, high or low, the performance of one of these duties, that person stands in the master's place as a vice-principal. The master is then liable for that person's acts or negligence to the same extent as if the master had performed them.10
The common-law fellow-servant rule marks the other side of the line. Where the master has performed these duties, the master is not liable to a servant for the acts or negligence of a mere fellow-servant who does not hold that representative relation to the master.11 A coworker's carelessness therefore reaches the employer only through the employer's own duties, either because the employer failed to take reasonable precautions or because the coworker was performing a duty the employer had delegated.
The injury is the same kind of event in the first two scenes, so it cannot be what moves the answer. What moves it is the owner's own conduct in staffing, careful in the first scene and absent in the second. The third scene shows that the duty follows the task even when another person carries it out. The usual mistake is to reason backward from the harm, or to treat a foreman's rank as deciding whether the owner is liable. The questions to ask are which duty was in play and whether reasonable precautions were taken.
Imminent Danger to a Servant
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314B(1) makes a master liable when a servant, while acting within the scope of employment, comes into a position of imminent danger of serious harm, the master or a person who has duties of management knows of it, and the master or that person fails to exercise reasonable care to avert the threatened harm.13 The rule is the sudden-peril duty an employer owes its workers. It is an exception to the general rule that no one must help a person in danger, and the exception rests on the employment relationship: the employer is uniquely situated to mitigate the harm, and the employee is present for the employer's benefit.14 The four elements confine the duty to the situations in which that relationship justifies it.
The first two gates mark out when the relationship is doing its work. The scope requirement ties the duty to the setting that justifies it, because the worker is on the premises or at the task for the master's benefit and the master controls the surroundings in which the peril arises. That is why a factory owner is held to a duty to help an employee trapped in an elevator in the course of the job.15 The imminence and seriousness requirements reserve the duty for emergencies, in which a quick response from the party with control can change the outcome. Ordinary hazards are handled by the safe-workplace duty, which asks the master to take reasonable precautions about the place, tools, and machinery it provides.16 The imminent-danger duty begins after danger has appeared, and the text does not require that the master created it. A worker pinned beneath a toppling rack is in imminent danger of serious harm, while a worker who mentions that a stairwell light flickers is reporting a condition for the safe-workplace duty.
The knowledge element ties the duty to someone able to act. The text locates knowledge in the master or in a person who has duties of management, and it holds the master liable for a failure by either one.17 Averting a sudden peril usually means summoning help, stopping equipment, or sending others to the scene, and only someone with authority over the operation can take those steps. A manager who learns of the danger is the enterprise's own means of responding, so the manager's inaction is the master's inaction. A coworker with no managerial role cannot shut down the line or order a rescue, and the text does not treat such a coworker's awareness as the employer's. It becomes the master's knowledge when it reaches a person with management duties, as when the coworker tells the shift manager.
The last element sets the standard of conduct. The standard is reasonable care to avert the threatened harm, which is less than a guarantee of rescue. A manager who promptly calls emergency responders and cuts the power has performed the duty even if the responders arrive too late. That matches Baugh's account of the master's positive duty about the workplace, which stops short of a guarantee and requires reasonable precautions.18 A guarantee would make the employer the insurer of every emergency, including those in which no response could have helped, so liability attaches to a failure of effort after someone with authority knew.
An exam stem that traps a worker in a stalled elevator invites the instinct to ask how badly the worker was hurt, yet the question that decides the case is who knew. A supervisor who watches the elevator stall and does nothing supplies the knowledge through a person with management duties, and the owner answers for the supervisor's failure.19
The elevator and the peril are the same in both scenes. What changed is who knew. In the first scene no one with authority did, so the duty never arose, and in the second a manager had notice, so the duty of reasonable care was triggered. A response that reasons from the severity of the injury overlooks that the text conditions liability on knowledge held on the master's side of the relationship.
Aid to an Injured Servant
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314B(2) supplies the second affirmative duty. If a servant is hurt and thereby becomes helpless while acting within the scope of employment, and this is known to the master or to a person having duties of management, the master is subject to liability for his negligent failure, or that of such a person, to give first aid to the servant and to care for him until he can be cared for by others.21 The rule has four parts: an injury that leaves the servant helpless, a setting within the scope of employment, knowledge held by the master or by someone with management duties, and a negligent failure to give first aid and care until others can take over.
The duty in § 314B(1) is keyed to an earlier moment. It protects a servant who has come into imminent danger of serious harm and requires reasonable care to avert it.22 Section 314B(2) begins after the harm has happened and the servant can no longer help himself. A single emergency can pass through both. A worker trapped in a stalled freight elevator is in imminent danger, which engages the duty to avert harm, and if the cable then gives way and the worker lies unconscious on the elevator floor, the duty shifts to first aid and care.
The justification is the one that supports the whole line of employer duties. The employer is uniquely situated to mitigate the harm, and the employee is on the premises for the employer's benefit.23 Both points apply with added force once the servant is helpless. A hurt worker who cannot move cannot telephone for help, cannot direct anyone to the right equipment, and cannot make himself easy to find. The people who can act are on the master's side of the relationship, since they control the phones, the first-aid supplies, the premises, and the other workers. The duty rests on the relationship, and the text does not condition it on the master's having caused the injury.
The remaining parts each have their own reason. The knowledge element puts the duty on the master or on a person having duties of management because rendering aid means summoning help, clearing the area, or stopping machinery, and only someone with authority can do those things. A manager who knows of the injury is the enterprise's own means of responding, so the manager's inaction is the master's inaction. A coworker with no management duties who sees the injured servant but tells no one has not supplied the master's knowledge, because the information has not reached anyone able to act on it. The standard of conduct is negligence, which means reasonable care, so a manager is expected to do what an ordinary person in that position could do, such as calling for emergency help and giving basic first aid. The end point comes from the text itself. The duty runs only until the servant can be cared for by others, so the master serves as a bridge to professional help and takes on no duty of long-term care.
The dock, the injury, and the worker's helplessness are the same in both scenes, so the manager's response is the fact that moves the answer. The knowledge element can end a case earlier still. If the worker had fallen unseen in a back stockroom and no one with management duties knew of it, the duty to give aid would not have arisen, however long he waited, because the text conditions liability on knowledge held on the master's side.
Two shortcuts mislead on exam facts. The first asks who caused the worker's injury, but the text does not make the duty depend on the master's having caused it. The second reaches for the imminent-danger duty whenever a worker is in trouble, but timing decides which subsection applies. A servant who is already hurt and unable to help himself falls under § 314B(2), while a servant facing a peril that has not yet struck falls under § 314B(1). The servant must also have been acting within the scope of employment when hurt, which ties the duty to the setting the master controls.