Concept
The Parent's Duty of Care
Duty to control the conduct of another: parent and child
The Parent's Duty of Care
No one would think it reasonable for a parent to let a toddler wander the streets at will. We expect the parent to keep the child in hand, because the child cannot protect himself from the dangers around him. That expectation eases as the child grows but never disappears: parents are still expected to see that their children attend school, obey curfews, and stay out of trouble.1 Parents do not insure their children's conduct, but a parent who fails to exercise a reasonable degree of supervision can be held liable for that omission.2
Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts puts this expectation in rule form. A parent must exercise reasonable care to control a minor child so as to prevent the child from intentionally harming others, or from conducting itself so as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.3 The duty attaches only if the parent knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the child,4 and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.5 The next two sections take those conditions in turn. This section concerns the duty itself: which harms it covers, what standard measures it, and what it makes the parent answer for.
The duty guards against two kinds of harm. One is intentional harm, as when a child deliberately strikes a playmate or throws rocks at passing cars. The other is conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, which reaches the child who hurts someone through carelessness and with no wish to hurt anyone. That second category speaks only of bodily harm, so the duty does not extend to every loss a child might cause.6
Reasonable care measures the duty in both categories. The parent must take the steps a reasonably prudent parent would take to keep the child from causing the harm. The breach is therefore the parent's own omission. The child's act supplies the injury, and the parent's failure to act as a prudent parent would supplies the fault. How much watching is reasonable depends on the circumstances, and age is the first of them: a toddler must be kept in hand, while an older child needs less oversight but never none.7 The Restatement takes the same approach to its other duties to control a dangerous person, which call for reasonable care to prevent injury and do not guarantee absolute protection.8
Because the duty concerns the parent's conduct, it does not hinge on the child's own fault. In Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture, Inc. the Iowa Supreme Court stated the rule in the Restatement's terms and quoted the comment's observation that the very youth of the child is likely to give the parent more effective ability to control the child's actions, and to make it more often necessary to exercise that ability.9 The comment treats a child's youth as a reason for more control, not less. A child too young to answer for his own acts is the child who depends most on a parent's control.
The second version of the hypothetical follows Williamson v. Daniels, where the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the mere fact that parents failed to control a child is insufficient to prove negligence.10 The plaintiff must show that the parents failed to act as reasonably prudent parents would, given notice of the child's propensity to do harm.11 An injured plaintiff therefore cannot rest on the bare fact that the child hurt someone. The claim needs evidence about what the parent knew and what the parent did with that knowledge.
The Restatement is persuasive authority, and courts phrase the duty in their own ways. Iowa restates it in the Restatement's terms.12 Mississippi reaches a similar result through foreseeability: parents must take reasonable measures to supervise their children so as to protect others from acts of the children that are reasonably foreseeable.13 Georgia asks for more specific notice. When one child injures another through an unprovoked assault, and not through any instrumentality, the plaintiff must show that the parent was on notice of a dangerous proclivity or propensity for the specific dangerous activity that caused the injury.14 Some courts thus demand more specific notice than the Restatement's text suggests. On an exam, use the local formulation when the question supplies one and § 316 when it does not.