Concept
Ordering or Inducing Conduct
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Ordering or Inducing Conduct
A landowner who tells a tree crew to cut down an oak on the back boundary never touches a saw. If the oak belongs to the neighbor, the crew has committed a tort, and the neighbor can sue the crew. The harder question is whether the neighbor can also reach the person who gave the order.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a) says yes, on conditions. A defendant answers for another's tortious conduct if he "orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own."1 The clause sets two requirements: the defendant must have ordered or induced the conduct, and he must have known, or had reason to know, the facts that make it wrongful. Neither requirement mentions employment or control. Liability follows from what the defendant did and what he knew, so a hirer who is not the actor's employer can still be liable under it.
Ordering and Inducing the Act
The clause names two routes to liability. A defendant orders conduct when he commands it. He induces conduct when he brings it about some other way, as by encouraging it or by setting up an arrangement that predictably draws others into it. The authorities below run from the most direct route to the least direct, because the farther a case sits from a plain command, the more the analysis turns on what the defendant's conduct was likely to bring about.
A principal who commands or authorizes an agent's tortious act answers for it personally, not vicariously.2 The distinction matters. Vicarious liability rests on the relationship between principal and agent; this liability rests on the principal's own decision that the act should happen. If a defendant could escape by routing a wrongful act through a hired hand, anyone who wanted a tort committed could pick a compliant or judgment-proof intermediary and leave the injured person to collect from that intermediary alone. Holding the person who decided the act would happen to the same account puts the incentive to avoid the tort where the decision was made.
The dissent in Dirks v. SEC invoked the same idea outside the principal-agent setting. The Court acknowledged that Secrist could not do by proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally, the dissent noted, citing Mosser v. Darrow, and Secrist did exactly that when he used Dirks to pass information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers.3 As the dissent describes Mosser, a trustee authorized his employees' activities, and the Court held him liable to the estate for what they did, although he neither intended to benefit nor did benefit and his motives were selfless.4 The Court called the arrangement "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that of the trust."5 Mosser is a fiduciary case, offered here as an illustration and not as an application of § 877(a). Its point still carries over: when the wrong is authorizing the harm, a good motive and the absence of personal gain do not excuse the person who authorized it.
Statutory duties set a separate limit on proxies. Several courts have held that a party cannot contract away liability for failing to comply with a duty that a safety statute imposes.6 The chapter returns to that point under delegating a protective duty.
Encouragement can do the work of a command. A footnote in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories that collects concert-of-action decisions describes two such cases. In Loeb v. Kimmerle, a defendant who encouraged another to commit an assault was held jointly liable for the plaintiff's injuries. In Agovino v. Kunze, a participant in a drag race was held liable to a plaintiff who collided with another racer's car, and the footnote adds Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. as a further example.7 Because these decisions arise under concert of action, they illustrate the idea behind clause (a) and do not apply it. The encourager never swings a fist, yet the encouragement is part of the reason the blow lands, and a rule that excused him would reward whoever stays out of arm's reach.
Neither authorization nor encouragement removes the actor from the case. An agent remains personally liable for tortious acts within the scope of the agency, and the principal who commanded them is liable as well.8 Tort law has long stated the result as joint and several liability for everyone who takes part. A footnote in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver quotes Cooley's treatise: "All who actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, or who command, direct, advise, encourage, aid or abet its commission, are jointly and severally liable therefor."9 The same footnote observes that when § 10(b) was enacted, aiding and abetting liability was widely, though not universally, recognized in tort law.10 The injured person can therefore pursue the instigator as well as the actor, which matters most when the actor cannot pay.
The least direct form of inducement is an arrangement that rewards conduct without anyone ordering it. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., a radio station's contest sent listeners racing to a disc jockey's new location, and two teenage drivers in an 80-miles-per-hour drag race to reach him forced the decedent's car off the highway, where it overturned and killed him.11 The California Court of Appeal, over a dissent, reversed the plaintiff's judgment, holding that the station "had no control, or right to control, over the conduct of the drivers of other cars on the highway." The California Supreme Court unanimously reinstated the judgment.12 Weirum illustrates inducement and does not apply clause (a). The station told no one to speed, but a contest that rewards the first listener to reach a moving location rewards speed. The court of appeal's question about control is the question a different ground asks. Clause (a) asks whether the defendant set the conduct in motion, and it holds that defendant whether or not he could have stopped it.
At the other pole, parallel conduct induces nothing. The plaintiff in Sindell argued that drug manufacturers had acted in concert because each relied on the others' testing, took advantage of the others' promotional and marketing methods, and made the drug from a common formula. The court found only parallel or imitative conduct, a common practice in industry.13 It also doubted that concert liability can rest on substantial assistance and encouragement given pursuant to a tacit understanding to fail to act.14 The decisions the plaintiff cited, the court observed, involved a small number of individuals whose conduct injured a single plaintiff, usually over a short span of time, and the defendant held liable either took part directly or encouraged and assisted the person who caused the injury by participating in a joint activity.15
That line is the one clause (a) needs. A manufacturer that copies a competitor's testing has not been the reason the competitor tests inadequately, since each acts on its own judgment. The encourager of the assault and the station with its contest were each the reason the other conduct happened. Erasing the line would carry a cost: treating imitation as concert would render virtually any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if the injuring product was not the defendant's.16
Knowledge of Tortious Circumstances
The last words of clause (a) set a yardstick. A court takes the defendant's order or inducement, pictures the defendant performing the act himself, and asks whether that act would have been a tort on the facts he knew or should have known.18 If it would, the defendant's part in setting the conduct in motion carries liability for the resulting harm. If it would not, the instigation is real but the clause is not satisfied, and under this clause the injured person must look to the actor alone.
The phrase "if it were his own" puts the benchmark in the defendant's position, not the actor's. The reason is practical. A worker who follows an instruction often does not know the facts that make the act wrongful, and a defendant who knows them could otherwise hide behind the worker's innocence. The tree crew may believe the oak stands on the landowner's side of the line. If the landowner knows it stands on the neighbor's, the yardstick measures him by what he knows, and the crew's ignorance cannot be lent to him as an excuse.
The words "knows or should know" tie the clause to fault from both directions. A defendant whose order was innocent on the facts as he reasonably understood them has done nothing blameworthy because the facts later proved different. The words "should know" set the limit from the other side. They make the standard objective: the question is what a person in the defendant's position would have learned, not what the defendant admits learning. A defendant who gives the order while avoiding the obvious question, or while leaving unread the document that would settle the matter, gains nothing from the resulting ignorance.
Two landowners show the difference.
The two orders and the two harms are identical. What separates the landowners is the information reasonably available to each when she or he gave the order. Failing to make an obvious inquiry counts against the instigator; reasonable reliance on competent advice does not.
False imprisonment law, the field of Enright v. Groves, shows the same hinge from another angle. These rules illustrate how knowledge shapes liability for helping another's act and are not an application of § 877(a). A private citizen who physically helps an officer carry out an unlawful arrest can be liable to the person arrested, but when the officer asked for the help, the citizen escapes liability unless he knows the arrest is unlawful.19 The helping hand is the same in both situations; only what the citizen knew differs. A citizen who joins an arrest he knows to be baseless holds the very circumstances that make the detention wrongful, so his help makes him a participant. A citizen who answers an officer's request with no reason to doubt it has done what a reasonable person would do and carries no culpable knowledge to which liability can attach.
Supplying information sits further from the line. In Holcomb v. Walter's Dimmick Petroleum, Inc., Indiana declined to impose false imprisonment liability on a defendant who only gave his version of the facts and asked for help, at least where the account did not prevent the officer from exercising discretion intelligently.20 That qualification marks where reporting shades into instigating. An honest reporter knows of no circumstance that makes the officer's act wrongful, while one who knowingly feeds the officer false facts supplies those circumstances himself.
The concert-of-action cases turn on the same kind of knowledge. The Sindell complaint failed in part because it did not allege that each defendant knew the other defendants' conduct was tortious toward the plaintiff and that they assisted and encouraged one another to test DES inadequately and to warn inadequately.21 In both settings, a question of fact about what the defendant knew decides whether encouragement becomes liability. The concert ground returns near the end of this chapter.