Concept
Negligent Employment of an Agent
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Negligent Employment of an Agent
Clause (b) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 reaches a defendant who "conducts an activity with the aid of the other and is negligent in employing him."1 Clause (a) asks what the defendant ordered or encouraged; clause (b) asks whether the defendant was careless in dealing with the person whose help was enlisted. Three parts do the work. The defendant must be conducting an activity, so the work is the defendant's own project. The other person must be aiding that activity, a description that fits an employee, an independent contractor, or any other agent. And the defendant must have been negligent in employing that person, which makes the defendant's own carelessness the fact on which liability turns.
This liability is direct, not vicarious. The rules that impute one person's negligence to another share a single aim: finding a financially responsible defendant for an injured plaintiff.2 Clause (b) asks a different question, whether this defendant was at fault, and the answer does not change with the label on the relationship. Apart from any rule of vicarious liability, the hirer of an independent contractor is liable under ordinary negligence principles for his own negligence in dealing with the contractor.3 An owner with no vicarious liability must still answer for his own conduct in connection with the work.4
That negligence can enter at several points. Selection comes first: the hirer must use reasonable care to choose a contractor who is competent, experienced, careful, and properly equipped.5 When the work will create a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may also require the hirer to insist, in the contract or otherwise, that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions, and then to see that he does so. Reasonable care may even require inspecting the completed work.6
How much inquiry selection demands depends on the work. A hirer who engages a carpenter to repair the ceilings of his shop, or a plumber to install plumbing in his hotel, may assume that a carpenter or plumber of good reputation can do the job safely.7 He need not take great pains to learn whether the reputation is good. The contractor's trade is enough unless the hirer knows the reputation is bad or knows facts that should lead him to realize the contractor is not competent.8 Dangerous work moves the other way, because foreseeable danger to third persons is what brings in the duty to insist on precautions and to follow up.9
A fact pattern that mentions a quick background check therefore calls for a question about what the work threatened to third persons, because the existence of some check settles nothing. Liability depends on the defendant's own careless act, so run the clause from the defendant's conduct outward to the harm.
The third step does the real work, because it ties the clause to fault. A defendant who had reason to know of the danger and went ahead has a careless act to point to, while a defendant who had nothing to alert him has none.
The clearest applications involve a defendant who knew. In Freeman v. Bell a discotheque kept on an employee who had already shot one patron. He later shot another, and the employer was held liable because he knew of the employee's propensity for violence.10 The careless act there is the retention: once the first shooting revealed the danger, continued employment put the next patron within reach of a person the owner knew to be violent. In Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency the security agency for an apartment building had hired a guard with a violent record, and the guard used a passkey to enter a tenant's apartment and assault her.11 The assault was a crime, yet the agency's exposure rests on having brought into contact with the tenants a person it knew or should have known to be peculiarly likely to commit crime. The crime that occurred was the very danger that made the hiring careless.
Where the defendant had no reason to suspect unfitness, the chain breaks. In Spicer v. Osunkoya a physician referred a child to an ear, nose, and throat specialist who, after performing a tonsillectomy, prescribed too high a dose of a painkiller and left the child with brain damage. The court noted that other jurisdictions consistently hold the referring physician not liable for the specialist's negligence unless he had reason to know the specialist was incompetent.12 A referral is not the hiring of an assistant, so the case works as an analogy and not as an application of clause (b). It isolates the variable that separates it from the discotheque. The discotheque owner knew of the violence and kept the employee on, while the referring physician had nothing to suggest the specialist was unfit. The first defendant carries a careless act, and the second does not.
Clause (b) must be kept apart from the other actor's own negligence. The contractor who carelessly drops the beam is liable for that carelessness, and the third person's claim against the contractor supplies the tortious conduct of another on which the clause operates. The hirer's liability rests on a separate wrong: carelessness in selecting the contractor, in failing to require necessary safety precautions and see that they are followed, or in failing to inspect completed work.13 Plaintiffs frequently plead both direct and vicarious theories against an owner, which is a reason to keep the two bases distinct in your analysis.14
Some states limit the claim against an employer, which shows how closely it is tied to the employment setting. Some jurisdictions do not permit a separate claim for the employer's own negligence in hiring if the employer has admitted that it would be vicariously liable for the employee's negligence, a rule associated with McHaffie v. Bunch and later adopted in Colorado, Indiana, and Wyoming.15 Oklahoma went the other way in Fox v. Mize, holding that an employer's stipulation that the accident occurred within the course and scope of employment does not bar a negligent entrustment claim.16 The rule is therefore not universal. It also turns on an admission of vicarious liability, which ordinarily exists only for an employee acting within the scope of employment. The hirer of an independent contractor ordinarily has no such admission to make, so the direct claim stays open.
Punitive damages draw the same line between the direct and vicarious routes. Jurisdictions differ on when a principal can be held vicariously liable for punitive damages based on an agent's tortious conduct, and some follow the usual respondeat superior rules.17 Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, which many courts follow, the principal must have authorized, participated in, consented to, or ratified the act, deliberately or recklessly employed an unfit agent, or acted through an agent in a managerial capacity within the scope of employment.18 Reckless employment of an unfit agent is a higher level of fault than the ordinary negligence that clause (b) requires for compensatory liability.