Concept
Controlling the Other Actor
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Controlling the Other Actor
Clause (d) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 makes a defendant liable for another’s tortious conduct when he “controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who is likely to do harm if not controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control.”1 Three elements carry the clause. The defendant must hold control over the other person’s conduct, either because he exercises it in fact or because the law gives him a duty to use care in controlling it. The other person must be likely to do harm if not controlled, which confines the clause to danger the defendant could see coming. And the defendant must fail to use care in the control, so that he answers for his own careless oversight.
Control explains why the clause exists. A defendant who directs how work proceeds, or who has charge of a dangerous person, can stop the harmful act before it happens, and the third person in its path can do nothing. Control also separates clause (d) from clause (c). Clause (c) reaches the defendant who lends premises or equipment knowing of the danger; the lender need have no authority over what the borrower does next. Clause (d) assumes that authority and asks whether the defendant used it with care.
The clause’s two opening phrases describe two settings. “Controls” describes a defendant who has kept the reins, the clearest example being a hirer who gives work to an independent contractor but keeps control over part of how it is done. There the questions are how much control the hirer kept and whether he used it with care. “Has a duty to use care to control” describes a defendant whose relationship to a dangerous person obliges him to supervise that person, though he never chose to run that person’s conduct. There the question is where the duty comes from, because the law does not ordinarily require anyone to manage another adult. Both settings turn on control, danger, and a failure of care, but they supply the control differently and follow different rules.
Retained Control Over Work
A hirer who gives work to an independent contractor but keeps control over part of it falls within the first phrase of clause (d).2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 states the rule for this setting: one who entrusts work to an independent contractor but retains the control of any part of the work is subject to liability for physical harm to others, for whose safety he owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, that is caused by his failure to exercise the control with reasonable care.3 The hirer answers for how carefully he used the control he kept, whatever label the contract gives the contractor.
The reason for the general rule of nonliability also explains this exception. A principal who has no control over details cannot effectively increase the care taken during the work, so holding him vicariously liable would not make the work safer.4 As to the part of the work the hirer controls, that reasoning no longer fits. He can stop an unsafe step before it happens, while the pedestrian or neighbor in its path cannot, and the law requires him to use that power with care. The fault lies in his own supervision, so the liability is direct, and the contractor’s negligent work supplies the tortious conduct of another that § 877 presupposes. An owner may be negligent by failing to supervise the contractor properly, by failing to require necessary precautions, or by carelessly performing work over which he retains control, and he answers for that negligence even when no theory of vicarious liability succeeds against him.5
How much control the hirer kept decides which theory applies. The commentary to § 414 separates two levels of retained control from the baseline of none. A hirer who retains control over the operative detail of doing any part of the work answers for the negligence of the contractor’s employees engaged in that part under the rules of master and servant, which is vicarious liability. A hirer who retains less, such as only the power to direct the order of the work or to forbid its being done in a manner likely to be dangerous, may not be a master. He is nonetheless liable under § 414 unless he exercises that supervisory control with reasonable care to keep the ordered work from injuring others.6 The result is three levels, from least control to most:
- Where the contractor controls its own work, the hirer is not vicariously liable for the contractor’s torts, and he answers only for his own negligence, such as hiring a clearly incompetent contractor or failing to require necessary precautions.7
- Where the hirer keeps supervisory control short of a master’s control, he is directly liable for physical harm caused by failing to exercise that control with reasonable care.8
- Where the hirer keeps control over operative detail, he is vicariously liable under the master and servant rules for the negligence of the contractor’s employees engaged in that part of the work.9
The middle level is the one clause (d) is built for. The hirer is not a master, so respondeat superior is unavailable, yet he cannot ignore the danger and retreat behind the contract label. The label has a second limit: a party cannot contract away liability for failing to comply with a duty imposed by a safety statute, a point taken up below with delegated protective duties.10
The control that triggers § 414 must be real. The Minnesota supreme court has held that liability under § 414 requires more than a minimal level of control. It is not enough that the hirer has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations that need not be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations; the hirer must retain a right of supervision such that the contractor “is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.”11 The same limit appears from the other side. A mere general right to supervise, receive reports, make suggestions, or alter the plans is usually insufficient where those powers relate solely to the quality of the work and compliance with the plans, and the control must involve the right to influence the manner of performing the details or otherwise to affect safety, so that the hirer could have acted with respect to the danger.12
The line makes sense. A right to inspect or receive reports gives the owner no means of changing how the work is done, so failing to use it is not a lapse in exercising control. Courts asking the neighboring question, whether such a reservation makes the owner the contractor’s master, draw the same line: most hold that reserving the right to inspect the work for compliance with the contract and to see that the contractor operates safely is not in itself the kind of control that creates an employer-employee relationship.13
Both owners kept some right over the job, and the outcome turns on whether that right reached the danger. The homeowner could not have changed how the trench was braced without renegotiating the contract; the superintendent could have prevented the collapse by giving a different order.
Control standing alone also fails as a basis for vicarious liability, and the construction foreman shows why. The borrowed-employee cases, such as Charles v. Barrett, ask which employer answers for a lent worker, and the question invites an answer based on control. Yet control alone cannot create respondeat superior liability. If it could, the foreman of a construction crew would answer vicariously for the negligence of every worker in the crew, since he plainly controls their physical conduct. That result ignores that the foreman and the workers are joint employees, or co-agents, who work on behalf of the company that employs them and not on behalf of the foreman. The foreman is subject only to direct liability for negligently exercising control, the same standard § 414 applies to a hirer who keeps part of the work, and one commentator suggests the standard could serve for a borrowing employer as well.14
Two fact-pattern signals follow. When a stem says the owner reserved the right to inspect or receive reports, ask what that right let the owner do about the danger; a general oversight right supports no liability. When a stem says the worker was an independent contractor, keep going if the owner was directing the dangerous step, because the owner’s exposure then rests on its own conduct and survives the contractor label.
Duty to Control Dangerous Persons
The second phrase of clause (d) reaches a defendant who “has a duty to use care to control” the conduct of a person likely to do harm, but the clause does not say where that duty comes from.16 The common law supplies it only in particular relationships, because its starting point runs the other way. As the California Supreme Court recognized in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, one person generally owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those the other endangers.17 A plaintiff who cannot point to a recognized relationship therefore has no claim under this phrase, however easily the defendant might have prevented the harm. The analysis runs in two layers: first, whether the law imposes a duty to control at all, and only then whether the defendant used care in carrying it out.
Courts have narrowed the no-duty rule from the side and have left it standing. Because of the practical difficulties of imposing affirmative duties, they have increased the instances in which such duties exist not by rejecting the common law rule but by expanding the list of special relationships that justify departing from it.18 The expansion keeps the duty tied to a reason. A relationship identifies a defendant who has both the ability to prevent the harm and a basis for the law to ask it of him, so liability does not spread to everyone who might have stepped in.
The exception recognizes a duty when the defendant stands in a special relationship either to the person whose conduct needs controlling or to the foreseeable victim of that conduct.19 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315, as Tarasoff quotes it, describes the two routes as a special relation between the actor and the third person “which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct,” and a special relation between the actor and the other “which gives to the other a right of protection.”20 Relationships to the victim, such as a train conductor to a passenger or school officials to a child, produce duties to take affirmative steps to minimize or avert harm that the defendant did not cause.21 The relationships that matter for clause (d) run to the dangerous person, and the rest of this section follows that route, because the defendant’s failure of care in controlling that person is what connects him to the harm.
Several relationships to a dangerous person carry a duty of reasonable care. The Second Restatement looks to a defendant’s relation to his minor children and others in his immediate custody, employees using his premises or chattels, persons in his custody or subject to his authority, and licensees on his land or users of his chattels.22 Each gives the defendant a right and an ability to control the other person, and each gives the law a reason to hold him responsible for using it. Control need not mean literal custody: in Hertog v. City of Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court treated the relationship between a parole officer and a parolee as the relevant inquiry and did not require custodial control.23
Parent and child is the category in which courts demand the most specificity. Parents must use care to control a minor child, yet courts have been reluctant to hold them liable for a child’s torts even when the parents knew the child was dangerous, and they have refused liability where the parents could foresee harm of some kind but not the particular harm or the occasion for it.24 In Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, the Alaska court required the parent to have reason to know, with some specificity, of a present opportunity and need to restrain the child, and treated general knowledge of past misconduct as necessary but not sufficient.25
An employer owes a related duty. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, a master must use reasonable care to control a servant who is acting outside the scope of employment, so as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them. The duty applies when the servant is on the master’s premises, or on premises he may enter only as servant, or is using the master’s chattel, and when the master knows or has reason to know that he can control the servant and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for control.26 The duty rests on the benefit the employer draws from the employee’s work and on the employer’s unique position to prevent the harm.27 The premises-or-chattel condition ties the duty to settings the employer controls.
The third category reaches a defendant who takes charge of a dangerous person. This exception applies primarily to those in charge of mental patients or prisoners, and it reflects the conclusion that a defendant who takes charge of a person who poses a risk of injury accepts a duty of care.28 Knowledge about the particular person decides the cases. A youth-center matron was held liable for a policeman’s death when juveniles who had escaped from the center stabbed him in Christensen v. Epley. Henderson v. Dade Coal Co. denied recovery to a woman raped by an escaped convict whom the company had negligently guarded, a result the commentary criticizes. And Williams v. State denied liability because the defendant had no reason to anticipate violence.29 The custodian who knew of dangerous tendencies and failed to restrain the person answers; the custodian with nothing to alert him does not.
Tarasoff illustrates the therapist-patient setting. Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff, and her parents alleged that he had earlier told a psychologist employed by the university’s hospital that he intended to kill her. At the psychologist’s request campus police briefly detained Poddar and released him when he appeared rational, and no one warned the plaintiffs of the danger. The California Supreme Court held that when a therapist determines, or under the standards of his profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.30 Discharging that obligation may require him to warn the intended victim or others likely to tell the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.31 The therapists were public employees, so a statute shielded them from liability for failing to bring about Poddar’s confinement, but no specific statute shielded the failure to warn, and the discretionary-act immunity did not cover it.32
The court’s reasoning shows how the relationship rule operates. Tatiana was never the therapists’ patient, but a special relation between the defendants and either Poddar or Tatiana suffices to establish a duty of care, and the relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies that requirement.33 The court therefore did not decide whether foreseeability alone, without a relationship, would create a duty to protect a potential victim of another’s conduct.34 An exam answer should accordingly describe the therapist-patient relationship as sufficient and should not state a rule that foreseeability alone imposes a duty.
Whether the relationship alone grounds a duty remains contested. Justice Clark, dissenting, agreed that a duty to warn should arise when a psychiatrist, in terminating a patient, increases the risk of violence toward a particular individual, but he found neither precedent nor reason to support a duty based solely on the psychiatrist-patient relationship, and other courts have agreed that the relationship does not ground a duty to warn.35 Even under the majority’s rule, the trigger is the therapist’s determination, actual or required by professional standards, that the patient presents a serious danger of violence, and the content of the duty is reasonable care and not a guarantee of the patient’s conduct.36
The duty has two limits, and each follows from the reason for the relationship requirement. The first is that the duty runs only to those in a real relationship with the dangerous person or the victim. The court sustained the demurrer as to the campus police, who had briefly detained Poddar and released him, because the plaintiffs pleaded no relationship between the police and Poddar that would impose a duty to Tatiana and suggested no other basis for one.37 The second is the burden of a wider duty. Because of that burden, some courts refuse to extend the duty beyond threats to a particular victim, and in Leonard v. State the Iowa Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist owes no duty to members of the general public in discharging a patient.38 A duty to protect everyone who might cross a former patient’s path would make the defendant answer for risks no one could identify in advance.
The third step sorts defendants who share a relationship: the same parent, custodian, or therapist is liable on one set of facts and not on another, according to what was known and how specific the danger was.