Concept
Delegating a Protective Duty
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Delegating a Protective Duty
A defendant can hire the best contractor in town, never touch the work, and still answer for the contractor's mistake. Clause (e) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 produces that result when the defendant "has a duty to provide protection for, or to have care used for the protection of, third persons or their property and confides the performance of the duty to the other, who causes or fails to avert the harm by failing to perform the duty."1
Three elements must all be present. The protective duty must be the defendant's own, so a person who merely stands near a danger has nothing to delegate. The defendant must have confided performance of that duty to someone else, whether an employee, an independent contractor, or another helper. And the other person must have caused or failed to avert the harm by failing to perform the duty, which ties the defendant's liability to a lapse in the very protection the duty demanded.
Clause (e) asks different questions from its neighbors. Clause (b) located the defendant's fault in carelessly choosing or keeping the actor, and clause (d) located it in carelessly using control the defendant held. Clause (e) asks about neither. A defendant who chose an excellent contractor and kept no control over the work can still be liable, because the duty was the defendant's own and passing the job along did not discharge it. The law calls such a duty nondelegable: it is important enough to the community that the obligor may not hand it to an independent contractor and thereby escape tort liability for physical harm the contractor causes by misperforming it.2
Ordinary hiring shows why the clause matters. A hirer may assume that a carpenter or plumber of good reputation can do the work safely, has no duty to take great pains to check that reputation, and is at fault only on knowing that the reputation is bad or knowing facts that should lead the hirer to realize the contractor is not competent.3 A careful hirer therefore escapes liability under the negligent-employment ground. Clause (e) can still reach that same careful hirer, once the duty is nondelegable.
Clause (e) is one of several exceptions to the rule that a hirer is not vicariously liable for an independent contractor's torts. That rule rests on the hirer's lack of control over the details of the work and on the contractor's separation from the hirer's enterprise.4 The exceptions have multiplied until the rule serves mainly as a preface to them, and they fall into three groups: the hirer's own negligence in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor; a duty so important, because of some special relation to the public or to the plaintiff, that its obligor cannot escape responsibility by hiring a contractor; and work that is particularly or inherently dangerous.5 The first group matches the negligent-employment and retained-control grounds studied above. Clause (e) belongs to the second. Where such a duty exists, one who employs a contractor to perform it is liable for physical harm resulting from the contractor's negligence even though the employer was entirely without fault.6 Of the § 877 grounds, clause (e) therefore comes closest to vicarious liability: the "fault" lies in an unperformed duty that the law treats as the obligor's own, whoever did the work.
Maloney v. Rath supplies the standard illustration. The owner of a car had a duty under the Vehicle Code to keep her brakes in working order, and she had an independent mechanic overhaul them. The brakes failed, and the failure resulted from the mechanic's negligence in overhauling or later inspecting them. Applying California law, the court held her duty nondelegable, so the mechanic's negligence was no defense for her.7 Two Restatement sections supported that result. Section 424 makes one who is under a statutory or regulatory duty "to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others" liable to the persons the duty protects for harm caused by a contractor's failure to provide them. Section 423 treats one who carries on an activity threatening a grave risk of serious bodily harm unless its instrumentalities are carefully maintained as liable for a contractor's negligent maintenance as though the employer had done the work personally.8
The court's reasoning shows what makes a duty nondelegable. The vehicle statutes reflect a legislative judgment that poorly maintained cars threaten grave bodily harm, and the responsibility for minimizing that risk falls on the person who owns and operates the car. That person is primarily benefited by the car's use, selects the contractor and can insist on one who is financially responsible, can demand indemnity from the contractor, bears a liability-insurance cost properly attributable to her activities, and performs a duty of the utmost importance to the public.9 Each reason points to the same allocation of risk. The owner chose to bring in a contractor, gained from the activity, and could screen for solvency or bargain for indemnity; the injured traveler had no voice in the choice and no way to inspect the mechanic's work. If handing the job to a contractor ended the owner's responsibility, a private contract the public never saw could dissolve a duty imposed for the public's protection, and the injured person would be left to collect from a contractor who might be unable to pay. The rule does not strand the owner, either. An owner who pays can seek indemnity from the contractor whose negligence caused the loss, and a contractor is likelier than an individual employee to have the resources or insurance to cover it.10
Courts find a duty nondelegable on several recurring grounds. Treat them as alternatives and not as a checklist, since any one can suffice:
- A statute or regulation that requires specified safeguards for the safety of others can create the duty, as the brake statute did.11 Courts refuse to let a party contract away that liability. As one court put it, "A party cannot contract away liability for damages caused by that party's failure to comply with a duty imposed by a safety statute," and decisions applying mine-safety and home-inspection statutes agree.12
- A contract or other undertaking to protect another person can create it, because a principal bound by contract or by law to protect another cannot avoid liability by delegating performance.13
- An invitation to the public, such as opening premises to visitors, can create it.14
- Work that creates a peculiar risk of injury to others unless special precautions are taken, such as an excavation beside a public highway, can create it.15
- Maintaining instrumentalities whose failure threatens grave bodily harm can create it.16
The undertaking ground produced Kleeman v. Rheingold, which held that an attorney's duty of care in serving process for a client cannot be delegated to a process-serving company.17 No single test sorts delegable duties from nondelegable ones. The decisions are policy judgments that a particular responsibility is too important for its obligor to shed, and the categories above mark the places where courts most often reach that judgment.18
The categories need a limit, because the contractor rule would disappear if every duty of care were nondelegable. A homeowner who hired a professional tree service would then answer whenever a trimmer dropped a limb on a neighbor's car, although the homeowner had no way to prevent the carelessness by controlling the details.19 Peculiar risk must therefore mean something narrower than the risk that attends careless work. Sawing two-by-fours may well be dangerous if the guard is left up, but virtually any activity other than bookkeeping or playing chess involves some risk of injury if done carelessly. A rule that made the duty nondelegable whenever some appropriate precaution was omitted would make the owner liable whenever its contractor was negligent, and the exception would swallow the general rule that the contractor, not the owner, is liable for the contractor's torts.20
Even a nondelegable duty is nondelegable only as to the risk that justified it. A building owner who hires a contractor to demolish a skyscraper answers when the contractor's negligence lets falling debris injure a passerby, because the danger of falling debris is the reason the duty cannot be shed. Suppose instead that a contractor's employee, sent to the hardware store, has an accident on the way. The contractor is liable for that, but the owner is not: demolition gives rise to a nondelegable duty because of the risk from falling debris, and driving is an ordinary activity that may accompany any kind of work.21 Lawyers call negligence of this kind collateral, because it has no connection to the danger that made the duty nondelegable. The limit follows the justification for the duty. The owner takes on special responsibilities by starting an activity that is dangerous to the community, and those responsibilities attach to that danger and not to every incident of the job.22
The second garage shows the other limit: nondelegable does not mean strict. Declaring a duty nondelegable makes the owner answer for the contractor's tortious conduct. It does not make the owner answer for every accident that occurs during the work.23 The clause itself requires that the other person cause or fail to avert the harm "by failing to perform the duty."24 Where the contractor's employees were not negligent, as when the defect that injured the plaintiff was undetectable, the contractor is not liable, and the owner is not liable either. A plaintiff in that position should look for other precautions the contractor failed to take, such as cordoning off the worksite, because a failure of that kind is negligence that could be charged to the owner.25 The owner's own care therefore enters neither answer. Careful selection does not excuse a contractor's failure, and the absence of any failure leaves nothing to attribute to the owner.
The second and fifth steps do most of the sorting. An essay stem that says the owner hired a reputable contractor and kept no control over the work has ruled out the negligent-employment and retained-control grounds, but it has not ruled out clause (e). Two questions remain open: whether the owner's duty was one the law refuses to let anyone delegate, and whether the injury came from the risk that made it so.