Concept
What Makes a Risk Peculiar
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
What Makes a Risk Peculiar
Two of the exceptions turn on the same kind of work, so you need that trigger before either one's mechanics make sense. Sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts both apply when an employer hires an independent contractor to do work that the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken. Section 413 calls the danger a "peculiar unreasonable risk"; § 416 calls it a "peculiar risk."1 The word should makes the test objective: the question is what a reasonable hirer would see in the nature of the job. A hirer who can see the danger when it hires can provide for precautions in the contract or in some other way, and § 413 faults it if it does not. What remains is to say what makes a risk peculiar.
A risk is peculiar when it differs from the common risks to which people in general are exposed by the ordinary forms of negligence usual in the community. Comment d to § 416 says so, and the court in Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Ass'n quoted it.2 The definition keeps the exception from consuming the rule. Virtually any activity other than bookkeeping or chess involves some risk of injury if done carelessly. If every omitted precaution made a risk peculiar, the hirer would answer whenever its contractor was negligent, and the exception would swallow the rule that the contractor, not the owner, is liable for his torts.3 What qualifies is a special hazard that results from the nature of the work and calls for special precautions.4 Ordinary carelessness stays with the contractor.
Trucking marks the line. In Ek v. Herrington, a logging-truck case, the court accepted the Restatement's suggestion that malfunctioning brakes pose an ordinary risk against which the hirer of an independent contractor has no duty to provide. It held likewise that overloading a logging truck is no peculiar risk of logging. The danger would not arise but for the contractor's negligence, the ordinary precaution of not overloading avoids it, and the hirer may presume that a careful contractor will not create it. The duty rests solely on the contractor.5 The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on that reasoning in Mavrikidis v. Petullo.
The cargo, not the truck, can change the answer. A contractor who hauls potatoes creates no special danger by driving, so the hirer is not vicariously liable for careless driving. One hired to carry explosives, or huge logs that are unusually dangerous unless securely fastened, may expose the hirer to vicarious liability when he is negligent with respect to that unusual risk.6
Peculiar risk asks for less than abnormal danger. In LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co., the California Court of Appeal quoted Holman v. State of California for the principle. The work need not be extra hazardous or abnormally dangerous, but it must involve some special hazard that results from the nature of the work and calls for special precautions. Nor must the risk be unavoidable; it is enough that the usual or contemplated methods of doing the work are likely to lead to a special risk.7 The two ideas pull in opposite directions on one point. Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care is a factor in the Restatement's test for an abnormally dangerous activity.8 The peculiar-risk sections assume the reverse, that special precautions can be taken, and they make the hirer answer for their absence. "Inherently dangerous" is therefore a much broader category than "abnormally dangerous." A typical qualifying job is the construction, repair, or maintenance of a structure, which often creates special dangers for people nearby.9 A later section sets the two ideas side by side.
Some jobs qualify on their face. One widely quoted formulation calls such work inherently dangerous: an activity that can be carried on safely only by the exercise of special skill and care, and that involves grave risk of danger to persons or property if negligently done.10 The Restatement's own examples are demolishing a building and digging an excavation, both of which carry unusual dangers that sawing boards to build a garage does not.11 High-voltage electrical work also belongs on the list. It is not so irreducibly dangerous as to be abnormally dangerous, yet it involves unusual risk.12 Jurisdictions draw the contours differently. The Restatement Third hinges direct liability on retained control, but it keeps vicarious liability for hirers in eight situations, one of which is activity posing a peculiar risk.13
Courts use several labels for this idea, and they overlap heavily. Section 427 speaks of work involving a special danger to others that the employer knows or has reason to know is inherent in or normal to the work, or that it contemplates when making the contract. The California court in LaCount observed that this rule is closely related to § 416 and to a considerable extent duplicates it.14 The comments to § 427 leave "special danger" undefined, so the Huddleston court looked to § 416 as a different form of the same general principle.15 A fact pattern that says "inherently dangerous" or "special danger" is therefore likely posing the question this section teaches.
Whether the work carried a peculiar risk is generally an issue for the trier of fact. The court in Pusey v. Bator treated it as akin to the question whether a contractor's negligence was collateral, and it quoted the Restatement's point that the employer is not liable for abnormal or unusual kinds of negligence, or for negligence in operative details that ordinarily can be expected to be carried out with proper care.16 The inquiry depends on the nature of the work and the methods the hirer should have expected, and that is why it falls to the jury. On an exam, argue the point from the facts on both sides rather than announcing a label.