Concept
Hirer's Duty to Provide Precautions
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
Hirer's Duty to Provide Precautions
The general rule is that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused by the contractor's act or omission. The comment to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 acknowledges so many exceptions, however, that the rule applies only where no good reason is found for departing from it.1 The court in LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. put the question this way: whether, as a matter of law, none of the exceptions is applicable.2 Section 413 supplies one of those exceptions.
Section 413 applies when the hirer employs an independent contractor to do work it should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken.3 That is the peculiar-risk trigger defined in the previous section. Once the trigger is met, the hirer is liable for physical harm caused by the absence of the precautions if it failed in either of two ways. It may have failed to provide in the contract that the contractor would take them, or it may have failed to exercise reasonable care to provide for them in some other manner.4
The question here differs from the one asked about nondelegable duties. A nondelegable duty will frequently let an injured plaintiff recover from an owner who exercised due care, because the contractor's negligence is charged to the owner.5 Section 413 starts with the hirer instead and asks what it did about the precautions the job required. The liability comes from the hirer's own omission, the kind of fault described in Restatement §§ 410 through 415. An owner may be negligent in connection with contract work, even though it delegated the work, by failing to require the contractor to take necessary precautions.6 Labels vary, and the exceptions differ by jurisdiction. The Restatement Third lists activity posing a peculiar risk among the eight situations in which a hirer remains vicariously liable, so check how the governing jurisdiction frames the exception.7
The two clauses are alternatives. Clause (a) tests the contract, and clause (b) tests everything the hirer did outside it. Each has its own typical failure, and the next two subsections take them in turn.
Contractual Precautions Under 413(a)
Clause (a) fixes the hirer's first obligation at a particular moment and in a particular document. A hirer who employs a contractor for peculiar-risk work is liable for harm caused by the absence of the needed precautions if it "fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions."8 When the contract is drafted, it must therefore contain a term that obligates the contractor to take whatever precautions the job requires.
The hirer carries this burden because it is the party positioned to impose the precautions. The peculiar-risk trigger is measured by what the hirer should recognize when it engages the contractor, so the hirer knows before work begins that the job will need shoring, barricades, or similar measures, and it controls the terms of the engagement. Commentators who defend liability for dangerous activities make the same point in economic terms. A principal can require the precautions in the agreement, attach a penalty such as loss of the fee, and enforce the term cheaply when the precautions are easy to observe.9 Highway maintenance is the standard illustration, because barricades, signs, and flagmen are cheaply observable by the principal, and one commentator treats liability for accidents caused by their absence as clearly efficient.10
Silence in the contract is the omission clause (a) punishes. The clause asks only whether the contract contains the term. A contract that says nothing about safety does not contain it, however skilled the contractor appears, and the hirer's liability then rests on its own failure at the contracting stage. Ordinary negligence principles point the same way. When work will create a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may require the hirer to insist, in the contract or otherwise, that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions, and then to see that it does so.11 An owner who fails to require necessary precautions is negligent even though the work has been delegated.12
A silent contract does not create liability by itself. The text imposes liability for physical harm caused by the absence of the precautions, so the missing term matters only when the missing precaution is what allowed the harm.13 A contract that never mentions barricades has not caused an injury that barricades would not have prevented. The plaintiff must connect three things: the work called for particular precautions, the contract did not require them, and the injury flowed from their absence.
Dunmore's case shows where clause (a) stops. Clause (b) is stated in the alternative and separately asks whether the hirer failed to use reasonable care to provide for the precautions in some other manner.14 Section 416 goes further and makes the hirer answer for the contractor's failure to take the precautions even though the hirer provided for them in the contract or otherwise.15 Two errors follow from stopping at clause (a). One is to treat a contract that includes the precautions as the end of the hirer's exposure, which ignores clause (b) and § 416. The other is to treat a silent contract as harmless because the contractor is independent, which ignores that the insulation rule gives way once the peculiar-risk trigger is met.
Other Precautions Under 413(b)
Clause (b) supplies the second route to liability. Where work is likely to create a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm unless special precautions are taken, the hirer answers for harm caused by their absence if it "fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions."17 The clause is stated in the alternative to clause (a), so it asks its own question. A hirer that wrote the precautions into the contract has answered clause (a) but has not thereby answered clause (b). The phrase "some other manner" takes in everything outside the contract text, such as supervising the work, inspecting it, supplying the barricade or the shoring itself, or ordering the contractor to comply once the hirer learns it has not. The trigger is still the peculiar-risk trigger defined earlier, and the plaintiff must still show that the harm was caused by the absence of the precautions.18
The law looks past the contract because a written precaution protects no one unless somebody makes sure it is carried out. The hirer started the work for its own benefit, and it is the party likely to know, before the first shovel is lifted, that the job needs special precautions. Precautions such as barricades and signs are also cheap for the hirer to observe, so checking on them costs little compared with the injuries they prevent.19 Without clause (b), a hirer could buy compliance on paper, keep the paper as its defense, and leave the public exposed whenever the contractor ignored the term. Clause (b) closes that gap by attaching liability to the hirer's own failure to follow through.
What reasonable care requires here is ordinary negligence applied to a particular setting. When the work will create a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may call for the hirer to insist, in the contract or otherwise, that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions and then to see that the contractor does so. Reasonable care may also require inspection of completed work.20 A hirer that fails to supervise, fails to require necessary precautions, or fails to inspect is liable for its own negligence and not for the contractor's.21 Because the standard is reasonable care and not a guarantee, what counts as enough follow-up depends on the circumstances. A hirer that has been told the safeguards are missing has little room to do nothing, while one that has heard no complaint has more.
In both scenes the contract required barricades and the contractor failed to install them. What moved the answer was the hirer's response to the warning, which is why clause (b) tests the hirer's own conduct. A student who sees a contract term requiring precautions and stops there overlooks clause (b) entirely. A student who sees a missing barricade and stops there overlooks that the question is what the hirer did about it.
Because clause (b) measures the hirer's own conduct, it can overlap with the liability of a hirer that retains control over part of the work and exercises that control carelessly. Section 414 provides that one who entrusts work to an independent contractor but retains control of any part of it is liable for physical harm caused by failing to exercise that control with reasonable care.22 A hirer with a supervisor on the site may satisfy both theories on the same facts. They differ in where the duty comes from. Control liability depends on the hirer's having kept a right to influence how the work is done, and a mere general right to receive reports, make suggestions, or monitor quality usually does not qualify.23 Clause (b) depends on the peculiar-risk trigger, so a hirer that left the contractor free to do the work in its own way can still answer under it. Retained control is a separate basis of direct liability and is not developed further here.
Clause (b) leaves the hirer a way out that stronger rules do not. A hirer that exercises reasonable care to provide for the precautions is not liable under clause (b) when the contractor ignores them. Section 416, taught next, still makes the hirer answer for the contractor's failure to take the precautions even though the hirer provided for them in the contract or otherwise.24 Nor does every court read the rule as clause (b) is written. One opinion puts the test as the presence or absence of a necessary precaution, not whether the contractor's failure is excusable, and says liability turns on neither the contractor's lack of care nor the hirer's lack of care in making sure the contractor takes the precautions.25 On that view careful follow-up by the hirer is no defense, whereas under clause (b) as written it is.