Concept
Contractor's Employees as Plaintiffs
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
Contractor's Employees as Plaintiffs
A homeowner hires a roofer to replace the roof on his house. One of the roofer's employees negligently drops hot tar, and it strikes a passerby. The passerby can sue the homeowner through the peculiar-risk exception to the rule that a hirer is not liable for an independent contractor's negligence.1 Change one fact, and the answer is no longer clear: suppose the tar strikes another of the roofer's own employees. Whether the hirer answers to that worker is a question on which the authorities divide.
The Restatement's text does not settle it. Section 413 makes a hirer liable for physical harm to "others" when the hirer employs a contractor for work likely to create a peculiar unreasonable risk unless special precautions are taken, and then fails to provide for those precautions in the contract or in some other reasonable way.2 Section 416 reaches the hirer when the contractor fails to take the precautions, even though the hirer provided for them.3 Neither section says whether the contractor's own employees are among the "others."
California authority, as LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. recites it, answers yes. The California Supreme Court has determined that employees of an independent contractor come within the word "others" in these sections, citing Van Arsdale.4 The reading follows the text. A worker is not the hirer, and the workers who perform the job stand closest to the danger that special precautions guard against. The worker gains no shortcut by invoking the sections. The worker must still prove work likely to create a peculiar risk unless special precautions are taken, and physical harm caused by the absence of those precautions.
A second view denies recovery for injuries that arise from the risks the contractor was hired to handle. Its reasoning rests on expertise. An owner who hires a contractor for its skill in managing a particular risk may answer to strangers to the work, but should not answer to the contractor's own employees for the risks the contractor was engaged to control.5 Take a demolition contractor who fails to furnish safety equipment the job requires, and whose employee is hurt as a result. On this view, the employee has no claim against the owner who hired the contractor.
The roofing hypothetical shows the same view at work. When the person hurt by the hot tar is the roofer's own employee, the California Supreme Court held in Privette v. Superior Court that the exception is unavailable and the homeowner bears no vicarious liability.6 Read through the expertise reasoning, the worker was hurt by the very risk the roofer was hired to manage. The two California sources point in different directions, so neither shows a national rule, and the jurisdiction named in the question controls.
Liability under these exceptions is limited to the particular risk that gives rise to them, whoever the plaintiff is. A bricklayer who negligently drops a brick on a passerby can create vicarious liability, but the same bricklayer driving a truck to the brickyard cannot.7 A worker's claim must therefore also trace the injury to the peculiar risk and not to a collateral one.
On an exam, check first who was hurt. A passerby on a peculiar-risk job invokes the exception without any status problem. A contractor's own employee raises the split. State both positions with their reasons, apply the jurisdiction's rule if the facts name one, and otherwise argue the side the facts favor, for instance by asking whether the risk that injured the worker is the very one the contractor was hired to manage.