Concept
The Duty-to-Control Backdrop
Duty to control the conduct of others on one's land or chattels
Controlling Others on Your Property
The Duty-to-Control Backdrop
Section 318 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reaches a possessor who lets someone else use land or chattels. If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in the actor's possession otherwise than as a servant, the actor, if present, must use reasonable care to control that person so as to prevent intentional harm to others or conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, but only if two conditions about the actor's knowledge are met.1 A chattel is movable personal property, such as a car or a firearm, and a possessor is the person who holds the land or chattel.
The rule is unusual because the danger does not come from the possessor's own conduct. It comes from the guest or borrower, and the possessor must answer for failing to stop it. A duty of that kind is an exception, and an exception makes sense only against the rule it departs from. The two subsections below state the baseline, that one ordinarily has no duty to control another person, and then place the possessor's duty among the other relationship-based exceptions. With both in hand, each condition in § 318 reads as part of what justifies leaving the baseline.
The General No-Duty Rule
Every control duty in this chapter is measured against Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. As Remsburg v. Montgomery states it, there is no duty so to control a third person's conduct as to prevent that person from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation between the actor and the third person imposes a duty to control, or (b) a special relation between the actor and the victim gives the victim a right to protection.2 Quoting Lamb v. Hopkins, the court described § 315 as a special application of § 314, which holds that an actor's realizing that action is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose a duty to take that action.3 The control rule is thus one branch of a broader principle: realizing that someone needs help does not, by itself, require anyone to give it.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California shows the exception at work. The defendants there stood in the relation of therapist to patient. The court held that this relationship satisfied the requirement, so it did not need to decide whether foreseeability alone could create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another's conduct.4 The court rested the duty on the relationship and left foreseeability alone for another day.
A passenger who watches the driver grow dangerously drunk shows what happens when the relationship is missing. The passenger has no custody of, authority over, or other special relation to the driver, so the rule imposes no duty to persuade the driver to stop or to give up the wheel.5 Foresight cannot explain the difference between this case and Tarasoff. The therapists had a relationship with the dangerous person, and the passenger has none.
The rule governs omissions, and treating it as protection for careless affirmative conduct misapplies it. Anyone who acts affirmatively owes others reasonable care against unreasonable risks arising from the act, while the duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted and in general are confined to situations involving a special relation.6
A dissent in Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC drew the same line from the Third Restatement. It argued that § 315 addresses only an affirmative duty to control third parties and leaves untouched the ordinary duty of reasonable care for conduct that might give a third party the occasion to cause harm.7 The dissent added that § 302B comment e and § 449 of the Second Restatement contemplate liability, without regard to any special relationship, for acts that are negligent because of the risk of a third party's conduct.8 The relationship-based duties therefore matter when the claim is that the defendant should have restrained someone else. Section 318 is one of them.
Relationships That Create Control Duties
Section 318 belongs to a family of four control duties. As Remsburg recounts them, a parent must control a minor child (§ 316), a master must control a servant (§ 317), a possessor of land or chattels must control a licensee (§ 318), and those in charge of persons with dangerous propensities must control them (§ 319).10 Each ties the actor to the person who might cause harm, so each falls under § 315(a). Section 315(b) ties the actor to the potential victim instead, and a train conductor who sees a passenger assaulted and does nothing is the kind of scenario it addresses.11 A claim that the defendant should have restrained someone else therefore starts by asking which of the four relationships, if any, joined the defendant to that person.
The four relationships share a convergence of authority and responsibility. A defendant who takes charge of a person who poses a risk of injury accepts a duty of care, which is why that exception applies primarily to those in charge of mental patients or prisoners. An employer's duty to control an employee presumably rests on the benefit the employer derives from the employee's activities. In these situations the defendant is also often uniquely positioned to prevent the harm.12 Each recognized relationship gives the defendant a right, authority, and duty to control, and the defendant must then exercise reasonable care.13 The passenger beside an intoxicated driver has no such lever and stays under the baseline rule.
The four duties differ in where the defendant's power comes from, and tracking that source is the quickest way to tell them apart:
- Under § 316, the parent's power is parental authority over a minor child.14
- Under § 317, the master's power is control over a servant, and the duty presumably rests on the benefit the master draws from the servant's activities.15
- Under § 318, the possessor's power is possession of the land or chattel, which the permitted user is allowed to use only because the possessor said so.16
- Under § 319, the actor's power comes from taking charge of a person whom the actor knows or should know is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled.17
Having one of these relationships opens the inquiry without closing it, and parents show why. Courts are reluctant to hold a parent liable for a child's torts even when the parent knows the child is dangerous, and they reject liability where the parent could foresee harm in general but not the specific harm or the specific occasion for it. Where the parent knows of a specific propensity and an imminent occasion for it, a failure to control the child or to warn potential victims is negligence.18
Section 318 differs from its siblings in what triggers it. Its text excludes the servant, whom § 317 covers, and it does not require that the actor have taken charge of anyone.19 That separates it from § 319. The Maryland court read the illustrations to § 319, a private hospital's negligent release of an infectious patient and a sanitarium's guards losing a homicidal patient, as showing that the section has peculiar application to custodial situations, though it cautioned that the illustrations do not limit the section because there are degrees of being in charge and having control.20 A possessor need not hold anyone in custody. The permitted user is on the land or using the chattel because the possessor allowed it, and that permission is the authority § 318 builds on. The facts to look for are possession and permission, with custody of the person playing no part.
Marguerite's relationship to Dale opens the inquiry. Section 318 then asks whether she knew or had reason to know that she could control him, and whether she knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.21 Walter never reaches those conditions, because the relationship itself is missing. Courts treat financial support of an adult child as probably insufficient by itself to justify a parent's liability, absent some unusual element of control.22
The word control in all four sections can mislead, because it suggests custody or physical restraint. A reasonable defendant may satisfy the duty with the most limited efforts, such as a warning, and the relationship can call for reasonable use of whatever means the defendant has even when real control is impossible.23 Later sections take up what reasonable care demands of a possessor under § 318.
The list does not end at §§ 316 through 319. The Third Restatement recognizes similar categories and adds a duty of mental health professionals to use reasonable care in protecting others from dangerous patients.24 Tarasoff applied the same logic to the therapist-patient relation, where no land or chattel is involved.25 A social acquaintance with no custody of, authority over, or possessory relationship to a dangerous person fits none of these categories, so the baseline no-duty rule governs.