Concept
The Section 318 Duty
Duty to control the conduct of others on one's land or chattels
The Section 318 Duty
Section 318 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the possessor's duty in a single sentence. A possessor who permits a third person to use land or chattels in the possessor's possession, otherwise than as a servant, must exercise reasonable care to control that person, if the possessor is present, so as to prevent the person from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.1 Two knowledge conditions finish the rule. The possessor must know or have reason to know of the ability to control the third person, and must know or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.2 The Restatement titles the section "Duty of Possessor of Land or Chattels to Control Conduct of Licensee," and the licensee is the person the possessor has allowed onto the land or to use the property.3
Each condition screens out a class of cases, and each screen has a reason. Possession is the source of the duty: a possessor decides who may enter or use the property and on what terms, so a permitted user's access rests on the possessor's consent, which the possessor can condition or withdraw. A bystander holds no comparable power. The remaining conditions confine the duty to cases in which the possessor could have prevented the harm. Presence asks whether the possessor was positioned to act while the use was under way. Ability asks whether the possessor held real leverage over this user. Necessity and opportunity ask whether the possessor knew or should have known that the occasion to use that leverage had arisen. Remove these limits, and every host and homeowner would answer for each guest or family member who misbehaved.
Volpe v. Gallagher supplies the running example. The defendant's son kept guns in her house, including a loaded shotgun, while he showed symptoms of delusional and paranoid mental illness. When he stalked a neighbor outside with that shotgun, she sat reading a newspaper in the living room, unaware. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that her obliviousness did not preclude liability under § 318, because she was present in the house during his dangerous gun-possession activity. The remaining question, the court said, was whether she knew or should have known that she could control him by causing the guns to be removed from the premises.4 The subsections below take the conditions in order and then define what reasonable care requires.
Permitted Use of Land or Chattels
The duty switches on when "the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession otherwise than as a servant."5 Until that clause is satisfied, § 318 supplies no duty, and the baseline rule that one person owes no duty to control another governs. Each phrase screens out a class of cases, so the clause should be tested phrase by phrase before any question about the possessor's knowledge or the reasonableness of the response.
Permission matters because it creates both the exposure and the means of preventing it. A person who is on the property by the possessor's consent is there by the possessor's choice, and the possessor can condition or withdraw that consent. That power is what makes a duty to control realistic. An intruder the possessor never permitted brings neither feature: the possessor made no choice to open the property to the intruder, and there is no consent to condition or withdraw. Possession completes the picture, because an actor who does not hold the property cannot set the terms of its use. Landlords test this element most sharply, since an owner who has handed over the premises may no longer possess them; the ability subsection below takes up how courts have divided.
In Volpe, the son's keeping of loaded guns in the house was a use of premises in his mother's possession that she allowed, and nothing in the facts makes him her servant. The court's question, whether she could control him by removing the guns from the premises, asks about a power that comes with possessing the house.6 That link among possession, permission, and duty is the one the trigger is built to capture.
The phrase "otherwise than as a servant" marks the border with the master's duty in § 317. That section requires a master to use reasonable care to control a servant who is acting outside the scope of employment, but only if the servant is on premises the master possesses (or premises the servant may enter only as a servant) or is using the master's chattel, and only if the master knows or has reason to know of the ability to control and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for control.7 The two sections share a pattern of duty, ability to control, and necessity and opportunity, yet each ties the duty to a different source of power. The master's power flows from the job, so § 317 reaches premises the servant may enter only because of the service, even where the master does not possess them. The possessor's power flows from the property, so § 318 speaks only of land or chattels in the actor's possession. The text of § 317 as quoted has no counterpart to the "if present" requirement that § 318 contains.
The Restatement lists the two relationships as separate entries in the same family of control duties, alongside the parent's duty in § 316 and the duty of those in charge of persons with dangerous propensities in § 319.8 Excluding servants keeps § 318 from colliding with § 317: an employee using the employer's chattel would otherwise fit both descriptions, and two sets of conditions would compete. Because the exclusion speaks of use "as a servant," the question is the capacity in which the third person is using the property, and use as part of the job points to § 317.
The Presence Requirement
The possessor "is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care" to control the permitted user.10 The condition asks where the possessor was while the third person was using the land or chattel. A possessor on the premises during the use falls within the section, and for a chattel the same words ask whether the possessor was with the item during the use. A possessor elsewhere falls outside the duty as § 318 is written. Presence is therefore a threshold question about location, and it comes before any question about what the possessor knew.
Presence matters because the duty is a duty to use a power, and the power exists only where the possessor is positioned to use it. A possessor on the premises can watch the permitted user, speak to the user, forbid the activity, or take away the dangerous object, and can do each while the dangerous use is under way. An absent possessor generally cannot do any of these while the use is in progress. That is why § 318, by its terms, does not impose this duty on an absent possessor. The statement concerns this section only; whether another doctrine reaches an absent possessor is a separate question.
Volpe shows how little the requirement demands of the possessor's location. The defendant's son kept guns in her house, including a loaded shotgun, and he was showing symptoms of a delusional and paranoid mental illness. When the shooting occurred she was reading a newspaper in the living room, unaware that he was outside stalking a neighbor with the loaded shotgun. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that her obliviousness at that moment did not preclude liability under § 318, because she was present in the house while he engaged in his dangerous gun-possession activity.11 The court tied her presence to the dangerous use going on in the house, which was his keeping of loaded guns while in that mental state, and not only to the instant of the shooting.
Having found the mother present, the court went straight on to ask whether she knew or should have known that she could control her son by causing the guns to be removed from the premises.12 That inquiry belongs to the knowledge conditions in § 318(a) and (b), which the next two subsections develop. Keeping the two questions apart prevents two errors. If presence required awareness of the particular act, it would swallow the knowledge conditions and make liability turn on which room the possessor happened to be in. If presence ended the analysis, every possessor at home would answer for every permitted user's misconduct. A parent who is at home but could not have known of the danger or of any power to remove the guns is present and may still escape liability at the next step.
An exam stem that puts the possessor in the house but unaware therefore does not end on the presence element. The possessor is present, and the issue becomes whether the possessor knew or should have known of the ability to control and of the necessity and opportunity for exercising it.
Ability to Control
The first knowledge condition asks whether the possessor "knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person."14 The clause has two halves. Ability is a fact about the possessor's actual power over the permitted user's conduct, and knowledge or reason to know is a fact about the possessor's awareness of that power. Both must exist before the duty of reasonable care attaches. This condition is separate from the one in § 318(b), which asks whether the possessor knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control and is taken up next.15
The two halves have different reasons. A duty to control is a duty to use a power, so it makes sense only where a power exists; a rule requiring a possessor to restrain someone the possessor has no means of restraining would punish a failure to do what no one could have done. The knowledge half answers a separate problem. A possessor who holds a lever but has no reason to realize it cannot fairly be faulted for leaving it untouched, because a choice not to act presupposes awareness of the option. The rule also places responsibility where prevention is cheapest, since a possessor with a practical lever, such as the power to remove guns from the premises, can usually head off the harm at far less cost than the victim or the public could.
In practice, ability means a concrete lever the possessor could pull to affect the permitted user's dangerous conduct. Three recur: the power to demand that a dangerous chattel be removed, the power to forbid the dangerous activity, and the power to end the permission and send the user away. Each flows from possession, the same source the permitted-use trigger identified. Ability in this sense is a practical power over the use of the property. It does not call for custody of the person or the capacity to restrain the user physically, and reasonable care under these control duties can sometimes be satisfied by modest efforts such as a warning.16 What the possessor must actually do once the conditions are met belongs to the later subsection on reasonable care. The question here is only whether the lever exists and whether the possessor knows it.
Volpe shows ability grounded in possession. The mother's son, who was showing symptoms of delusional and paranoid mental illness, kept guns in her house, including a loaded shotgun. The court framed her ability around one lever: whether she knew or should have known that she was able to control him in respect of his gun activity by causing the removal of the guns from the premises.17 The lever came from her possession of the house and fit the danger, since removing the guns reached the very threat her son posed. The court's wording, "knew or should have known," differs slightly from the Restatement's "knows or has reason to know," so an exam answer should state the element in the Restatement's words.18
The phrase "reason to know" asks what information the possessor actually had, and whether a reasonable person holding that information would infer that the possessor could control the user.19 Whitlock knows the boathouse is hers, that Pryor is there on her permission, and that the permission can be withdrawn, and those facts point straight to the power. A bare possibility that some lever might exist does not satisfy the phrase. A possessor who never thought about a lever that the known facts made plain cannot use that lapse as a defense. For possessors of their own homes, ability and knowledge of it usually travel together, so this condition rarely decides the case. The contest arises where ability itself is in doubt, and that happens most sharply when an owner has handed the premises to someone else.
Landlord cases show how far courts disagree about that doubt. Some courts find indirect control in a landlord's power to exclude dangerous tenants or end their tenancies, and decisions such as Rosales v. Stewart, Giacalone v. Housing Authority of Town of Wallingford, and Strunk v. Zoltanski reach landlords on that reasoning when a tenant's dangerous use of firearms or dangerous dogs causes harm.20 Other courts think of control narrowly and deny liability because the premises are in the tenant's possession and the landlord has no right of control over them. In Stewart v. Aldrich, the Maine court reasoned that a landlord's right of control does not include the incidental control that comes from being able to threaten nonrenewal or eviction, and in Englund v. Vital the South Dakota court found no duty to protect a plaintiff from the rock-throwing child of tenants where the landlord lacked control over the tenants' property.21 These are landlord-liability decisions about tenants' dogs and children and not § 318 holdings. They matter here because they mark where a narrow view of control ends a claim.
The broad view treats the power to end a tenancy as a real lever that the landlord can pull cheaply. The narrow view treats the threat of eviction as pressure on the tenant and not as control over the premises or the conduct on them, and counting it would reach almost every landlord. Reach explains the contrast with Volpe. The mother could take the guns out of her own house herself, while a landlord who has surrendered possession ordinarily cannot enter the tenant's unit and remove the tenant's dog. Because a landlord out of possession may also fail the possession element at the threshold, the trigger and the ability condition often blur together in these cases.
Necessity and Opportunity
The second knowledge condition asks whether the possessor "knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."23 Section 318(a) asks about a power, namely whether the possessor holds a lever over the permitted user and knows it.24 This clause asks about an occasion, namely whether the moment has come to pull the lever and whether the possessor is positioned to pull it. Necessity refers to the user's conduct, which must be heading toward intentional harm to others or toward an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. Opportunity refers to the possessor's practical chance to intervene while intervention can still matter. A possessor can hold a power and know about it, and still have no reason to think that today is the day it is needed, which is why the first condition cannot do the work of the second.
The words "should know" measure the possessor by what a reasonable possessor would have noticed. The comment to § 318 says so directly: the duty requires the possessor to exercise the ability to control the user "not only when he knows of the necessity for so doing, but also when as a reasonable man he should know of it."25 The Rhode Island Supreme Court quoted that comment in a footnote to Volpe. The standard has two reasons that pull in opposite directions. A possessor with no cause to suspect trouble cannot be faulted for failing to use a power when nothing signaled a need, and liability on those facts would make the possessor an insurer of everything a permitted user does. A possessor who would have seen the danger with ordinary attention cannot escape by looking away, because the law attributes to that possessor the knowledge a reasonable person in the same position would have had.
A reasonable-person standard needs a measure of how closely a reasonable possessor watches, and the same comment supplies one. Whether a possessor should be vigilant to discover that a proposed use will create an unreasonable risk of harm "depends upon the character of the property, the use which the licensee is making of it, and the circumstances under which it is used."26 At the far end of the scale, a possessor who permits an activity "highly dangerous unless great care is taken" may be required to exercise "constant vigilance" so as to be ready to control the user "when and if the occasion for it arises."27 Necessity and opportunity therefore form a single inquiry about knowledge, and the attention a reasonable possessor owes rises with the danger. The allocation of burden follows. For a harmless use, constant watching would cost the possessor a great deal and prevent almost nothing. For a deadly use, a little attention costs very little compared with the harm it can head off. A possessor who is watching closely will also tend to be positioned to act in time, so opportunity follows from the same watchfulness. A possessor who learns of the danger only after the harm is complete has had no chance to exercise control.
Volpe places a family home at the dangerous end of the scale. The mother's son kept guns in her house, including a loaded shotgun, and he was showing symptoms of a delusional and paranoid mental illness while he engaged in that gun activity. The court held that her duty to use reasonable care depended on what she knew or should have known.28 Loaded firearms in the hands of a person with those symptoms sit near the highly dangerous end of the comment's scale, so a reasonable mother in that house, on notice of the symptoms and aware of the guns, owed closer attention than a possessor whose permitted user does something harmless. Her being in the living room with her newspaper during the shooting resolved only the presence requirement. What she should have noticed remained a question about the danger the premises held.
Specific, serious notice proves more than general worry. Courts dealing with parents and their children offer an analogy, though it comes from a different relationship and shows only how knowledge of a specific danger is treated. Courts have rejected liability where a parent could foresee that a child might cause harm in general but could not reasonably foresee the specific harm or the specific occasion for it. Once the parent knows of a specific propensity and an imminent occasion for it, a failure to control the child or to warn potential victims is negligence.29 The same difference appears under § 318. A possessor with only a vague unease about a guest has no reason to know that control is needed against any particular risk, while a possessor who has seen concrete signs of a serious danger is charged with knowing of the need and of the chance to act on it. On an exam, the possessor's own awareness is therefore only half of the question. The other half asks how much watching the property and the use demanded, and whether a possessor who watched that closely would have seen the necessity and a chance to act.
What Reasonable Care Requires
Once the permitted-use trigger, the presence requirement, and the two knowledge conditions are all satisfied, the remaining question is what the possessor owes. Section 318 answers in its opening clause: the possessor must "exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them."31 That is the ordinary negligence standard of reasonable care, pointed at one object, the permitted user's conduct. The earlier subsections decided whether a duty exists, and this one defines its content. Doing so keeps apart two questions that students tend to blend: what the possessor was required to do, and whether a given possessor did it.
The standard is reasonable care, and the duty does not make the possessor guarantee that the user will do no harm. A guarantee would make the possessor answerable for whatever the user did, however much effort the possessor made, and a possessor's power is seldom complete. A possessor can forbid an activity, demand removal of an object, or end the user's permission, yet cannot read the user's mind or watch every hour of the day. The law seldom imposes a duty of absolute protection, and the Restatement's companion duty to control a dangerous person in one's charge is described in the same terms, as a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury from that person.32 Reasonable care also builds proportion into the duty. When the risk is modest, a modest precaution satisfies it, and when the risk is grave and the precaution cheap, a possessor who ignores a known danger cannot say that acting was too hard.
The word control, which runs through all of these duties, can suggest custody or physical restraint, and the duty requires neither. The relationship may call for the defendant to use whatever reasonable means are at hand even where real control is impossible, and the most limited effort, such as a warning, may be enough to protect the person at risk.33 For a possessor, the usual means are the levers that possession supplies: demanding that a dangerous chattel be removed, forbidding the dangerous activity, ending the permission, or warning the person the user is likely to harm. In Volpe the Rhode Island Supreme Court identified exactly this kind of step for a mother whose son kept guns in her house while showing symptoms of a delusional and paranoid mental illness. She had a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent his dangerous gun-possession activity if she knew or should have known that she was able to control him in that respect by causing the removal of the guns from the premises.34 Removing guns from a house is an ordinary act within the reach of any homeowner, and it addressed the very danger her son posed. A possessor in her position who knew of the illness, knew of the loaded firearms, knew the guns could be taken out, and did nothing would have exercised no care at all.
Reasoning backward from the injury to a failure of care is the most common error with this standard. The duty is measured by what the possessor did in light of what the possessor knew, and a bad outcome shows only that harm occurred. Had Lindqvist done nothing, the same injury would support a finding of breach, so the fact that separates the two situations is the possessor's conduct and not the result. Whether a particular possessor's steps were reasonable is a question for the fact-finder, who weighs the seriousness of the danger against the burden and likely effect of the precautions. A highly dangerous use calls for a stronger response than a harmless one, and a possessor facing a deadly risk cannot rest on a gesture. The conditions already taught (permitted use, presence, ability, and necessity and opportunity) decide whether the duty exists, while the possessor's response decides whether it was met.
The duty text reaches two kinds of harm. The possessor must use reasonable care to control the user so as to prevent the user from intentionally harming others and also from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.35 The second limb carries the duty well beyond violent crime. A borrower who drives a lent truck recklessly intends harm to no one, yet creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, and the words of the section fit that conduct. A fact pattern about a guest who plans an assault and one about a guest who handles a dangerous chattel carelessly therefore both fall within the content of the duty, and the knowledge conditions and the reasonableness of the possessor's response sort out the outcome. The second limb speaks of bodily harm, so a stem that threatens only property damage calls for a different source of duty.