Concept
Grounds for Indemnity
Indemnity between the hirer and the contractor
Grounds for Indemnity
Section 886B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the general principle of indemnity concrete content by listing the situations in which it applies: “Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the following.”1 The word “include” makes the list illustrative. The Wyoming court in Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co. described the entries as instances of “general recognition that indemnity should be granted” and as situations in which “alternative care” obligations exist among the actors.2 Each entry names a recurring relationship in which, as between two parties liable to the plaintiff, the loss belongs to one of them.
The list also protects an indemnitee who acted on the indemnitor’s directions and reasonably believed them lawful, and one who justifiably relied on the indemnitor’s misrepresentation.3 Four other entries describe how a hirer comes to pay for a contractor’s wrong, and they organize this section: the hirer is liable only vicariously; the contractor’s defective work went undiscovered; the contractor created a dangerous condition that the hirer failed to discover; or the contractor owed the hirer a duty of protection. In the first three, the hirer’s role is derivative or passive. In the fourth, the contractor’s own promise does the work. How far the hirer’s own fault reduces any of these claims is the subject of later sections.
Merely Vicarious Liability
The plainest ground covers an indemnitee that was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the indemnitor.4 A party is liable only vicariously when the law makes it answer for someone else’s wrongful conduct and nothing it did or failed to do forms part of the basis for the judgment. A hirer held liable under a nondelegable duty fits that description. Once it pays, the loss belongs, as between hirer and contractor, to the contractor, and the hirer has no share of fault to leave behind. In an Illinois opinion’s words, an indemnitee that was not at fault “can rightfully seek to shift its entire liability to the truly responsible party.”5
Tracy, a building owner, hires Hepburn, a contractor, to lift heavy objects with a crane above a public sidewalk. The work poses an obvious risk to passersby unless special precautions are taken, so Tracy’s duty to the public is very likely nondelegable.6 If Hepburn’s negligence injures a passerby, finding the duty nondelegable does not relieve Hepburn; it simply makes Tracy liable as well. Because Tracy’s liability arises from Hepburn’s negligence, Tracy is entitled to indemnity from Hepburn if Tracy pays the judgment.7 The doctrine of nondelegable duty exists to assure the injured party a financially responsible defendant when negligence causes harm,8 and indemnity then returns the cost to the contractor whose negligence caused it.
The right runs in one direction only. Hepburn has no right to contribution or indemnity from Tracy,9 because Tracy’s liability is borrowed from Hepburn’s negligence. Nondelegability gives Hepburn no defense against the plaintiff either. Just as respondeat superior does not bar a suit against a negligent employee, an owner’s vicarious liability does not bar the plaintiff from suing the contractor for its own negligence.10
This complete shifting for the merely vicarious party grew out of the common-law bar on contribution. Courts used indemnity to soften that bar, and the doctrine came to provide “a complete shifting of liability from one party to another in cases where a party was held only vicariously liable.”11
The ground carries a condition: the indemnitee must truly lack fault of its own. Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc. recounts Village of Portland v. Citizens Telephone Co., in which a village sought indemnity from a telephone company for a child’s injury, claiming that it was merely passively negligent in failing to discover a dangerous condition the company had created in part. The court rejected the claim for two reasons. The village’s negligence was active, because it knew of the condition or could have discovered it by inspection, and that negligence combined with the company’s to cause the injury.12 Because both defendants were guilty of active, causal negligence, indemnity was unavailable. A party in the village’s position is no longer merely vicarious, and the fault limits discussed later in this chapter decide what, if anything, it can recover.
An indemnity right is worth only what the indemnitor can pay. The actual wrongdoer remains liable to the plaintiff and must indemnify the other party “to the extent that he is able to do so.”13 A contractor is more likely than an employee to have adequate resources and insurance to cover the loss, which is why a hirer is far more likely than an employer to pursue indemnity.14
A contract term requiring proof of the contractor’s insurance would have given her claim something to draw on, a point the section on the contractor’s duty to protect develops.
Defective Work Left Undiscovered
The next ground fits a hirer that paid for a contractor’s mistake it never noticed. Indemnity is available where the indemnitor “supplied a defective chattel or performed defective work upon land or buildings as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect.”16 A chattel is movable personal property, so the clause reaches a manufactured part or product as well as construction, repair, or installation work. The decisions below involve suppliers and manufacturers, and their reasoning carries over to a contractor’s defective work on a building.
The first question locates the defect, and the reason lies in why a hirer hires. A hirer ordinarily engages a contractor for its skill and relies on it to do the work properly. When the work proves defective, the hirer’s lapse is at most a failure to find someone else’s mistake, and the party who produced the defect should bear the whole loss. A contrary rule would reward careless work, because the contractor could defend by pointing to the hirer’s missed inspection, a defense built from the very ignorance that led the hirer to hire it. The defect must also be the indemnitor’s own. A hirer whose instructions produced the flaw stands in a different position, which the discussion of the hirer’s own negligence takes up later.
Two decisions about suppliers show the reasoning, and they rest on different foundations. In East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda the court reasoned from warranty. An intermediary seller in privity with the manufacturer receives an implied warranty that the product is safe for its intended use. When breach of that warranty exposes the seller to liability, and the seller’s fault lay only in failing to discover and correct a defect the manufacturer created, upon whose skill and expertise the seller reasonably relied, the court thought it equitable to shift the burden of loss entirely to the manufacturer.17 Peters v. Lyons rests on equity itself. It repeats that indemnity is an equitable doctrine that “does not lend itself to hard-and-fast rules” and is invoked “to protect one who is legally liable but morally innocent against one whose wrongful conduct or omission has caused liability to be imposed on him.”18 East Penn’s reasonable-reliance logic applies equally to a hirer that relies on a contractor’s skill.
The second question asks about shared exposure. The clause requires that both parties be liable to the third person,19 and that requirement separates this ground from an ordinary contract claim for poor work. The text speaks of liability, not joinder, so the point is whether the plaintiff could recover from both and not whether the plaintiff sued both. Where the contractor’s work was on a chattel, its liability to the plaintiff is easy to establish. The Restatement of Torts rule recited in Moody v. Martin Motor Co. makes an independent contractor who negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another subject to the same liability as a negligent manufacturer.20 The plaintiff’s theory can vary, because equitable implied indemnity under § 886B may rest on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, and the relief available differs with the theory.21 A finding that the hirer was itself negligent toward the plaintiff, say in failing to inspect, establishes joint liability to that plaintiff and nothing more. The rule that protects the plaintiff and the rule that allocates the loss between the defendants serve different purposes, and the clause confirms the point by treating a negligent failure to discover as compatible with indemnity.22
The third question separates the hirer who missed a defect from the hirer who saw it. The clause covers an indemnitee who “innocently or negligently failed to discover” the defect, so carelessness alone does not defeat indemnity.23 Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc. supports the same view. As between an installer and a supplier, it is the supplier’s duty to supply the correct part, and an installer may rely on that duty where the part actually fits and appears correct in all respects, in which case the installer should be entitled to indemnity.24 The opinion also quotes a restitution rule that denies recovery to a party that, “after discovery of the danger,” acquiesced in the continuation of the condition.25 The rule was written for dangerous conditions, but its logic extends: a party who knew of the defect and left it in place has not merely failed to discover it.
Two tempting answers are wrong. The store’s missed inspection does not defeat indemnity, because the clause covers a negligent failure to discover. And the fact that both defendants answer to the patron does not turn the claim into contribution, because the allocation turns on whose work created the hazard.
The clause as written speaks of a failure to discover, and this store discovered. The principle that withholds recovery from a party who acquiesced after discovery points toward denying indemnity or sharply limiting it.26 How far the store’s knowing inaction reduces its recovery depends on the fault rules examined later in this chapter. Those rules matter even where the ground is met. The traditional result is all-or-nothing, as when East Penn shifted the burden entirely to the manufacturer. Some courts apportion negligence-based indemnity by relative fault, and Schneider adopted that partial approach for claims premised on negligence, dropping the separate inquiry into active and passive negligence.27
Dangerous Conditions Created
A third ground applies where the indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels, both the indemnitor and the indemnitee were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect.29 The clause is built like the defective-work clause, with the same joint liability and the same tolerance for the indemnitee’s oversight, but it points at a different object. The defective-work clause asks what the contractor delivered. This clause asks what hazard the contractor made. A dangerous condition is a hazard in the physical setting: an open trench, an unguarded opening in a floor, a structure left standing in an unsafe state. Shoddy work often leaves a hazard behind, so the two clauses overlap. A fact pattern that stresses the product or finished work calls for the first, and one that stresses a danger the contractor created and left in place calls for this one.
The rationale comes from comparing the parties’ roles. The restitution rule quoted in Tolbert gives relief to a party who became liable with another because of its negligent failure to make safe a dangerous condition of land or chattels that “was created by the misconduct of the other or which, as between the two, it was the other’s duty to make safe.”30 Where the contractor made the hazard, the hirer’s lapse is that it failed to find and correct someone else’s creation. The contractor’s wrong is the greater, and leaving the whole loss with the hirer would let the contractor’s own liability to the plaintiff be discharged at the hirer’s expense.
The court in Schneider held that the plaintiff’s allegations stated a claim for recovery against Rissler for creating a dangerous condition that Schneider failed to discover.31 It added that equitable implied indemnity under § 886B may rest on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, and that the relief available differs with the theory.32
Otero v. Jordon Restaurant Enterprises shows the passive indemnitee at its clearest. A contractor erected bleachers, and the city had issued the construction permit. The court applied the distinction drawn in Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc.: creating a dangerous condition is active negligence, and failing to discover and remedy it is passive. The party that failed to discover is entitled to indemnification from the party that created the condition because, as between the two, the far greater responsibility is the creator’s.33 The city stood even further from the hazard. It did not inspect the bleachers after they were erected, did not control the premises, supplied no equipment or materials, and did no more than give the contractor the opportunity to build by issuing a permit to which the contractor was not entitled. The court held its negligence, if any, entirely passive and minimal compared with the negligence of the party that created the dangerous condition.34
The opinion also identifies, by their absence, facts that would have raised the city’s fault: inspecting the work, controlling the premises, supplying equipment or materials, and knowing that the contractor had done shoddy work before.35 A hirer that supplies materials or inspects the work stands closer to the hazard than the city did.
Whether a hirer reaches the passive position can turn on how the plaintiff framed the case against it. The Hardy opinion describes a dispute in which J & L argued that every theory the plaintiff advanced charged Leonard with active negligence, so that any verdict against Leonard would rest on Leonard’s own active negligence and defeat indemnity.36 The contest it records still decides these cases. Either the verdict could rest on a mere failure to discover a hazard the contractor created, or it necessarily rests on the hirer’s own conduct.
Village of Portland, discussed earlier, shows where the contest usually turns. A village that knew of a dangerous condition or could have discovered it by inspection was held actively negligent and denied indemnity.37 That result sits uneasily beside a clause that treats even a negligent failure to discover as compatible with indemnity, and beside Otero’s rule that failing to discover and remedy a hazard is passive.38 The section on failure to discover returns to the tension.
Contractual Duty to Protect
The last ground applies where the indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to protect it against the liability to the third person.40 The grounds above ask what the contractor did to produce the plaintiff’s harm: whether its conduct was the only source of the hirer’s liability, whether its work was defective, or whether it created the hazard. This ground asks what the contractor promised the hirer. Between a hirer and a contractor, such a duty most naturally comes from the contract, in an express indemnity clause under which the contractor agrees to bear claims arising from the work, often paired with a requirement that the contractor carry liability insurance.
The right to be indemnified may be express, as in a contractual provision, or implied, and the two differ in the source of the obligation.41 Implied indemnity arises where a promise to indemnify can be implied from the relationship between the parties, and it has its roots in restitution.42 In the grounds covered earlier, the law supplies the promise because fairness requires it, so the hirer must prove the facts that trigger it, such as its merely vicarious position or its innocent failure to discover a defect. Under this ground the parties supplied the promise themselves, and the contractor’s liability to the hirer rests on its own bargain. How a particular clause is worded and read is a question of contract law, which this chapter leaves aside. What matters here is that a promise to protect gives the hirer a ground that does not depend on proving an equitable one.
A careful hirer drafts for the clause because the implied route is sensitive to fault. Illinois courts, following Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., limit implied indemnity in defective-product cases to indemnitees who were not negligent or otherwise at fault in causing the loss, because an indemnitee at fault should not shift the entire loss to others.43 That limit is stricter than the Restatement clauses, which tolerate a negligent failure to discover. A hirer relying on equity alone must litigate whether it was merely passive, whether it should have found the defect, and how far its own conduct contributed, questions the sections below take up. An express promise settles the allocation in advance, while the parties are negotiating and nobody yet knows who will be hurt.
Collectibility is the second reason to draft for the clause, and it explains the insurance requirement. Tracy’s lawyer should include a clause requiring evidence that Hepburn is fully insured, so that the right of indemnity actually protects Tracy from absorbing losses caused by Hepburn’s negligence.44 Principals cannot escape liability for negligence in performing explicit or implicit contractual obligations by delegating them to an independent contractor, because a contrary rule would create an enormous incentive to delegate to an insolvent one.45 The hirer therefore cannot walk away from the plaintiff’s judgment, and a thinly capitalized contractor leaves the hirer holding the loss.
Price is the third reason. Where the owner knows he is avoiding a potential liability, the contractor knows that he is assuming it, and the cost of insuring against tort liability is considered in setting the price of the work.46 The hirer pays for the protection openly, and the contractor prices the risk into the job.
On an exam stem, look for a promise before reaching for the equitable grounds. A contract in which the contractor promises to indemnify the hirer supplies the duty to protect, and the hirer’s claim then does not depend on proving an equitable ground such as innocent failure to discover. The plaintiff is a stranger to the contract and can still sue the hirer; what the promise changes is who ultimately pays. Without a promise, the hirer is back on the grounds taught above, with all of their fault limits.