Concept
Fault Limits on Indemnity
Indemnity between the hirer and the contractor
Fault Limits on Indemnity
The Restatement's defective-work and dangerous-condition grounds both reach an indemnitee that "innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect."1 Those words forgive one kind of carelessness, a lapse in finding the contractor's mistake, and they say nothing about a hirer whose fault goes further. A hirer may have picked a contractor known for shoddy work, dictated an unsafe method, or kept control of the job and mishandled it. Each of those contributions weakens the case for shifting the loss, because a party that fails to discover a condition is indemnified on the premise that, as between the two, the far greater responsibility lies with the party that created it.2
Jurisdictions differ on how much fault a hirer may have and still shift its loss, and on whether the shift is total or proportional. Three questions sort the cases that follow:
- Does the jurisdiction still ask whether the hirer's negligence was active or passive, and where do the hirer's facts fall?
- Does it divide a negligence-based loss by relative fault, or does it give the hirer all of the loss or none of it?
- Did the hirer commit negligence of its own, so that part of what it paid was never borrowed from the contractor's tort?
The first two questions describe rival rules for one problem: what a jurisdiction does when a hirer with some fault of its own seeks to shift its payment. The third asks what the payment consists of. A hirer's own negligence creates a liability separate from the one the law attaches to it on the contractor's account, so raise that question on every set of facts. The traditional rule comes first, because the comparative rule was developed to soften it.
Active Versus Passive Fault
Some jurisdictions measure a hirer's fault with an older, more demanding test that asks whether its negligence was active or passive. As Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing and Drain states the test, conduct is active when the party seeking indemnity personally took part in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or failed to perform a precise duty it owed. Conduct is passive when that party fails to discover and remedy a dangerous situation created by the negligence or wrongdoing of another.3
The classification decides the whole result, because traditional indemnity shifts a loss completely or not at all. A passive hirer recovers its entire payment from the contractor. A hirer whose negligence is active, or in pari delicto (negligent "in an equal degree" with the other party), recovers none of it.4 New Mexico adopted these tests in the 1940s and still follows them, even after adopting comparative negligence.5
The test descends from the common-law bar on contribution. That bar left a payer to carry an entire judgment alone, however slight its fault, so courts first used indemnity to move the whole loss off a party held only vicariously liable. They then extended it to a party who was somewhat at fault but far less culpable than the other, whose negligence could be called passive beside the other's active.6 The label does an apportionment's work without permitting any division. A slightly careless hirer and a grossly careless one can land on the same side of the line, and the line itself is not always easy to draw.7 The comparative approach, taken up next, replaces that cliff with a division.
Michigan's cases, as one opinion recounts them, show where the label falls. In one, a village sought indemnity from a telephone company that helped create a dangerous condition that injured a child. The court denied the village indemnity for two reasons: its negligence was active, because it knew of the condition or could have found it by inspection, and that negligence combined with the company's malfeasance to cause the injury.8 In another, a motorist's vehicle fell into an excavation, and the city recovered from the general contractor on their express agreement. The general contractor then won common-law indemnity from the subcontractor, because it had no control over the work and was not guilty of active negligence.9 Each payer's own conduct made the difference. The general contractor stood outside the work, and its liability grew out of the subcontractor's omission. The village could have found the condition by inspecting.
A New Mexico opinion draws the line elsewhere. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Amrep, it treats creating a dangerous condition as active negligence and failing to discover and remedy that condition as passive, so the party that failed to discover is entitled to indemnification from the party that created it.10 Set beside the Michigan village, the two formulations treat a missed hazard differently. Michigan called the village's negligence active in part because inspection could have revealed the condition. The Amrep formulation puts a failure to discover and remedy on the passive side. A hirer that actually saw the hazard and let it stand is active under both, since New Mexico's active category reaches knowledge or acquiescence. The disagreement concerns the hirer that could have seen the hazard and did not.
A jurisdiction that labels a discoverable hazard active applies a stricter rule than the Restatement does. The Restatement's defective-work and dangerous-condition clauses list a negligent failure to discover among the covered states of mind, so a hirer that merely missed what a closer look would have found still fits them.11 On an exam, identify which test the jurisdiction applies before answering, because the Restatement question and the active-passive question can yield opposite results on the same facts.
Illinois restricts full indemnity from a different direction. In Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., the Illinois court limited implied indemnity in a defective-products case to an indemnitee that was not negligent or otherwise at fault in causing the loss.12 A party without fault may rightfully shift its entire liability to the truly responsible party, the court reasoned, but fairness forbids a party whose own negligence contributed to the injury from shifting the entire loss to others.13 That rule draws its line at any fault, a stricter line than active fault, and a hirer whose only fault was a negligent failure to discover would apparently fall on the wrong side of it. Contribution is the separate right that divides a loss among joint tortfeasors according to each one's relative fault.14
Comparative Partial Indemnity
In Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court modified the all-or-nothing rule for equitable implied indemnity actions premised on a negligence theory of recovery. It began from Restatement commentary recognizing that influential state courts have developed a doctrine of "partial indemnity," with each party's proportion of responsibility depending on relative percentages of fault. It then gave two reasons for following them, sound policy and the legislature's acceptance of comparative fault in Wyoming. Comparative fault measures each party's share of responsibility for an injury as a percentage and allocates liability accordingly. The modification, the court added, also removes the confusing separation of active and passive negligence from the relative fault determination.16 The last subsection showed why that separation needed removing: it turned a question of degree into a question of category.
The traditional rule suited a legal setting that could not divide a loss between wrongdoers. At common law there was no contribution among tortfeasors, and courts used indemnity to soften the bar, first by shifting the whole loss from a party held only vicariously liable and then by extending indemnity to a party somewhat at fault but far less culpable.17 Indemnity gave one party everything or nothing because the law offered no way to give anyone a part. Where a jurisdiction compares fault in percentages, that limitation disappears and the all-or-nothing result becomes the defect. A hirer that shares the blame recovers everything if its lapse is called passive and nothing, even for the contractor's share, if the lapse is called active. Apportionment ties each party's burden to its responsibility and makes the label unnecessary.
Under partial indemnity, the hirer recovers the portion of the loss attributable to the contractor, and the portion attributable to its own negligence stays with it. A negligent failure to inspect, which the Restatement's clauses treat as compatible with indemnity, becomes a share of fault that reduces the recovery without ending it.18 Those clauses still decide whether indemnity is available at all. Schneider itself treated the allegations before it as stating claims on both: one against a supplier of a defective chattel and one against a party that created a dangerous condition, each a hazard Schneider allegedly failed to discover.19 Partial indemnity then governs how much the hirer recovers.
A jurisdiction that sorts the same facts by label reaches a more extreme result: the hotel recovers the entire $300,000 if its missed inspection is called passive and nothing if the court calls it active. Percentages replace that cliff with a slope, so a slightly careless hirer and a grossly careless one no longer receive the same answer.
The modification serves one kind of claim. Schneider observed that equitable implied indemnity under § 886B may rest on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, and it adopted partial indemnity for actions premised on a negligence theory.20 A fault comparison fits a claim that sets two negligent parties side by side. When an exam stem presents a different theory, check how the jurisdiction treats it before applying any percentages. The theory of liability is therefore the first thing to identify when a stem raises indemnity in a jurisdiction that has adopted this approach.
The same logic answers a question an essay is likely to ask: what does a purely vicarious hirer recover in a comparative-fault jurisdiction?
The percentages in the hotel scene compare two parties' fault. The store scene has one party's fault and a loss the law attached to the store only because of the contractor's tort. Indemnity historically gave a complete shift to a party held only vicariously liable, and that full shift remains the answer for such a hirer.21 Illinois likewise lets an indemnitee without fault shift its entire liability to the truly responsible party.22 The tempting error is to carry the percentage method into every indemnity case because the jurisdiction has adopted it. The method needs two fault-bearing parties, and a purely vicarious hirer is one party carrying a borrowed liability.
A somewhat negligent hirer fares differently in each of the jurisdictions discussed. New Mexico continues to apply the active/passive and in pari delicto tests, so the hirer gets everything or nothing according to the label.23 Illinois limits implied indemnity in a defective-products case to an indemnitee that was not at fault, and the remedy that divides a loss by relative fault there is contribution, a separate right.24 Wyoming gives the hirer the contractor's percentage of the payment, a result that resembles contribution but arrives inside the indemnity action.25 Treat the choice among them as a jurisdictional one.
The Hirer's Own Negligence
The Restatement's indemnity grounds reach a hirer that "innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect" in the contractor's work or in the dangerous condition the contractor created.27 Those words cover one narrow kind of hirer fault, a lapse in finding someone else's mistake. They say nothing about the other ways a hirer can be careless in its own right: choosing a contractor badly, instructing it badly, or running its own part of the job badly. Each of those is liability for the hirer's own conduct, and the grounds for indemnity, which exist to move a borrowed liability, do not reach it. The first task in any indemnity problem is therefore a sorting step: decide how much of what the hirer paid is borrowed from the contractor's tort and how much is its own.
Fairness explains the sorting step. A hirer that was negligent in its own right paid part of the judgment on a debt it owed in its own name. In the defective-products setting, Illinois put the principle this way: a party without fault may rightfully shift its entire liability to the truly responsible party, but if the party seeking indemnity was at fault in causing the injury, fairness dictates that it not shift the entire loss to others.28
Plaintiffs rarely leave the hirer's conduct unexamined. An injured plaintiff will frequently assert both a vicarious theory against the hirer and a claim that the hirer was negligent in connection with the work. The two bases must be kept apart, because the hirer answers for its own conduct even where no vicarious basis exists.29 The direct failings form a short, familiar set, and a fact pattern usually signals one of them with a single detail:
- Choosing a contractor who is clearly unqualified for the work, or failing to use reasonable care to find one who is competent, experienced, careful, and properly equipped.
- Failing to insist on the safety precautions that a foreseeable danger calls for, or specifying that the work be done in an unsafe manner.
- Failing to supervise the contractor properly.
- Performing negligently any part of the work over which the hirer retained control.
- Failing to inspect completed work where reasonable care called for an inspection.
Each item is liability for the hirer's own negligence, independent of any rule of vicarious liability.30 A hirer that gives improper directions or equipment, or fails to stop an unreasonably dangerous practice that comes to its attention, has combined its own negligence with the contractor's. That is ordinary concurrent negligence, not vicarious liability.31
Retained control is the direct failing most often hidden in an exam stem. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, a hirer that entrusts work to a contractor but retains control of any part of it is liable for physical harm to those whose safety it owes a duty to protect, if the harm results from its failure to exercise that control with reasonable care.32 The hirer need not control the work so fully that the contractor becomes its servant. A supervisory power to direct the order of the work or to forbid dangerous methods is enough, provided the hirer uses it carefully.33 A bare general right to supervise, receive reports, make suggestions, or alter the plans does not qualify when those powers concern only the quality of the work. The control must reach the manner of performance or the safety of the work.34 The Restatement Third likewise hinges direct liability for work entrusted to an independent contractor on retained control, and it separately retains vicarious liability in listed situations such as abnormally dangerous activities, peculiar-risk activity, and precautions required by statute.35
These failings interact with the indemnity grounds in different ways. A failure to inspect is the one the Restatement clauses absorb: it gives the plaintiff a direct claim against the hirer, yet the clauses count a negligent failure to discover as compatible with indemnity.36 Instructions that dictate an unsafe method, a retained power over safety that is mishandled, and tolerance of a practice the hirer knows is unsafe are affirmative contributions or acquiescence, so they fall outside what "failed to discover" describes. The consequence depends on the fault rules from the preceding subsections. Where courts ask whether the hirer's negligence was active or passive, conduct of that kind is active and indemnity is denied entirely. Where courts apportion by relative fault, the hirer's percentage stays with the hirer and only the contractor's percentage shifts.
An exam stem that reports a contractor's negligence and a hirer's payment invites a flat claim for full indemnity, and the sorting step tests that claim.
The first scene shows a payment that is entirely borrowed, so the indemnity claim is complete. The second shows a payment with an own-fault component, so the claim shrinks or disappears. Both hirers are answerable to the plaintiff on the same kind of judgment, and only the hirer's own conduct separates the two results.