Concept
Kinds of Negligent Conduct
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Kinds of Negligent Conduct
The Restatement divides a plaintiff's contributory negligence into two kinds. Clause (a) covers an intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to a danger created by the defendant's negligence, a danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know about. Clause (b) covers conduct that, in other respects, falls short of the standard a reasonable person should meet to protect himself from harm.1 The earlier sections of this chapter fixed the yardstick for the plaintiff's conduct. This section asks what conduct falls below it, and clause (b) answers as a residual category that takes in whatever shortfall clause (a) does not describe.
The plaintiff's state of mind separates the two. Clause (a) requires that the plaintiff know of the danger, or have reason to know of it, and then deliberately meet it, and the choice must also be unreasonable. Clause (b) covers the rest, including the inattentive plaintiff who never perceived the danger at all. The split also shapes the defendant's proof. For a lapse, the defendant shows what a reasonable person would have noticed or done. For a knowing exposure, the defendant shows what the plaintiff knew and then shows that the choice was unreasonable.
Whichever clause applies, the conduct must also be a legally contributing cause of the harm, because contributory negligence is conduct that falls below the standard the plaintiff should meet for his own protection and that cooperates with the defendant's negligence in bringing about the harm.2 The careless lapse comes first below. The knowing exposure follows it and resembles a defense with a similar name, assumption of risk, in which a plaintiff who understands a danger and chooses to meet it can be barred from recovery.3 The two defenses overlap on some facts, and assumption of risk is a distinct doctrine, so this section treats knowing exposure only as one way a plaintiff can fail to protect himself. All of this operates within the common-law bar. A jurisdiction that adopts comparative negligence must also decide, among other things, what becomes of ameliorating doctrines like last clear chance, as the Tennessee Supreme Court had to when it made that change.4
Careless Failure to Protect Oneself
Clause (b) describes conduct that, in respects other than the knowing exposure of clause (a), falls short of the standard a reasonable person should meet to protect himself from harm.5 Clause (a) is limited to a plaintiff who knows or has reason to know of a danger and unreasonably chooses to meet it, so clause (b) takes in everything else, including the plaintiff who never perceived the danger at all. The yardstick is the objective one taught earlier: what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have noticed and done, and not what this plaintiff happened to notice. Negligence toward others is a failure to use due care for their safety, and this clause describes a failure to use due care for one's own.6
Clause (b) fault turns up in two places. A plaintiff may fail to discover a risk that a reasonable person would have discovered, or may discover the risk and then encounter it carelessly.7 The first is the more frequent, since contributory negligence often involves a plaintiff's failure to notice and appreciate a danger.8 The law assigns these lapses to the plaintiff because only he controls them. He decides where to look, how fast to move, and how carefully to place a hand or a foot, and a reasonable person adjusts all three to the conditions in front of him. Under the complete bar taught earlier, a lapse of this kind defeats the claim whenever it is also a legal cause of the harm, even if the plaintiff was only slightly negligent and the defendant was primarily at fault.9
Butterfield v. Forrester illustrates the first pattern. The plaintiff was proved to be riding as fast as his horse could go through the streets of Derby when he struck an obstruction in the road. Justice Bayley reasoned that had he used ordinary care he must have seen the obstruction, so the accident appeared to happen entirely from his own fault.10 Nothing in that reasoning suggests the rider knew of the obstruction. His fault was speed and inattention, which kept him from perceiving what was there to be perceived, and that is clause (b) in its plainest form.
A health spa case shows what changes when the plaintiff has been given reason to look. A member slipped on a foreign substance in the shower. She had used the spa on several occasions and had heard that the showers were slippery, filthy, and dirty, yet she exposed herself to the risk without protesting and without ascertaining the condition of the showers that day, and she was held contributorily negligent.11 The rider's danger was in plain view, so ordinary attention would have revealed it. The member's danger may not have been visible, but what she had heard put her on notice, and a reasonable member who had been warned would have checked before stepping in. Facts like hers sit close to the border with clause (a), because she had reason to suspect the danger even though she did not know of the particular spill. Either clause can be argued, and the label matters less than the failure to use care once on notice.
The same logic fixes the limit of clause (b). A plaintiff cannot be careless about a danger that reasonable care would not have revealed, because no reasonable person guards against a hazard he has no way to perceive. Absent notice to the contrary, a spectator can usually assume that the premises are reasonably safe,12 and a shopper or other visitor who has been given no warning stands in the same position. The spa member lost because she had notice. A member with none could have relied on the assumption. Without this limit, the complete bar would take the whole claim from ordinary people for risks that only the defendant knew about or controlled.
When an exam stem shows a plaintiff hurt by a hazard he did not see, the question to ask is whether a reasonable person in his position would have seen it or been put on guard.
Consumer conduct is a prominent issue in products cases, because product accidents result more often from consumer misconduct than from product defects.13 In Parris v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., a spray painter claimed the manufacturer had not warned him that inhaling epoxy fumes could cause asthma, and a jury could find him contributorily negligent for often not wearing the mask his employer furnished.14
Knowing Exposure to Danger
Clause (a) makes it contributory negligence for a plaintiff intentionally and unreasonably to expose himself to a danger created by the defendant's negligence when he knows or has reason to know of that danger.16 Clause (b) describes an oversight, in which the plaintiff misses a danger or handles it carelessly. This clause describes a decision. The plaintiff has the danger in view, or has facts that put it in view, and goes ahead for reasons of his own. The intent runs to the exposure and not to the injury, since the plaintiff means to cross the floor or stay in the car and expects to get through unharmed. What the clause asks is whether a choice made with the danger in mind was a reasonable one.
The first three questions establish an informed choice, and the fourth decides whether that choice was negligent. As with every form of contributory negligence, the exposure must also be a legally contributing cause of the plaintiff's harm.17
The first two questions fix the facts that make the choice informed, and their order matters because a plaintiff who is hurt before he knows anything is wrong has made no choice at all. An unsuspecting passerby injured by an explosion in the street recovers, since it is negligent to explode firecrackers in the immediate vicinity of others.18 A plaintiff who sees the fireworks and chooses to stand next to the person setting them off has made an informed choice, and a decision of that kind will virtually always be unreasonable.19 The danger must also be a specific one. A pedestrian who walks along a sidewalk knowing that some drivers are careless has not exposed himself to the danger created when a particular driver veers onto the sidewalk, because walking there is entirely reasonable and general awareness that others are sometimes negligent does not make him the taker of every risk of ordinary life.20
The clause reaches a plaintiff who has reason to know of the danger as well as one who actually knows, and the second phrase closes an easy escape. A plaintiff who holds facts that would make the danger plain to a reasonable person cannot avoid the clause by saying he never drew the inference. What the clause still requires is information pointing to the danger. A plaintiff who had nothing to put him on notice, and who would have found the hazard only by looking harder, has failed to discover it, and that failure is judged under clause (b).21
The fourth question does most of the work, because knowledge alone proves nothing. People run known risks every day, and the reasonable person avoids only the risks that are unreasonable.22 Contributory negligence of this kind arises when the risk is clearly unreasonable in relation to the benefit the plaintiff sought.23 Driving a car with bad brakes may be reasonable when the purpose is to get a heart attack victim to a hospital and unreasonable when the purpose is to reach a poker game on time.24 The danger is identical on both trips and only the reason differs, which is why the reason carries the analysis. If knowledge alone settled the question, a plaintiff forced to choose among poor options would forfeit the claim whichever option he chose.
The unreasonable side is easy to recognize once the purpose is on the table. A shopper who sees that the store has just waxed part of the floor, but wants a box of cereal and crosses the wet area anyway, has met a negligently created risk for a convenience that is unlikely to justify it.25
Even when the choice is reasonable, the way the plaintiff carries it out is judged separately. Had Lindqvist hurried down the stairs two at a time, she would have made a sound choice in an unreasonable manner, and that shortfall would be judged under clause (b), because contributory negligence can lie in the manner in which a known risk is encountered as well as in the decision to encounter it.26
A passenger who stays aboard a car he knows to have faulty brakes, because he is injured and the ride is the fastest way to reach help, has also run a known risk created by the driver's negligence. The emergency supplies a sufficient reason for staying, so if his decision was reasonable under the circumstances, contributory negligence does not bar his recovery.27
The facts that satisfy this clause often describe a second defense as well. A plaintiff who knowingly encounters a risk the defendant's negligence created is the subject of what courts call secondary assumption of risk, and where his choice was unreasonable, the same conduct is both contributory negligence and assumption of risk, either of which sufficed at common law to bar recovery.28 The overlap runs out on the reasonable side. A reasonable choice is not negligent, so contributory negligence is unavailable, yet the common-law assumption defense rested on free choice and not on fault, and it could still be raised against the passenger in the example above.29 A lawyer facing such facts flags both defenses and keeps them apart. This one asks whether the plaintiff's choice was unreasonable, and the other asks whether he knowingly and voluntarily accepted the risk, a question taught elsewhere.
The label also invites an error inside the contributory negligence analysis, because calling knowing exposure assumption of risk can suggest that knowledge alone makes the plaintiff negligent. Ordinarily only the conscious taking of an unreasonable risk is a defense.30