Concept
Legal Cause of the Plaintiff's Harm
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Legal Cause of the Plaintiff's Harm
A plaintiff's lapse in self-protection does not defeat his claim unless it also helped bring about the harm. Contributory negligence is conduct that falls below the standard the plaintiff owes to himself and that is a legally contributing cause, co-operating with the defendant's negligence in producing the injury.1 A defendant who proves only the lapse has proved half the defense.
Two filters decide whether the lapse counts as a legal cause. The first is factual: the lapse must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.2 The second limits scope: the harm must result from one of the hazards that made the conduct negligent.3 A plaintiff whose carelessness fails either filter keeps his claim.
Substantial Factor Causation
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 465, a plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if, but only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and no rule restricts his responsibility for it.4 Two conditions must therefore be met together. The first is factual: did the plaintiff's carelessness make a real difference to how the injury came about? The second is legal: does some rule, such as the hazard limit in the next subsection, withhold responsibility even though the carelessness mattered in fact?5 This subsection takes up the factual condition.
Courts answer the factual question with the rules they apply to the defendant. The causal relation between the plaintiff's negligent conduct and his harm is determined by the same rules that determine the causal relation between a defendant's negligence and harm to others,6 so the substantial factor test that governs the defendant's negligence governs the plaintiff's as well.7 The defense therefore needs no causation doctrine of its own. It also means the plaintiff's lapse can be one cause among several. When two parties are negligent and one is hurt, the case is an ordinary multiple-cause case in which each party's negligence is among the causes.8 The lapse need not be the only cause, because the definition asks only that it co-operate with the defendant's negligence in bringing about the harm.9
Each half of the rule has its own justification. The common-law bar takes the entire claim, so its logic rests on a causal link: a lapse that changed nothing about how the accident happened says nothing about who should bear the loss. The word substantial guards the same flank. If any contribution at all sufficed, a trivial lapse could defeat a claim that the defendant's negligence otherwise established. Borrowing the defendant-side rules serves a different end: courts keep one body of causation law, and the defense stays symmetrical with the negligence claim it answers.
The same reasoning explains a jury instruction that courts have corrected. In Bahm v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co., the trial court told the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if his conduct directly and proximately contributed “in any degree” to the accident. The reviewing court held the instruction erroneous: the phrase had to go, so that the jury would understand that the plaintiff's conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the accident.10 An instruction in that form lets a jury bar a plaintiff for a contribution too slight to count as substantial. A correct instruction asks the jury to find a lapse and then to find that the lapse was a substantial factor in the harm.
On an exam, a stem that sets a plaintiff's carelessness beside the defendant's negligence usually turns on one causal question: would the plaintiff's care have changed the outcome?
Okafor's inattention is a lapse and a substantial factor, so the defense is established against him, subject to the limits on the bar covered later in this chapter. Delgado's inattention is a lapse and nothing more. Had she been watching, the collision would have happened exactly as it did, so the defense has no causal link to attach to, and her claim goes forward on the ordinary negligence analysis.
Causation must still be proved when a defendant raises contributory negligence, and the medical cases show how that proof fails. In Zak v. Zifferblatt, the defense failed because no expert testified that the patient's delay in returning to treatment contributed to the injury.11 In Hofstrom v. Share, a patient had not returned immediately to the emergency room, as the physician had instructed, when her condition worsened. The court treated that failure as irrelevant because the defendant's experts did not establish that it was a substantial factor in her injuries.12 One lapse is a delay and the other disregards an instruction, yet both defenses fail at the same step. Whether delay worsened a medical condition is a medical question, and in both cases the expert proof of that link was missing.
Those results follow from who must prove what. The burden of establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence rests on the defendant,13 and contributory negligence includes the causal link.14 The defendant must therefore prove both that the plaintiff fell below the standard for self-protection and that the lapse was a substantial factor in the harm. The plaintiff need not disprove the link. A later section of this chapter returns to the burden.
A finding that the plaintiff's lapse was a substantial factor establishes only that it was one of the causes of the harm. What the law does next is a policy choice: the common law bars the claim, comparative fault reduces the recovery, and strict liability would hold the defendant fully liable anyway.15 Because the causal inquiry comes first in each system, the analysis in this subsection carries over to jurisdictions that have abandoned the bar.
Scope of the Hazard
Contributory negligence reaches only the kind of harm that made the plaintiff's conduct careless. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 468 says so directly: the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care for his own safety does not bar his recovery unless his harm results from one of the hazards that make his conduct negligent.17 The defense is usually limited strictly to the risk that made the conduct negligent.18
This is the second causal filter, and it asks a different question from the first. The substantial-factor requirement asks whether the lapse was a real part of the explanation for the harm. The hazard limit asks whether the harm is the kind that made the lapse a lapse. The two questions differ because conduct is rarely careless in the abstract. It is careless because of particular dangers that a reasonable person would avoid, and the rule confines the plaintiff's responsibility to those dangers. A plaintiff who was careless about one danger and is hurt by another has not suffered the harm that made his conduct wrong, so the bar does not reach that injury, even though he was negligent and in the wrong place.
A worker on an unsafe platform shows the filter at work. Standing there is careless because of the danger of falling, so a fall results from the very hazard that made his conduct negligent. If an adjacent wall collapses on him instead, he is not contributorily negligent with respect to those injuries.19 The same careless act defeats one claim and leaves the other intact, and the difference lies entirely in which risk materialized.
Decided cases confine the defense the same way, reading proximate cause narrowly as applied to the risks the plaintiff exposed himself to through his own negligent act.20 In Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., the plaintiff's negligence reached the danger of slipping off an unguarded icy ledge but not the danger of a wall collapsing on him, which is the platform-and-wall distinction in a reported decision.21 Furukawa v. Uoshio Ogawa draws the line finer, finding negligence as to the danger of falling but not as to falling upon a hook.22 Courts thus describe the hazard by the specific danger and not by the general category of event, since a fall and a fall onto a hook are different dangers. An exam answer should name the particular risk that made the conduct careless before comparing it with the injury, because a hazard described broadly enough would swallow the limit.
The bar is tied to the hazard because of what the bar does. It takes the whole claim, so its justification must be that the plaintiff was careless about the very harm he suffered. Negligence analysis weighs a precaution against the risk it would address,23 and the precaution the platform worker skipped was a precaution against falling. Charging him with the wall's collapse would impose the full cost of the complete bar for a danger his lapse never created. Without the limit, a defendant could point to any lapse that put the plaintiff within reach of any injury and escape liability for harms the plaintiff's care was never meant to prevent. Tying the bar to the hazard keeps the penalty proportionate to the fault.
In both versions Reyes's choice to stop in the lane is a but-for cause of the harm, since had he been on the shoulder, the vehicle or the tree would not have struck him. In the first version, the harm is the very danger that made the stop careless, a vehicle arriving around the curve, so the defense is established, subject to the limits on the bar covered later. In the second, the tree has nothing to do with the danger of oncoming traffic. The harm falls outside the hazard, and the defense fails even though the lapse is identical.
The hazard limit also explains a recurring medical rule. In a malpractice suit, the patient's antecedent negligence is not a damage-reducing factor, because a person who has negligently injured herself is still entitled to non-negligent medical treatment.24 Her carelessness concerned the risk of getting hurt in the first place, while the harm she complains of is the worsening caused by the treatment, so the hazard that made her earlier conduct careless did not produce that harm. Fault after treatment begins is different. A patient told to return if her pain intensified can be charged with comparative fault for staying away for an extended period.25 As the cases in the previous subsection show, a defendant who relies on such a lapse must still prove that it contributed to the injury.