Concept
Limits on the Bar
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Limits on the Bar
The Restatement writes the first limit into the bar itself: except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable for the plaintiff's harm.1 It also states the exception on its own terms. A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for the harm so caused if, immediately preceding the harm, the stated conditions are met.2
These limits come into play at one point in the analysis: after the defendant has proved every element of the defense. The defendant must show that the plaintiff breached a duty to protect himself and that the breach was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the harm.3 Once the defendant does so, the rules taught so far end the claim. A limit on the bar keeps the claim alive without denying that the plaintiff was careless. It looks elsewhere: to the defendant's final opportunity to prevent the harm, to the seriousness of the defendant's misconduct, or to the kind of duty the defendant broke. Each answers the same unfairness. The bar relieves a negligent defendant of all liability merely because the plaintiff's negligence also caused his own injury,4 and that result is hardest to defend when the defendant had the last chance to avert the harm, acted worse than an ordinarily negligent person, or broke a duty meant to protect people who could not protect themselves.
Three limits follow, in that order. A stem that establishes the plaintiff's lapse and its causal link has not finished the analysis. The next question is whether one of these limits displaces the bar.
Last Clear Chance
A plaintiff whose carelessness put him in danger can recover from a defendant whose later negligence completed the harm, if the Restatement's conditions are met immediately before the harm.5 The complete-bar rule makes the same point in its opening clause.6 Two features of the wording organize the doctrine. The defendant's negligence must be subsequent, coming after the plaintiff's lapse, and the conditions are measured at the moment immediately before the harm, which is later than the plaintiff's own error. The question changes from who created the danger to who could still prevent the harm as it was about to happen.
The doctrine descends from Davies v. Mann. The plaintiff left a donkey on the highway with its forefeet fettered, and the defendant's wagon ran it down.7 The jury was told that fettering the donkey there might be unlawful, yet the action could be maintained if the driver's want of ordinary care was the proximate cause, and that the plaintiff should win if ordinary care by the driver could have avoided the accident.8 The full court declined to disturb the verdict.9 Lord Abinger reasoned that a defendant who by proper care might have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, is liable for the consequences of his negligence, even if the animal was improperly on the road.10
Later courts rationalized that result as a rule: a defendant who had an opportunity to avoid the accident after the plaintiff no longer had one should bear the loss.11 Timing cannot carry the rule alone, because the plaintiff's earlier fault remains a cause of the harm. In the contributory negligence cases, the plaintiff's negligence and the defendant's are both causes in fact and both proximate causes.12 The explanation lies in the doctrine's name. A chance is clear when the danger is open and obvious, and last when the plaintiff can no longer extricate himself. A defendant who holds such a chance can be inferred to know that he alone can prevent the injury, and failing to act on that knowledge is far more blameworthy than ordinary negligence.13 That makes the doctrine a rough comparison of fault inside an all-or-nothing system, and a close relative of the exception for aggravated defendant misconduct in the next subsection.14 The donkey could not move, and the driver was the only party still able to act.
Marisol was helpless, and jurisdictions have not agreed that helplessness is required. Some restricted the doctrine to a plaintiff who was helpless and unable to avoid the danger the defendant's negligence created, while others permitted it if the plaintiff was merely inattentive.15 The split reflects two views of when the plaintiff's own chance to avoid harm ends. A helpless plaintiff has no way left to help himself, so the defendant's opportunity stands alone. An inattentive plaintiff can still avert the harm by looking up, so his chance and the defendant's run side by side until the end. A jurisdiction that insists on helplessness declines to call the defendant's chance last while the plaintiff's own care could still have prevented the harm. One that reaches the inattentive plaintiff holds responsible the defendant who sees such a plaintiff heading into danger and can still stop. In a four-car case, a plaintiff, a defendant, and two friends were driving four cars through a suburban neighborhood at 60 miles per hour when the second and third cars collided. The court held a last-clear-chance instruction unavailable because the plaintiff did not show that he was unconscious of his peril.16 The plaintiff's awareness of the danger mattered to whether the doctrine could apply.
The defendant's side divides as well. Some jurisdictions required that the defendant have actually discovered the plaintiff's helplessness, while others allowed the doctrine if the defendant should have discovered it.17 Actual discovery tracks the reasoning behind the doctrine most closely, because a defendant who saw the danger and let it come to harm made a knowing choice.18 The should-have-discovered version reaches a defendant who was merely careless in failing to look, which moves the exception toward ordinary negligence and makes it available more often. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479 and 480 group these patterns around the nature of the plaintiff's conduct, so the plaintiff's condition is the first fact to establish.19 The few jurisdictions that still follow the common-law bar apply the exception in at least one of its forms, and a problem under the bar must be read for the form that governs.20
For modern decisions untangling the doctrine's forms, see Penn Harris Madison School Corp. v. Howard and WMATA v. Johnson.21 In the WMATA case, on a certified question, the court ruled that the doctrine does not apply to the intentional act of a woman who jumped into the path of an oncoming subway train, in her estate's suit over the operator's negligent failure to stop in time.22 The result fits the Restatement's wording, which addresses a plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to risk; deliberate self-exposure falls outside it.23 The doctrine also runs in one direction. It shields a plaintiff against a defendant's later negligence. A plaintiff who alone had the last chance to avoid the collision gains nothing from it, because his failure to take that chance is the contributory negligence the bar already reaches.
The doctrine is often described as a step in the transition to comparative negligence, but for many years its effect was to freeze that transition rather than hasten it.24 It softened the bar without abandoning the all-or-nothing form: a defendant with the last clear chance pays the whole loss, and a plaintiff without it recovers nothing.25 Where comparative fault has replaced the bar, the doctrine has little left to soften, and the defendant's last opportunity matters instead to the parties' relative fault.26 The final section of this chapter places the bar and its exceptions in today's landscape.
Aggravated Defendant Misconduct
The complete bar gives way again when the defendant's state of mind is the problem. Contributory negligence is generally no defense to a claim based on intentional, willful and wanton, or reckless conduct, because that conduct is so much more blameworthy than the plaintiff's ordinary carelessness.28 The Restatement's statement of the bar writes only last clear chance into its opening clause.29 This limit comes from the common law's separate treatment of intentional and aggravated misconduct, addressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 481 and 482.30 Look for it in the defendant's conduct and the claim pleaded, because the plaintiff's lapse is already established by the time it matters.
Contributory negligence answers a negligence claim by setting the plaintiff's carelessness against the defendant's. Courts treat it as the mirror image of negligence: a failure to use due care for one's own safety matched against a failure to use due care for the safety of others.31 The match assumes faults of the same kind. A defendant who injures someone deliberately, or who knows of a serious danger to others and drives into it, has made a choice about the plaintiff's safety, while the plaintiff has only failed to guard against that choice. A total bar would let the more blameworthy party keep the whole benefit of the victim's lapse. Treating the exception as a rough comparison of the parties' faults explains when it applies and when it does not.32
Intentional torts need the least explanation. An intentional tort is not a negligence claim, so a defense that answers negligence with negligence has nothing to match, and contributory negligence was not a defense to one.33 The same was true of a claim based on willful and wanton misconduct.34 Recklessness is grouped with it. These labels shade into one another, and jurisdictions favor different ones, but each describes a defendant who knows of a serious danger to others and proceeds with conscious indifference. Where the defendant's misconduct reaches that level, ordinary contributory negligence does not bar the claim.35
Gross negligence sits in the middle. It is ordinary negligence carried to a high degree, and extreme carelessness is still inadvertence, so the difference in kind that justifies the exception is missing. Where a jurisdiction draws the line at recklessness, a merely grossly negligent defendant keeps the defense. Jurisdictions are not uniform. Tennessee's decisions before it adopted comparative fault, as described in McIntyre v. Balentine, listed grossly negligent conduct among the exceptions to the bar, alongside intentional conduct, last clear chance, and remote negligence.36 A problem that states the jurisdiction's rule should follow it. One that does not should ask whether the defendant was conscious of the danger.
The exception carries a qualification. A defendant whose conduct was willful and wanton can still invoke the bar if the plaintiff showed willful and wanton disregard for his own safety, because blame of equal degree cancels out.37 A plaintiff's recovery against a reckless defendant is likewise barred if the plaintiff was contributorily reckless.38 The exception depends on a gap between the parties' faults. A plaintiff as blameworthy as the defendant has closed that gap and removed the reason for the exception.
Where comparative fault has replaced the complete bar, the same facts are analyzed differently. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 7 takes the position that comparative fault applies when the defendant's conduct was reckless, so the plaintiff's lapse is weighed in the apportionment and not simply ignored.39 The exception taught here therefore does its independent work in the jurisdictions that keep the common-law bar.
Protective Statutes and Duties
A third limit turns on the kind of duty the defendant broke. Before comparative fault, contributory negligence was usually no defense to the liability created by statutes intended to protect certain classes of persons from dangers against which they are incapable of protecting themselves.41 The list includes school bus laws, child labor laws, laws prohibiting sexual relations with minors, statutes prohibiting the sale of certain articles to minors, and factory acts and other statutes protecting workers.42 Here too the plaintiff's lapse and its causal link are already established. The exception denies the defendant the use of that lapse because of what the violated statute was written to do.
The reasoning follows from the statute's purpose. A school bus statute exists because students cannot be counted on to protect themselves around traffic, so a student's carelessness is the very hazard the statute addresses. If the bar applied, a driver who skipped the required precaution could answer the claim by pointing to the carelessness the precaution was meant to cover, and the statute would fail where it was needed most.
A statutory violation by the defendant does not trigger the exception by itself. Housing codes usually have not been construed to be protective statutes of this type, so a landlord may still raise contributory negligence despite the code violation.43 The contrast lies in purpose. A bus statute assumes that students cannot look after themselves around traffic. A housing code sets standards for the condition of a building, and courts usually have not read it as aimed at people unable to protect themselves. On an exam, apply the exception where the statute plainly protects such a class, and leave the defense in place for ordinary regulatory statutes.
A related idea runs from the duty itself and needs no statute. Where the defendant's duty was to protect a vulnerable person against his own self-abusive or self-destructive acts, and the breach caused the very self-inflicted harm the defendant was supposed to prevent, some courts hold that the plaintiff's contributory fault in causing that harm is no defense.44 Medical cases show both sides of the line. In Argus v. Scheppegrell (La. 1985), a doctor could not defend on the ground that an addicted teenager was at fault in taking the prescribed drugs, because taking the drugs was the very act the doctor had a duty to prevent by refusing the prescription. In Dehn v. Edgecombe (Md. 2005), a vasectomy patient failed to follow post-operative instructions for semen testing, and his contributory negligence was a bar.45 The duty reaches only as far as the act the defendant was charged with preventing.
Where comparative fault has replaced the complete bar, the question changes from whether the defense is available to whether the statute's policy negates it entirely or only reduces recovery. The answer depends on the particular statute and its context, but as a general rule the statutory policy should negate the defense entirely.46 The final section of this chapter places that rule in the landscape of states that have abandoned the bar.