Concept
Origin and Purpose
Last clear chance (exception to the contributory negligence bar)
Last Clear Chance
Origin and Purpose
From the inception of contributory negligence until the 1970s, most American states denied any recovery to a plaintiff whose own negligence was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the injury, however slight that negligence was.1 The rule is often called the Butterfield rule, after Butterfield v. Forrester. There the plaintiff rode as fast as his horse could go through the streets of Derby into an obstruction that ordinary care would have shown him, so the accident appeared to arise entirely from his own fault.2
The rationale for so total a bar was weak. Causal reasoning cannot explain it, because in these cases the plaintiff's negligence and the defendant's negligence are both causes in fact and both proximate causes of the harm. Deterrence cannot explain it either.3 That weakness drove courts and legislatures to find ways around the bar, and two became prominent: last clear chance, and the rule that a defendant whose conduct was willful and wanton cannot invoke the bar.4
The Mississippi Supreme Court stated the first of these in Fuller v. Illinois Central R.R.: the injured party's contributory negligence does not defeat the action if the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the consequence of that negligence. Fuller set that proposition beside its companion. Contributory negligence is no defense when the injury was willfully, wantonly, or recklessly done, or when the defendant's conduct was gross.5
Fuller traced the doctrine to Davies v. Mann, decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1842. The plaintiff there fettered his donkey's forefeet and turned it into the public highway to graze. The defendant's wagon, coming down a slight descent at a 'smartish' pace, ran against the donkey, knocked it down, and killed it under its wheels.6 The plaintiff's own act may have been wrongful, yet the judges still reasoned that the driver was liable. Lord Abinger held that a defendant who might by proper care have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, answers for his negligence even though the animal may have been improperly there. Baron Parke added that the driver was bound to go at a pace likely to prevent mischief. Otherwise, he said, a man could justify driving over goods left on the highway, over a man lying asleep there, or into a carriage on the wrong side of the road.7 English courts began to apply Davies, along with Tuff v. Warman (1858), as the emerging doctrine of last clear chance, to ameliorate the harsh Butterfield rule.8
The words 'last' and 'clear' explain why the doctrine moves the whole loss to the defendant. 'Last' marks timing: the defendant's negligence comes later than the plaintiff's.9 Timing alone cannot justify the shift. The plaintiff's negligence remains a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the harm, and a later lapse is not in itself worse than an earlier one.10 'Clear' supplies what timing lacks. A clear chance is open and obvious. When it is also the last chance, because the plaintiff cannot get out of danger and the defendant knows it, the defendant can see that only he can prevent the injury. A defendant who sees that and does nothing is far more blameworthy than one who was merely careless at the same moment the plaintiff was. That greater blame puts the doctrine beside the willful-and-wanton exception, and it is why the loss falls on the defendant entire.11
The doctrine does not rescue every careless plaintiff. A collision with no late opportunity shows where it stops.
Fuller sits at the other pole. The decedent, a man over seventy, drove his wagon toward a railroad crossing with his head down. He did not stop, look, or listen, and he never saw the oncoming train. The train, a light one, ran thirty minutes late at about forty miles an hour, faster than usual or appropriate. The decedent was in plain view on the track some 660 feet from the crossing, and uncontradicted evidence showed that the engineer could have stopped the light train within 200 feet. The record is silent on what the engineer did or thought when the decedent came into view. The train did not slow, though, and the only signal was a routine whistle about 20 seconds before it struck the wagon and killed him instantly.12 Those facts pose the doctrine's question: once the decedent was plainly on the track, did the engineer have a later opportunity to avoid the harm that he failed to use with reasonable care?
Last clear chance softened the bar without giving up its all-or-nothing character. When the doctrine applies, the plaintiff recovers in full, and when it does not, the plaintiff recovers nothing.13 In the 1970s statutes and judicial decisions began replacing the complete bar with comparative negligence, under which the plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery instead of barring it.14 Last clear chance has therefore been called a transitional doctrine, a way station on the road to comparative negligence, although for many years its effect was to freeze the transition rather than hasten it.15 The opinion in Alvis v. Ribar recounts how the various American jurisdictions made that move, and the sections below on comparative negligence return to it.16
The doctrine's theoretical footing was never settled. Dean Prosser suggested that '[t]he real explanation would appear to be nothing more than a dislike for the defense of contributory negligence, and a rebellion against its application in a group of cases where its hardship is most apparent.'17 Test that suggestion against the greater-blame account above. Does the doctrine state a principled rule about blame, or does it only let courts escape a defense they disliked?
Because the doctrine turns on the defendant's later opportunity, it travels under several names: the discovered-peril, humanitarian, last-opportunity, subsequent-negligence, and supervening-negligence doctrines. In the few jurisdictions where contributory negligence still bars recovery completely, it lets the plaintiff rebut that defense.18 Courts disagreed about its reach. Some limited it to plaintiffs who were helpless and unable to avoid the danger, while others extended it to plaintiffs who were merely inattentive. Some required that the defendant actually discovered the plaintiff's helplessness, while others asked only whether the defendant should have discovered it. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479 and 480 group these patterns around the nature of the plaintiff's conduct,19 and the next sections follow that grouping.