Concept
The Inattentive Plaintiff
Last clear chance (exception to the contributory negligence bar)
The Inattentive Plaintiff
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 480 covers the plaintiff who is not helpless: the careless person on a track who is awake and able to move, and who could have stepped clear at any moment. A plaintiff of that kind, “by the exercise of reasonable vigilance,” could discover the danger the defendant’s negligence created in time to avoid the harm, and the section lets him recover “if, but only if,” the defendant meets its conditions.1 His carelessness has not run its course when the defendant arrives. A glance up at any point before impact would have saved him, so his fault and the defendant’s overlap in time.
The section sets three conditions. The defendant must know of the plaintiff’s situation; must realize, or have reason to realize, that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover the peril in time to avoid the harm; and must thereafter be negligent in failing to use, with reasonable care and competence, a then-existing opportunity to avoid the harm.2 The Reporter’s Note to § 480 says the rule “is generally accepted.” In Zeni v. Anderson, the Michigan Supreme Court repeated that note and then asked whether Michigan’s own cases accepted the rule in application, if not in name. It found evidence of some acceptance.3
The conditions are demanding because the plaintiff’s fault is still running. A merely inattentive plaintiff can change the outcome by looking up, so a defendant who passes someone in plain view may ordinarily expect him to look after his own safety. That expectation gives way only when the defendant has grounds to doubt it. The section therefore asks for a defendant who knows the plaintiff is there and who realizes, or has reason to realize, that the plaintiff is not paying attention. On anything less, the ordinary contributory negligence bar stays in place.
This unit takes the first two conditions in turn, knowledge of the situation and then realization of the inattention. The third, the failure to use the then-existing opportunity, has its own section below.
Actual Knowledge of Situation
The first condition is that the defendant “knows of the plaintiff’s situation.”4 The situation is the set of facts that puts the plaintiff in the path of harm: where he is, what he is doing there, and what is bearing down on him. Because the verb is “knows,” the condition asks what the defendant actually perceived. Proof that a watchful defendant would have perceived the plaintiff does not meet it. The plaintiff must prove the defendant’s awareness, which is a different task from proving that the defendant drove carelessly.
The rule for helpless plaintiffs reads differently, and the contrast marks the point. That rule, § 479(b)(ii), charges a defendant with the plaintiff’s situation if the defendant “would discover the situation and thus have reason to realize the peril, if he were to exercise the vigilance which it is then his duty to the plaintiff to exercise.”5 Section 480(a) contains no such hypothetical about lookout. It says “knows.” The phrase “realizes or has reason to realize” appears only in paragraph (b), where it concerns the plaintiff’s inattention.6 A reason-to-realize standard therefore enters only after the defendant’s actual knowledge of the situation is established. A defendant who merely should have seen the plaintiff has been negligent in the ordinary way, and that negligence is concurrent with the plaintiff’s own.
The reason is easy to see against the ordinary case. When contributory negligence is raised, the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s negligence are both causes in fact and proximate causes of the harm.7 A defendant who only failed to look adds a second cause of the same kind as the plaintiff’s, so the case remains an ordinary one and the bar applies. What lifts a defendant out of that pattern is knowledge. A defendant who sees the plaintiff in peril and goes on has done more than fail to look, as the plaintiff did.
The Michigan cases surveyed in Zeni supply an illustration. In Montgomery v. Lansing City Electric Railway, a plaintiff was injured by a streetcar while marching in a street parade playing a cornet, and testimony indicated that he did not know the car was approaching. The court distinguished his situation from that of a person who attempts to cross in front of a car, observing that the motorman had seen the situation, had apprehended the danger, and, if the plaintiff was to be believed, had done nothing to avoid the accident. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.8 The plaintiff’s ignorance of the car is his inattention. The motorman’s having seen the situation is the knowledge that paragraph (a) requires.
The motorman in Montgomery differs from this driver in the respect that matters: he perceived the plaintiff and the driver did not. A driver who saw the worker from a distance and kept going would satisfy paragraph (a), and the inquiry would move to paragraph (b), which the next subsection takes up.
Each version of the doctrine carries its own proof requirements, and a plaintiff must bring evidence for each one. In Williams v. Harrison, four friends were driving four cars through a suburban neighborhood at 60 m.p.h. when the second and third cars collided, and the court held a last-clear-chance instruction unavailable because the plaintiff did not show that he was unconscious of his peril.9 A plaintiff proceeding under § 480 is likewise held to the section’s conditions. Pleading cannot substitute for proof. In one reported case an amendment adding a further allegation to the plaintiff’s complaint was filed on the day the case came on for trial,10 but an allegation establishes nothing under § 480 until evidence shows what the defendant actually knew.
Realizing the Inattention
The second condition turns from what the defendant saw to what the defendant understood about the plaintiff. The defendant must realize, or have reason to realize, “that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm.”12 Paragraph (a) is met once the defendant perceives the plaintiff’s situation, but perception answers only where the plaintiff is and what is approaching. It does not tell the defendant whether the plaintiff will move. A defendant who sees a person near danger and has every reason to think that person sees it too has satisfied (a) and failed (b), and the plaintiff cannot recover under § 480.
The requirement follows from what an inattentive plaintiff is. He can still escape by looking up, so his carelessness is operating when the defendant arrives, and a defendant who sees a person in plain view may reasonably expect him to look after himself. An expectation that is reasonable cannot be the later fault that outweighs the plaintiff’s. The reliance gives way when the circumstances show it is mistaken: the person is facing away, drifting toward the danger, or ignoring a warning. A defendant who goes on after that is no longer relying on the plaintiff’s self-protection but hoping he will wake up in time. Under the section’s third condition, a failure to act on the realization with the opportunity then available is the defendant’s own negligence.
The contrast the Montgomery court drew is the one paragraph (b) draws. A person who tries to cross in front of a car has presumably seen it, and a motorman can expect him to manage his own safety. A parade marcher absorbed in his cornet is a different case, and the motorman there had seen the situation and apprehended the danger.13
The words “has reason to realize” let the circumstances establish this element. The plaintiff need not prove what the defendant privately appreciated. It is enough that the circumstances, viewed from where the defendant stood, gave reason to realize the plaintiff was oblivious. A driver who watches a pedestrian walk toward the lane for several seconds without once looking up has reason to realize he is inattentive, whatever the driver later says he was thinking. The wording protects defendants as well, because it turns on what the defendant could perceive. A plaintiff who was in fact oblivious but looked alert gave the defendant nothing to act on. The two paragraphs thus ask different questions. Paragraph (a) demands actual knowledge of the situation, and paragraph (b) accepts either realization or reason to realize once that knowledge exists.
Students most often lose this element by treating (a) as though it carried (b) along with it. A driver who saw the plaintiff has answered only the first condition, and the facts must also show what the plaintiff’s behavior was telling the driver. The signals can change as the encounter develops. A plaintiff who looked alert at a distance and then turns away, or who fails to react to a horn, supplies at that moment the signal that was missing earlier, and the defendant’s reason to realize arises then. The realization must come early enough for the defendant to act on it, which connects this element to the third condition, the then-existing opportunity to avoid the harm, taken up in the next section.