Concept
The Apportionment Rule
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
The Apportionment Rule
Comparative negligence keeps the plaintiff’s carelessness in the case but changes what that carelessness does. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the court stated the new rule in one sentence. In all negligence actions for injury to person or property, the injured person’s contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but the damages awarded are diminished in proportion to the negligence attributable to the person recovering. The court also gave the litigant before it the benefit of that rule.1 The jury’s question therefore shifts. It no longer asks whether the plaintiff was at fault. It asks how much of the fault was the plaintiff’s.
The arithmetic begins with a convention. Courts normally treat the total negligence contributing to the plaintiff’s injury as 100 percent. The jury divides (or compares) that total among the negligent parties, and the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the plaintiff’s own percentage.2
The standard illustration uses round numbers. If the plaintiff’s damages are $100,000 and the jury finds the plaintiff 40 percent negligent, the reduction is $40,000, and the plaintiff recovers $60,000.3 If a jury finds a plaintiff 25 percent at fault on damages of $10,000, the same four steps produce a judgment of $7,500.
The percentages are a jury’s judgment about relative fault, and the conduct being compared can differ greatly in kind. Suppose a landowner negligently fails to trim a tree, and a driver, negligently speeding, does not see a stop sign that the tree obscures. Braking at the last minute, the driver skids and injures the landowner. The two parties’ negligence adds up to 100 percent, and the jury must decide how much of it belongs to each.4 In Hoffman v. Jones, the court expressed the task as a ratio. A plaintiff who is also at fault recovers only that proportion of the entire damages which the defendant’s negligence bears to the combined negligence of both parties. In the court’s illustration, a plaintiff found as negligent as the defendant has the award cut by one-half.5
Fairness is the main reason courts and legislatures made the change. The Hoffman court called the equation of liability with fault the most equitable result a court can reach in tort, and it concluded that comparative negligence achieves that equation more completely than contributory negligence.6 Ordinary intuition points the same way. Most people react to the bar by thinking recovery should not be cut off but should be reduced to account for the victim’s negligence, so that a negligent victim recovers something, though less than a blameless one would.7 Accident prevention does not decide the question. Plaintiffs probably take marginally more care under a bar and defendants marginally more under comparative negligence, and no one can say in general which effect is larger.8
The plaintiff’s negligence is an affirmative defense, so the defendant must plead and prove it.9 Proof has two parts. The defendant must show that the plaintiff breached the duty to use reasonable care for personal protection, and that the breach was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.10 In Shelton v. United States, a physician negligently failed to prescribe antibiotics for a bite wound. The patient ignored discharge instructions and did not return promptly when infection appeared, and the finger was later amputated. The court held the patient’s conduct to be a 50 percent contribution to the injury, and the damages were reduced by 50 percent under the applicable statute.11 The patient’s lapses helped produce the very harm for which recovery was sought, and that link is what allowed the court to assign them a percentage.
Where the link is missing, there is nothing to apportion. A patient who merely follows the physician’s orders has no negligence to compare, because patients are not ordinarily expected to know that a prescribed treatment was performed negligently or that undisclosed risks existed. Contributory negligence is therefore generally unavailable to mitigate the physician’s negligence in that situation, as in cases such as Weil v. Seltzer.12 Carelessness unrelated to the injury is excluded for the same reason. The Hoffman court said there can be no apportionment unless the defendant’s negligence was a legal cause of the harm. It added that a plaintiff is barred only when the plaintiff’s own negligence, alone or together with that of persons other than the defendant, was the sole legal cause.13
The rule now governs almost the whole country. All but four states (Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia have adopted comparative negligence, 36 by statute and 10 by judicial decision.14 Georgia enacted a comparative negligence statute in 1855, Mississippi adopted the pure form in 1910, and Wisconsin legislated in 1931. As recently as 1968, only five states had adopted any form of the doctrine by statute. Then the dam broke, and between 1969 and 1973 nineteen more states did so.15
The movement reached federal admiralty law as well. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., the Supreme Court criticized an older rule because its results had too often been the opposite of the “just and equitable” allocation of damages the Court sought in The Schooner Catharine. The Court reasoned that worldwide experience shows that goal is better realized by a standard that allocates liability by comparative fault.16 An opinion revisiting Maryland’s earlier decision in Harrison, which kept the bar, put the trend in numbers. Thirty-nine states had comparative negligence when Harrison was decided, and forty-six have it now. Not one jurisdiction that adopted it has retreated to contributory negligence.17
The logic of proportional fault reaches past the plaintiff’s own share. Because comparative fault lets a negligent plaintiff recover, most states have been persuaded to change the original joint and several liability rule. About 16 states now make each defendant liable only for that defendant’s proportional share of the fault, and most use hybrids of the two approaches.18
Adoption has not made the rule uniform. Even after several decades, many issues remain unsettled in many states.19 The choice between pure and modified comparative negligence is itself a live question.20 The next sections ask what happens when the plaintiff’s share is large, which is where the two forms part ways.