Concept
Pure Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Pure Comparative Negligence
Under pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff’s own fault reduces the recovery but never bars it. Washington’s statute puts the rule in one sentence: contributory fault chargeable to the claimant “diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages” for the injury attributable to that fault, “but does not bar recovery.”1 Another statute reaches the same result by providing that a plaintiff’s failure to use due care “shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the finder of fact in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured.”2 Two features carry the doctrine. The reduction is proportional, so each percentage point of fault charged to the plaintiff removes one percent of the award. And the plaintiff’s negligence is never a complete bar, so the plaintiff’s share of fault controls the size of the recovery at every point from 1 percent to 99.3
The far end of the scale shows the rule at work. Suppose two ships, the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth, collide. If the Queen Mary was only 1 percent at fault, her owners recover 99 percent of their damages. If she was 99 percent at fault and her owners lost $1,000,000, they still recover $10,000, which is 1 percent of the loss.4 An individual plaintiff fares the same way. Paine, found 65 percent at fault on $60,000 in damages, recovers $21,000 in a pure jurisdiction ($60,000 − (.65 × $60,000)), although he bore most of the fault.5
The pure form produces a zero in only one situation. A plaintiff found 100 percent at fault recovers nothing, and the reason lies in the defendant’s conduct: a finding that the plaintiff supplied all of the fault means the defendant was not negligent at all, so no liable defendant remains to pay anything.6
Everywhere short of that point the plaintiff recovers something, and the amount is exactly what a modified form would award whenever a modified form awards anything.7 The two forms therefore differ only at the high end of plaintiff fault. The modified forms in the next section are the same arithmetic with a cutoff added.
Thirteen states have adopted the pure form, seven by judicial decision and six by statute.8 The California Supreme Court’s decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. is one of the leading judicial adoptions. Li observed that, for all the variants, only two basic forms need be considered. The “pure” form “apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases,” and the alternative is a “50 percent” system. Li chose the pure form, noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had adopted it in Hoffman v. Jones and that most scholars and commentators favor it.9 Courts adopting the pure form have called it “the most equitable method of allocating damages in negligence actions.”10 The Illinois Supreme Court reached the same destination in Alvis v. Ribar. The defendants there urged the modified approach, and the court nonetheless abolished contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence “in its pure form.”11
Li’s objection to the 50-percent alternative is practical. Under that system the case turns on the narrow but crucial question whether the plaintiff’s negligence equaled the defendant’s, and the experience with it was numerous appeals and reversals. The reversals led to “arcane classifications of negligence according to quality and category.”12 The mechanism is easy to trace. Juries assign percentages to conduct that cannot be measured precisely, and a cutoff attached to one number gives every party a reason to fight over that number. A pure rule has no such number, so a one-point error in the jury’s finding changes the award by one percent of the damages. The cliff effect, taken up with the modified forms below, is the sharper version of the same point.
The defendants in Alvis pressed the objection most people feel first: a plaintiff 90 percent at fault, with $100,000 in damages, would recover from a defendant only 10 percent at fault.13 The court answered that a defendant’s liability should not depend on the damages the defendant sustained. It should be determined by the relationship of the defendant’s fault to the ultimate damages. When the defendant counterclaims, each party bears a share of both parties’ losses equal to that party’s share of fault. Suppose the defendant lost $10,000 of his own. The plaintiff then bears 90 percent of the combined $110,000, or $99,000, and the defendant bears 10 percent, or $11,000. The defendant pays the plaintiff a net $1,000. In the court’s words, “[n]either party is unjustly enriched,” and neither escapes liability for his negligent acts or omissions.14
The same court rejected the predictions that the pure form would raise insurance costs and discourage settlement. Studies comparing the two forms found the differences in insurance rates inconsequential. The settlement incentive also cuts both ways, because a defendant who cannot count on a 50-percent cutoff to relieve him of liability may be more willing to settle.15
The objection that survives is moral, and the ocean-liner example states it plainly. The defendant only 1 percent at fault must pay $10,000 to a plaintiff whose skipper caused 99 percent of the collision, and the owners of the Queen Elizabeth may be understandably reluctant to pay a penny.16 Li described the principal argument for the 50-percent alternative in just these terms: it is not morally right to let one more at fault in an accident recover from one less at fault.17 Some courts have accepted that argument, and Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co. is an example of a court that declined to go pure. One judge, writing separately in a pure-form case, pressed a related point. On his view the pure form keeps only “a semblance” of the fault basis, and its real focus is compensation and the distribution of the loss, so it accomplishes essentially no-fault recovery without admitting it.18
The courts that adopted the pure form answered by pointing to what the defendant actually pays. The payment is the share of the loss that the jury attributes to the defendant’s own negligence, so liability stays tied to fault at every level. A cutoff, by contrast, excuses a substantially negligent defendant merely because the percentages fell on one side of a line. As the Alvis court put it, there is no better justification for letting a defendant 49 percent at fault escape liability entirely than for letting a defendant 99 percent at fault escape under the old rule.19 The moral cost of the pure form, weighed against its consistency, is the question each modified form answers differently.
Comparative fault also changed the rules for multiple defendants. Most states treated the fact that a negligent plaintiff can still recover as a reason to depart from joint and several liability, and about 16 have adopted several liability, so that each defendant pays only its proportional share of the fault.20 That subject is taken up under joint and several liability below.21
Because the pure form leaves no line to argue over, a pure jurisdiction applies the arithmetic from the apportionment rule without exception. A plaintiff found 60, 80, or 95 percent at fault is treated like a plaintiff found 10 percent at fault: the court subtracts the plaintiff’s share of fault from the damages and enters judgment for the rest. The contest shifts to what conduct the jury may charge to the plaintiff. A court that overruled its prohibition on seat-belt evidence, for example, held that relevant evidence of seat-belt use or nonuse is admissible to apportion responsibility in civil lawsuits.22