Concept
Modified Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Modified Comparative Negligence
Most states that apportion fault stop short of the pure form. They set a ceiling on the share of blame a plaintiff may carry and still recover. Below the ceiling, the modified form works as the apportionment rule does: the plaintiff’s damages shrink in proportion to the plaintiff’s own negligence. At the ceiling, the claim ends, and a plaintiff found more negligent than the defendant (under some versions, as negligent as the defendant) recovers nothing.1 Thirty-three states follow this approach, 30 by statute and 3 by judicial decision, against thirteen pure-form states.2 Legislatures chose it most often: most states that adopted comparative negligence by statute picked one of the modified forms.3
Below the ceiling the two forms do identical arithmetic. When a plaintiff can recover anything under the modified form, the recovery is exactly what the pure form would have awarded.4 On $100,000 in damages, a plaintiff found 40 percent negligent recovers $60,000 under either form.5 A plaintiff found 60 percent negligent recovers $40,000 in a pure state and nothing in a modified one. The modified form thus adds one step to the apportionment procedure: before subtracting the plaintiff’s percentage, ask whether that percentage bars the claim. If it does, no subtraction is made.
A ceiling answers the objection most often pressed against the pure form, that a grossly negligent but severely injured plaintiff can collect substantial damages from a slightly negligent defendant with minor injuries.6 One sponsor of the New Hampshire statute explained the instinct behind the answer: his “sandlot instinct” rebelled against allowing recovery to a party who is primarily to blame for her own injury.7 The cost of the answer is the line itself, and two questions follow from it: where the line falls, and what it does to cases near it. The first two subsections take up the first question. Statutes that bar a plaintiff whose fault equals the defendant’s put the line at 50 percent, and statutes that bar only a plaintiff whose fault is greater put it at 51. The third subsection takes up the second question under the name of the cliff effect.
Barred at 50 Percent
Statutes of the “not as great as” type let a plaintiff recover only when the plaintiff’s negligence is less than the defendant’s. A typical provision says that a party’s negligence does not bar recovery “if that party’s negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom a claim is made, but the award of damages to that party must be reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to that party.”8 The sentence does two jobs in a fixed order. Its first clause sets a threshold: the plaintiff’s negligence must be less than that of the defendant or defendants, or the claim fails. Its second clause applies the proportional reduction to the plaintiff who clears the threshold. A plaintiff who fails the first clause never reaches the second.
The results follow from those two clauses. A plaintiff who was 45 percent at fault recovers 55 percent of her damages, and one who was 70 percent at fault recovers nothing. When the jury finds the parties equally at fault, as juries often do, the plaintiff also loses, because her fault is as great as the defendant’s and therefore not less than it.9 The same rule can be stated from the plaintiff’s side: recovery is reduced by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and barred if that percentage is 50 percent or more.10 About a dozen jurisdictions follow it, among them Arkansas, Colorado, Nebraska, and Tennessee.11
An Arkansas court describing its own rule observed that a plaintiff who has acted unreasonably is allowed a partial recovery so long as the plaintiff’s negligence is less than the defendant’s.12 The court made the observation while deciding what became of assumption of risk, a doctrine covered in a later section.
One state high court that adopted the form by decision stated the policy behind it. The court rejected “the major premise of pure comparative negligence that a party should recover his damages regardless of his fault, so long as his fault is not 100 percent,” and it would not abandon the concept that a party who substantially contributes to his own damages should not recover any part of them. It also called the old rule that bars a plaintiff at fault in the slightest degree “manifestly unfair,” because that rule rewards the substantially negligent defendant by letting him escape responsibility. The court’s own rule allows recovery “so long as [the plaintiff’s] negligence or fault does not equal or exceed the combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved in the accident.”13
The tie is the finding to watch, because an even split is probably the most common attribution a jury returns.14 A 50/50 apportionment appeals to juries and is therefore common.15 Under this form it falls on the defendant’s side of the line, so a verdict that feels like a compromise to the jury operates as a complete defense. Whether jurors who see this will adjust their percentages is a question for the cliff effect, below.
A fact pattern that gives the plaintiff’s percentage calls for a comparison before any arithmetic. Set the plaintiff’s share against the defendant’s; the plaintiff survives only if it is smaller. The usual slips are to treat a 50/50 finding as survivable and to subtract the plaintiff’s percentage from the damages before asking whether the plaintiff clears the threshold at all.
Barred at 51 Percent
The “not greater than” form moves the line by one word. New Jersey’s statute is typical: contributory negligence “shall not bar recovery” if the plaintiff’s negligence “was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought,” and any damages “shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering.”17
The structure matches the not-as-great-as statute of the previous subsection: a threshold, then the proportional reduction. The difference lies at the threshold. There a tie defeats the plaintiff; here a plaintiff whose negligence merely equals the defendant’s is not barred, because equal negligence is not greater negligence.18 Suppose Paine sues Burke for $60,000 and the jury finds each of them 50 percent negligent. In a not-as-great-as jurisdiction Paine recovers nothing, because his negligence is as great as Burke’s. In a not-greater-than jurisdiction he recovers $30,000: he is not barred, and his damages are reduced by his 50 percent share.19 At every other finding the two forms agree. A plaintiff at 45 percent recovers 55 percent of the damages under either, and a plaintiff at 70 percent recovers nothing under either.20
A single word matters because the tie is common. Since juries frequently find the parties equally at fault, the choice of wording changes the result in quite a few cases.21 In a not-greater-than state a 50/50 finding produces a judgment for half the damages; in a not-as-great-as state the same finding produces a complete defense.22 The headings in this unit borrow shorthand from the first finding at which each form ends the claim: the first bars a plaintiff at 50 percent or more,23 and the second bars only a plaintiff above 50 percent. About twenty jurisdictions, among them Connecticut, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin, use the second form.24
Because the tie is the only point of difference, a statute is best read for how it treats the tie. Three common phrasings sort as follows:
- A statute that allows recovery only if the plaintiff’s negligence is “less than” the defendant’s, or “not as great as” it, bars a plaintiff found equally at fault.25
- A statute that allows recovery if the plaintiff’s negligence was “not greater than” the defendant’s lets a plaintiff found equally at fault recover half the damages. New Jersey and Wisconsin, among others, use this wording.26
- A statute that states the line as a percentage of total fault produces the same tie result as the not-greater-than wording when it bars only a share “greater than” 50 percent. Texas bars a claimant whose percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent, and another statute directs a verdict for the defendants when the claimant’s fault is greater than fifty percent of the total fault involved in the incident.27
South Dakota is the only remaining jurisdiction that draws the line differently. It apportions damages only when the plaintiff’s negligence “was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant” and bars the plaintiff otherwise, and its courts treat “slight” as a relative and variable term that defies precise definition.28
The wording also settles whom the plaintiff is compared with. The New Jersey provision above measures the plaintiff against the combined negligence of all the defendants. Wisconsin’s statute measures the plaintiff’s negligence separately against each person found causally negligent.29 Some statutes then divide the award among several defendants in proportion to each one’s causal negligence,30 and most states that adopted comparative fault have departed from the original rule of joint and several liability, in whole or in part.31 Those consequences belong to the multiple-defendant sections below, and the examples in this unit assume a single defendant.
Above the line, the result is the same however far above it the plaintiff falls. In JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza the jury assigned the decedent sixty percent of the responsibility for his death. Texas bars a claimant whose responsibility is greater than 50 percent, so his contributory negligence barred recovery.32 A finding of 51 percent is as fatal as 60, and neither triggers a reduction, because the reduction is computed only after the plaintiff clears the threshold. One statute writes that sequence into the jury’s task. If the claimant’s fault is greater than fifty percent of the total, the jury returns a verdict for the defendants and deliberates no further; only if it is not greater does the jury fix the damages the claimant would recover if contributory fault were disregarded.33 An exam stem that reports a 50/50 finding without naming the state’s wording therefore deserves both answers: half the damages under “not greater than,” and nothing under “not as great as.”
The Cliff Effect
Every modified form attaches a threshold to the arithmetic of the apportionment rule, and a threshold treats plaintiffs very differently even when their fault differs by one percentage point. That is the cliff effect. In the pure form, each point charged to the plaintiff takes one percent off the award. In a modified form, the point that carries the plaintiff over the line takes off the whole award.
The California Supreme Court counted the cliff among its reasons for choosing the pure form in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. The court adopted the criticism, drawn from an amicus brief, that a partial rule “distorts the very principle it recognizes, i.e., that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result,” and so “simply lowers, but does not eliminate, the bar of contributory negligence.”35 A “50 percent” system, the court added, “simply shifts the lottery aspect” of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground. Under it, quoting Dean Prosser, a plaintiff charged with 49 percent of the negligence recovers 51 percent of his damages, while one charged with 50 percent recovers nothing at all.36
The standard illustration involves two injured drivers. Hobbes is 51 percent at fault and suffers $100,000 in damages. Mill is 49 percent at fault, also suffers $100,000, and counterclaims. In a modified jurisdiction Hobbes recovers nothing; he absorbs his own loss and pays Mill $51,000 besides, since Mill’s 49 percent fault only reduces Mill’s damages.37 In a pure jurisdiction the same findings yield two reduced judgments, $49,000 for Hobbes and $51,000 for Mill.38
The two results allocate the $200,000 loss very differently. Under the pure form, Hobbes ends up bearing $102,000 and Mill $98,000, which tracks the 51 and 49 percent findings almost exactly. Under the modified form, Hobbes bears $151,000 and Mill $49,000, so the driver who was two points more at fault carries about three-quarters of the combined loss. A two-point difference in negligence hardly justifies that disparity.39 The Li footnotes call the like position under the all-or-nothing contributory negligence rule a “double penalty”: the party forfeits recovery for his own injuries and, in addition, pays in uncompensated damages for part of the other party’s.40 Hobbes’s position has the same shape.
The cliff would matter less if a jury’s percentages measured something exact, and they do not. Prosser doubted that a jury trial would ever produce a finding as fine as defendant 49.9 percent at fault and plaintiff 50.1 percent.41 A figure that cannot be pinned down to within a few points becomes decisive when the line sits inside the margin of error. In a pure jurisdiction, a three-point error in the jury’s estimate changes the award by three percent of the damages. In a modified jurisdiction, the same error, if it carries the finding across the line, changes the award from about half the damages to nothing.
That consequence gives jurors who understand it a reason to adjust their findings. The most common jury attribution is an even split, and a jury that knows a finding on the wrong side of the line costs the plaintiff everything can take care not to attribute too much negligence to the plaintiff.42 In one study of jury findings, plaintiffs were found less than fifty percent negligent in 67.5 percent of the cases in modified states and 62.1 percent in pure states. The gap is not large, but it probably reflects the jury’s awareness of the consequences of its finding.43 A single study is a thin base, and its figures show the direction of the effect and not its size.
Whether to tell the jury is itself contested. Plaintiffs seek the instruction, since it alerts jurors that a plaintiff found as much at fault as the defendant, or more, will lose entirely. In a close case the likely effect is a finding of 49 percent where the jury might otherwise have returned 50, 55, or 60. Statutes that require the instruction accept that juries often shape their findings to divide the damages in close cases, and they find nothing particularly shocking in that.44 Hawaii’s high court took up the question in Kaeo v. Davis.
The pattern of adoption runs the same way. Of the states that moved to comparative negligence by judicial decision, 7 chose the pure form and 3 a modified form; of those that moved by statute, 6 chose pure and 30 modified.45 The courts that chose the pure form located the defect in the threshold itself, wherever it sits. Moving the line from zero percent to 50 percent leaves a line: a plaintiff just over it recovers nothing, as a plaintiff wholly at fault does, while one just under it recovers a little more than half.46 A torts treatise, quoted in a judicial opinion, makes the same point. Modified systems “reintroduce in large measure the very same all-or-nothing feature of contributory negligence that the remedy of comparative negligence is designed to overcome,” by establishing a new set point at which recovery for a contributorily negligent plaintiff is barred.47
The threshold has defenders, and their case rests on individual responsibility. One account credits the rule with knocking out of the system the cases in which the plaintiff bears the huge percentage of the responsibility, and it names the price in the same passage: a huge discontinuity in closely decided cases, where the plaintiff who is 49 percent negligent recovers 51 percent of the injury and the one who is 51 percent negligent recovers nothing.48 A judge who disagreed with a majority adopting the pure form noted that most states adopting comparative negligence had preferred to deny recovery to a plaintiff whose own negligence was the principal cause of his injuries.49 Commentators also offer a less principled explanation for the popularity of the modified forms: they are in part a political compromise between contributory and comparative negligence.50
The two positions disagree about what a fault-based system owes a plaintiff who carries a large share of the blame. One says the system owes proportionality at every point. The other says a party who is primarily responsible for the harm forfeits the claim. The cliff is the price of the second position, and every threshold pays it, including the old contributory negligence bar, whose line sat at zero. Only the pure form avoids a cliff short of 100 percent plaintiff fault, where the defendant was not negligent at all and so is not liable.51 On an exam, percentages near the line call for identifying the state’s form and its exact wording before any arithmetic. A 50/50 finding turns on whether the statute bars at 50 percent or at 51, while findings of 49 and 51 percent for the plaintiff produce the same results under both modified forms. In a pure state, none of the three bars the plaintiff.