Concept
Calculating the Judgment
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Calculating the Judgment
Under the contributory negligence bar, the judge had nothing to calculate. The plaintiff collected the full damages or collected nothing, and the bar decided which before anyone divided fault. Even when the defendant’s negligence consisted of violating a statute, the Restatement (Second) of Torts left the bar in place unless the effect of the statute was to place the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.1
Comparative negligence gives the judge arithmetic to do. The jury returns two kinds of numbers: the plaintiff’s damages, fixed without regard to the plaintiff’s own negligence, and percentages of fault that together make 100 percent. The court combines them, and in a modified jurisdiction it first tests the plaintiff’s percentage against the threshold, because a plaintiff who fails the test has no award to reduce. Two questions govern the combining. Against what base is the plaintiff’s percentage measured? And what happens when both parties are hurt and both were negligent? The next two subsections answer them in that order.
Reducing the Award
A comparative negligence statute orders the reduction, and its wording shows what the court must supply. Washington’s statute provides that any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant “diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages” for the injury attributable to that fault, “but does not bar recovery.”2 Proportionately to what? The jury’s findings answer the question. The jury treats the total negligence contributing to the harm as 100 percent and divides it among the parties, and the plaintiff’s recovery shrinks by the plaintiff’s own percentage.3 A plaintiff with $100,000 in damages who is found 40 percent negligent therefore recovers $60,000.
The same figure emerges from the other side: multiply the plaintiff’s actual damages by the defendant’s percentage of fault. On $100,000 in damages and a defendant found 90 percent at fault, the plaintiff recovers $90,000.4 The two methods agree whenever the plaintiff and one defendant divide the fault, because their shares add to 100. The percentages themselves are the trier’s judgment, just as the finding of negligence is.
Courts run the same arithmetic after the verdict. In Neely v. Club Med Management Services, Inc., the jury found the plaintiff sixty percent comparatively negligent on her Jones Act claim, and the district court molded the verdict, adjusting the judgment to reflect that finding. The parties agreed that on that claim she could recover at most 40 percent of her total damages, or $218,000.5 A plaintiff sixty percent at fault still recovers there because the traditional maritime rule is pure comparative negligence.6
Consider Pascal’s claim first; Hume’s counterclaim waits for the next subsection. Suppose the trial judge instructs the jury to reduce the damages “in the proportion that the plaintiff’s negligence bears to the defendant’s.”7 Read literally, the instruction relates Pascal’s 20 to Hume’s 80, a ratio of one quarter, and cuts the $60,000 award by 25 percent to $45,000. The correct reduction is Pascal’s own 20 percent of the total, which leaves $48,000.8 The faulty wording costs Pascal $3,000.
The instruction fails because the jury has already stated each party’s negligence as a share of one whole. Dividing 20 by 80 compares one slice with another slice and yields a percentage the jury never found. Followed to its end, the ratio would erase the award of a plaintiff found equally at fault, since 50 to 50 is a ratio of one, although a plaintiff 50 percent at fault under the pure form still recovers half.9 On an exam, a plaintiff at 30 percent and a defendant at 70 percent means that 30 percent comes off the damages. Never divide 30 by 70.
A sound instruction measures the plaintiff’s negligence against the total, so that the ladder reduction is 20 out of 100. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, the jury was told that the combined fault of plaintiff and defendant “must total one hundred percent,” and that the judge would then reduce the recovery “by an amount equal to the percentage of fault attributable to the decedent.”10 A special verdict can keep the jury out of the arithmetic altogether. The form described in Daly v. General Motors Corp. asks the jury for the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and for the plaintiff’s damages “without reference to” the plaintiff’s own negligence, and the court then reduces the award by that percentage.11 Statutes control who does the computing, and they vary, but where the question is open, a special verdict that asks only for the fault percentages and the total damages, and leaves the computation to the court, reduces confusion and error.12
The subtraction applies only to a plaintiff who clears the threshold. A plaintiff who is primarily at fault shows the difference between the forms most sharply: under the pure form that plaintiff recovers with a reduction for the plaintiff’s percentage of negligence, and under the modified form that plaintiff loses entirely.13 The loss reaches every item of the claim. When comparative negligence rules bar the claim, the entire claim is barred, including any claim for punitive damages.14 A plaintiff who clears the threshold and recovers compensatory damages stands differently. Punitive damages against a defendant guilty of outrageous misconduct remain appropriate, and it would seem that the punitive award, which exists to deter the defendant, should not be reduced by comparative negligence rules, since a reduction would weaken the deterrence and complicate the search for an appropriate punitive level.15
A doctrine inherited from the contributory negligence era can also scramble the judgment. Suppose last clear chance were abolished wherever comparative negligence applies but kept for a plaintiff found more negligent than the defendant. A plaintiff injured by a defendant who failed to take the last clear chance would then do better to prove greater negligence than the defendant, because last clear chance would erase that plaintiff’s contributory negligence and bring a full recovery, while a plaintiff proved less negligent would collect only part of the damages.16 Under a modified regime, last clear chance should therefore be abolished entirely or not at all, a point the later section on that doctrine develops.
Counterclaims and Setoffs
When both drivers in a collision are hurt and both were careless, the pure form of comparative negligence produces two successful claims instead of one. One court that faced the situation observed that where the plaintiff’s negligence is at issue along with the defendant’s, a counterclaim will usually follow, and the cross-plaintiff, though negligent to some degree, is entitled to damages proportionate to the negligence of both parties. The result can be two verdicts.18 A counterclaim is a claim the defendant brings back against the plaintiff in the same lawsuit, and each such claim is treated as a separate lawsuit.19 Each party is therefore the claimant on his own claim, which is why it does not matter who sued first.
In the ladder case, the verdict that fixed Pascal’s recovery also fixes Hume’s. The jury assigns the same percentages to both claims, 20 percent to Pascal and 80 percent to Hume, and only the damages differ.20 Each party recovers his own loss reduced by his own share of the fault. Pascal’s $60,000 is reduced by his 20 percent, so he recovers $48,000, and Hume’s $200,000 is reduced by his 80 percent, so he recovers $40,000.21
A state that retains the contributory negligence bar resolves the same collision differently. Under the bar, a plaintiff whose own fault contributed to the accident could not recover, even if the defendant was more at fault,22 so when both parties were at fault, typically neither could recover. Comparative negligence changed that by making it possible for each party to recover from the other.23 The pure form lets both claims succeed whenever each party’s fault falls short of 100 percent, and that double success is the source of the setoff question below.
A modified jurisdiction tests each claim against its threshold separately, so a party can lose his own claim and still owe on the other party’s. Suppose Hobbes is 51 percent at fault and suffers $100,000 in damages, and Mill, 49 percent at fault, suffers $100,000 and counterclaims. Hobbes recovers nothing; he absorbs his own loss and pays Mill $51,000 as well, because Mill is only 49 percent at fault and recovers his damages reduced by 49 percent.24 A two-percent difference in fault produces the entire gap, the cliff effect examined earlier.
Two verdicts need not mean two payments. When a jury returns a verdict for each party, the court should enter one judgment for the party with the larger verdict in the amount of the difference. That practice follows the long-recognized principle of set off in contract litigation, and it serves the court’s primary responsibility, which is to enter a judgment that reflects the jury’s true intent.25 A setoff nets mutual debts: each party owes the other, the smaller debt is subtracted from the larger, and only the balance is paid. On the ladder verdicts, Hume’s $40,000 comes off Pascal’s $48,000, and Hume pays Pascal the remaining $8,000. Netting also produces an occasional result that looks backward at first glance, in which the party who was more at fault ends up holding the judgment.
The court that approved netting acknowledged that in rare cases the party more responsible will recover more than the party less responsible, and it answered with an extreme example: a plaintiff 80 percent responsible who suffers $20,000 in damages, against a defendant 20 percent responsible who, fortunately, suffers none. A defendant’s liability, the court reasoned, depends on the damages he caused and not on the damages he happened to suffer, so that defendant pays 20 percent of the total.26 The same logic explains the driver hypothetical, since each claim measures the harm produced by the other party’s share of fault.
Netting assumes that the parties pay their own judgments, and liability insurance upsets that assumption. In Jess v. Herrmann, Justice Tobriner held that the statutory setoff applied only when the parties were not covered by insurance. A mandatory setoff, he reasoned, would produce “the anomalous situation in which a liability insurer’s responsibility under its policy depends as much on the extent of injury suffered by its own insured as on the amount of damages sustained by the person its insured has negligently injured.”27 The ladder verdicts show the anomaly. If Pascal and Hume are both insured and no setoff applies, Hume’s insurer pays Pascal $48,000 and Pascal’s insurer pays Hume $40,000. A setoff would have Hume’s insurer pay only $8,000 and Pascal’s insurer pay nothing, so Hume’s insurer would owe Pascal less precisely because Hume, its own insured, was badly hurt. The better rule is that the respective damages are not offset unless the parties are self-insured and fully collectible; see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 9.28 Where each party pays from its own funds, netting merely spares the same two parties an exchange of payments.
A stem with two injured and negligent parties calls for two computations before any netting. Reduce each party’s damages by that party’s own percentage of fault, test each claim against the threshold if the state follows a modified form, and only then subtract one result from the other, and only if each party stands behind its own judgment. The usual slip is to net the raw damages first, which on the ladder facts would subtract $60,000 from $200,000 before any percentage is applied. A second slip is to treat the more careless party’s claim as lost in a pure jurisdiction, where nothing short of a finding that the plaintiff caused the entire harm bars it.