Concept
Recklessness and Plaintiff Fault
Plaintiff's fault outside ordinary negligence: strict liability and avoidable consequences
Recklessness and Plaintiff Fault
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 503 sets out what a plaintiff's own fault does to a claim once recklessness enters the case. Subsection (1) favors the plaintiff: contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety.1 Subsections (2) and (3) turn to the plaintiff's conduct. A plaintiff who recklessly disregards personal safety is treated like one who was merely contributorily negligent, except against a defendant who was reckless too.2 Subsection (4) adds a consent-based bar for a plaintiff who assumes the risk of a reckless defendant's conduct.3
Negligence and recklessness are different mental states, not different amounts of the same one, and that difference explains the section. Negligence is inattention or inadvertence: the actor fails to notice a danger that a reasonable person would have seen. Recklessness is conscious disregard: the actor realizes the danger and proceeds anyway.4 Contributory negligence is the plaintiff's version of the first lapse, a failure to use reasonable care for personal safety.5 Because the two lapses are alike, a factfinder can set the plaintiff's slip against the defendant's. A defendant who saw the danger and ran it is not comparable to a plaintiff who failed to see it, so the defense loses its footing. The same difference raises a mirror-image question when the plaintiff is the one who courts danger knowingly.
The analysis therefore begins by classifying the defendant's conduct as negligent or reckless, and then classifying the plaintiff's conduct the same way. That pairing selects the rule. The first subsection below takes the reckless defendant. The second takes the reckless plaintiff, including the case in which both were reckless.
Reckless Defendants
The Second Restatement states the exception in a single sentence: a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety.6 At common law, contributory negligence was a full defense, and a plaintiff who failed to use reasonable care for personal safety recovered nothing, even from a negligent defendant.7 Section 503(1) leaves that lapse without effect when the defendant acted recklessly, and almost every jurisdiction has extended the same exception to wanton and willful misconduct.8 Because the defendant's state of mind triggers the exception, applying it starts with a definition of recklessness.
A defendant acts recklessly by realizing a danger to others and disregarding it, so the risk is seen and run instead of overlooked. The court in Kasanovich v. George drew the contrast this way: "Negligence consists of inattention or inadvertence, whereas wantonness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong."9 Adkisson v. City of Seattle put it more briefly: wanton misconduct is not negligence, because it involves intent rather than inadvertence and is positive rather than negative.10 The labels overlap. Willful misconduct is more than negligent but less than intentional, and it involves an intent to act, or to fail to act, with knowledge or appreciation that harm to another may result. Wanton misconduct is sometimes called an aggravated form of negligence, but it is more accurately a form of reckless conduct.11 A fact pattern that says willful and wanton therefore invokes the same exception as one that says reckless.
An ordinary lapse cannot answer recklessness because of what the contributory negligence defense assumes. The defense works when both parties failed in the same way: the plaintiff's inattention competes as a cause, and the court declines to shift the loss. A reckless defendant did not fail in that way. The defendant saw the danger and chose to run it, while the plaintiff overlooked it. Courts treat those two mental states as different in kind, and the defendant's conduct is so much more culpable that the plaintiff's inadvertence cannot be set against it.12 The basis is culpability, not causation, which is why the exception stands apart from last clear chance, where the question is who had the final opportunity to avoid the accident.13 Deterrence supplies the practical justification. If a plaintiff's inattention could erase the claim, a defendant who knowingly ran a serious risk would escape whenever the victim was less than fully alert.14
Section 503(1) is triggered by reckless disregard, so a merely negligent defendant leaves the defense intact. The exception has a counterpart at the far end of the culpability scale. Contributory negligence is no defense to an intentional tort, and a plaintiff who is battered cannot be charged with negligently failing to duck.15 Courts reach recklessness by the same reasoning: it is said to differ from negligence in kind, not only in degree, so the defense does not apply.16 One limit runs the other way. A plaintiff whose own conduct was in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's own safety is barred against a reckless defendant, as the next subsection explains.17
All of this describes the common-law rule, which grew up when contributory negligence defeated a claim completely. Most jurisdictions have since changed the doctrine's effect from barring the claim to reducing damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.18 In the pure form, the plaintiff's recovery falls by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff.19 Once the complete bar goes, the old exception loses part of its work, and the question becomes whether a jury may compare a negligent plaintiff's fault with a reckless defendant's at all. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. noted, quoting Dean Prosser, that the rule denying the defense against willful misconduct is in reality a rule of comparative fault in which the court refuses "to set up the lesser fault against the greater."20 The Li court then described as persuasive the argument that comparing would cost little deterrence, and that a comprehensive comparative system should apportion damages in every case of misconduct short of intentional.21 The traditional answer, that the two kinds of conduct differ in kind and cannot be weighed on one scale, remains available to courts that prefer it.
Courts have divided on the choice. Berberich v. Jack allowed a negligent plaintiff's fault to be compared with a reckless defendant's, while the Illinois court in Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc. held that the qualitative difference between negligence and willful or wanton conduct means the two cannot be compared, so comparative negligence is no defense to such conduct.22 Many jurisdictions now apply comparative fault to some or all cases of willful and wanton conduct, and the Third Restatement's apportionment provisions take that position.23 Statutory wording adds further variation, because some courts have read their comparative negligence statutes as reaching only negligence suits and so leave the greater-degree-of-blame exception untouched.24 A complete answer in a comparative-fault jurisdiction names the approach that jurisdiction follows. It does not assume that recklessness automatically cancels the plaintiff's fault or automatically counts against it.
Reckless Plaintiffs
Section 503(2) answers the first question about a plaintiff's own recklessness by borrowing an existing rule. Except as subsection (3) provides, the rules that determine the effect of the plaintiff's reckless disregard of personal safety are the same as those that determine the effect of contributory negligence.26 Contributory negligence is a failure to exercise reasonable care to protect oneself or one's property from harm or loss.27 A plaintiff who sees the danger and proceeds anyway has failed in the same direction, and the law gives that failure the same effect. Where contributory negligence still bars recovery completely, a reckless plaintiff suing a merely negligent defendant recovers nothing. Where comparative fault has replaced the bar, the plaintiff's damages shrink by the percentage of fault the jury attributes to the plaintiff.28 The borrowing is sensible, because a rule that already lets an ordinary lapse defeat or reduce a claim has no reason to treat a graver one more gently.
The exception is § 503(3), which applies when both sides were reckless. A plaintiff whose conduct is in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's own safety is barred from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm.29 The provision limits § 503(1), which spares a contributorily negligent plaintiff when the defendant was reckless.30 Subsection (1) rests on the premise that a defendant's conscious disregard of a known risk is far more blameworthy than a plaintiff's inattention. That premise fails when the plaintiff's own conduct was just as conscious. Where each side saw the danger and chose to run it, neither stands on a more favored footing, so the law leaves the loss where it fell. Some courts call this a same-degree-of-blame defense.31 The text also requires that the defendant's recklessness be a legal cause of the harm, so subsection (3) does not reach a defendant whose reckless conduct played no part in the injury.
Students usually err by matching a rule to the wrong party's state of mind. The four combinations of negligent or reckless plaintiff against negligent or reckless defendant each have their own answer:
- A negligent plaintiff against a negligent defendant is ordinary contributory negligence, so the plaintiff is barred where the complete bar survives and has recovery reduced where comparative fault applies.32
- A negligent plaintiff against a reckless defendant falls under § 503(1), so the plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery.33
- A reckless plaintiff against a negligent defendant falls under § 503(2), so the plaintiff's recklessness has the same effect as contributory negligence, a bar in one system and a reduction in the other.34
- A reckless plaintiff against a reckless defendant falls under § 503(3), so the plaintiff is barred at common law because the two culpabilities match.35
Comparative fault puts the most pressure on the two rows that involve a reckless defendant. Li found persuasive the argument that a comprehensive comparative system should apportion damages in every case of misconduct short of intentional.36 Many jurisdictions now apply comparative fault to some or all cases of willful and wanton conduct, which is also the position of the Third Restatement's apportionment provisions.37 The traditional bars survive where a court reads its comparative-fault statute as reaching only negligence suits and leaves the same-degree-of-blame defense in place.38 An answer in a comparative-fault jurisdiction therefore reduces a reckless plaintiff's damages against a negligent defendant, and it identifies whether the jurisdiction apportions or bars when both sides were reckless.
Section 503(4) adds a separate bar that rests on consent instead of culpability: a plaintiff who assumes the risk arising from the defendant's reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is barred from recovery for such harm.39 A plaintiff who understands the danger a reckless defendant has created and voluntarily accepts it has chosen to bear the risk. As in the earlier treatment of knowing assumption of risk, the plaintiff must actually understand the specific danger and freely choose to encounter it. Because the ground is consent, the plaintiff need not have matched the defendant's recklessness, and § 503(1), which removes only the contributory negligence defense, does not touch it.
Comparative fault narrows the reach of § 503(4). Many jurisdictions now let comparative fault define the role of assumption of risk,40 and Li treated the form of assumption of risk that is no more than a variant of contributory negligence as merged into the assessment of liability in proportion to fault.41 In those cases a plaintiff's acceptance of the risk reduces recovery instead of defeating it. The outright bar is most likely to survive where a jurisdiction rejects comparative fault and keeps the traditional defenses.42